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THE MILITARY-BUREAUCRACY RELATIONSHIP IN NIGERIA: A
STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION
Robert Aziakpono Dibie, PhT>.
Western Michigan University, 1997
The Federal Government of Nigeria’s Structural Adjustment/Make-or-Buy
policy was introduced in July 1986 to accelerate the development of Nigerian
industrial capacity by contracting government R & D out to the private sector.
This study expands the empirical and theoretical analyses of development policy
and its implementation that have traditionally relied on motives of "rationality"
(costs/benefits) to explain bureaucratic behavior. It examines and juxtaposes the
military-dominated policy making apparatus with the traditional bureaucracy,
which has the responsibility for the execution of public policy. It also attempts
to make some contribution to Nigerian and comparative literature in the field of
industrial development policy.
A hybrid version of a political system decision making model was used to
evaluate the relationship between initial public policy formulation at the highest
level of the army dominated government of Nigeria, and the subsequent
interpretation and implementation of the Structural Adjustment/Make-or-Buy
policy by the Nigerian civil bureaucracy. This study is unique and distinguishes
itself by testing the political system model in a unitary and developing nation
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where actors operate in a highly centralized manner. This helps identify the
differences between and reveals the difficulties in applying the political system
model to Nigeria rather than the United States. The central research question
is: What is the relationship between the Nigerian military junta and the country’s
bureaucracy in the decision making and implementation processes and how has
that relationship been shaped by the colonial legacy? It is shown that responses
within as well as between federal ministries and agencies depend on their
perception of specific departmental and agency goals, more so than the broader
objectives of the structural adjustment policy.
The study is based on field surveys in Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria. These
involved interviews of selected federal ministers, senior bureaucrats and Managing
Directors of major research and development corporations. Analyses of financial
data of federal ministries, agencies and the Central Bank of Nigeria are also
utilized to relate the ministries and agency responses to the goals of the policy.
The results of this study suggest that bureaucratic support has been central
to the minimal success of the Structural Adjustment/Make-or-Buy policy even in
so centralized a political administrative system as prevails in Nigeria.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the mid-1980’s, Nigeria, a developing nation in Africa, with just over two
decades of experience with independence, faced a severe economic and debt
crisis. This problem was due to an oil glut on the world market and declining oil
revenue. Petroleum had been the major source of revenue for this fledgling
nation since its independence. Under pressure from and using the suggestions of
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the military
government adopted a series of Structural Adjustment programs, which included
the devaluation of its currency, the reduction of its government size, the
encouragement of export of agricultural and other non-oil products, and the
privatization of some of its government enterprises. Among these policies was
one directed specifically toward the development of indigenous technology in the
private sector with contracts and financial resources provided by the various
ministries of the national government. It is this policy that the military govern
ment called the Structural Adjustment/Make-or-Buy policy. The SAP/Make-orBuy policy is the subject of this dissertation. With the use of a political system
decision making model, the making and the implementation of this policy will be
examined.

1
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No policy is created in a vacuum. To adequately examine the relationship
between the military which decreed the policy and the bureaucracy which
responded to it, depending upon the ministry, with support or resistance, it is
important to provide a history of Nigeria and of the important actors involved in
the policy formulation and implementation processes.

The overview below

introduces the detailed discussion in Chapters IV through VII. Chapters II and
HI are the review of literature and research design for the case study. The case
study of SAP/Make-or-Buy is examined in detail in Chapter VHI. What is an
appropriate technology for Nigeria is addressed in Chapter IX, along with other
conclusions from the research.
The Geographic and Demographic Setting
Nigeria was a British territory from 1861 until October 1, 1960 when it
achieved independence as a sovereign nation. The Federal Republic of Nigeria
was proclaimed in 1963. Nigeria is located on the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa.
Its area of 356,669 square miles is entirely within the tropical zone between
latitudes 4 and 14 degrees North and latitudes 2 and 14 degrees East. The
country is big, diverse, and oil-rich. It is as large as California, Arizona, and New
Mexico combined. Appendix 1 shows a map of Nigeria. The River Niger, which
is about 730 miles long (inside Nigeria) and from which the country derives its
name, is the third longest river in Africa. The River Niger and its main tributary,
the River Benue, divide the country into three major geographical sections: West,
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East and North. Nigeria is a tropical country. The climatic conditions along the
coastal areas in the south are more stable than in the rest of the country. There
are two main seasons in the year, the dry season and the wet season. In the
southern half of the country, the rainy season lasts for about six months - from
May to October - while the northern half of the country has a shorter rain season.
The dry season, which is of longer duration in the north, brings with it the dry,
north-easterly cold wind - the harmattan. For the whole country, the hottest
months of the year are March and April, while the wettest months are May, June
and October.
Nigeria is the most populous and potentially one of the richest countries
of black Africa. The country has one of the world’s most ethnically diverse
societies, with over 250 identifiable ethnic groups. There are three very large
ethno-linguistic groups - the Hausa-Fulani in the north, the Yoruba in the west
and the Ibo in the east. The Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Ibo, Kanuri, Tiv, Edo, Isoko,
Nupe, Ibibio and Ijaw groups together account for almost 80 percent of the
population. The overwhelming majority of the northern population is Muslim,
and Muslims are widely thought to comprise more than 50 percent of the total
population. Christianity is strong in the south, accounting for perhaps 35 percent
of the country’s total population, while the balance of the population remains
animist. Latest estimates put the population at about 115 million people (Walden
Report 1995; fiionvbere 1994).
Most Nigerians are to be found in the rural areas. Some 70 percent live
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in the rural countryside, and about the same proportion of the labor force is
engaged in agriculture and agriculture-related activities. There are, however, a
number of veiy large cities, such as Lagos (estimated at 4 million in 1990), Ibadan
(4.7 million), Kano (2.6 million), besides a number of other secondary cities that
now serve as state capitals in most of the 30 states. The national capital was
recently moved from Lagos, on the coast, to Abuja, a more central, hinterland
location, owing to considerations of space, centrality, and strategy, among others.
Political History
The post-independence history of the country has not been peaceful. The
politics of Nigeria have been dominated by ethnic and regional antagonisms, with
serious ramifications at all levels, from the civil war of the late 1960s to the
politicization of normally technical activities. Upon independence, Nigeria had
a federal constitution, with three semi-autonomous regions - Northern, Western
and Eastern, dominated respectively by the Hausa, the Yoruba and the Ibo. The
three regions and federation as a whole each had a parliamentary political system.
This civilian government was deposed in a military coup in January 1966.
Violence and ethnic tension between the Hausa and Ibos led to the Biafra
secession and civil war (1967-1970). In October 1979 the military stepped down
and ushered in a new civilian government, with Alhaji Shehu Shagari as the
president.

The Second Republic, operated under a new constitution which

included a presidential system of government. New elections were held in
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August-September 1983, and a political elite which had been accused of
widespread corruption won major offices. The 1983 elections met with numerous
accusations of vote rigging and violence. This weakened the legitimacy of the
government. The cited corruption of the political elite combined with the severe
slump in the economy set the climate for another military coup.
On the last day of 1983, a bloodless military coup led by a group of senior
military officers overthrew Alhaji Shagari, on the grounds that his administration
was inept and corrupt. This was shown by public unrest, diminished oil income,
and a declining economy. As chairman of the new Supreme Military Council,
Major-General Muhammadu Buhari suspended portions of the constitution,
banned political parties, and launched a campaign against corruption and the lack
of discipline.

Plagued by worsening economic conditions and resistance to

political repression, Buhari was in turn ousted in mid-1985 by General Babangida,
who became the head of the governing military junta. In 1987, the Babangida
regime set in motion a five year schedule that was directed toward another
civilian government. The agenda called for constitutional revision, terminating the
ban on political parties (only two parties were sanctioned), elections to unicameral
state legislatures in 1990, and federal presidential and legislative elections in 1992.
The elections were held, but on June 12,1993 General Babangida announced that
the presidential election results, which were not yet published, had been annulled.
This move was condemned at home and abroad.

Social Democratic Party

candidate Chief Moshood Abiola who, according to unofficial results had easily
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defeated Alhaji Bashir Tofa of the National Republican Convention, declared
himself president-elect but to no effect. The annulment precipitated serious
political unrest, and the civil disobedience brought the Nigerian economy to a halt
for weeks. On August 26, 1993, following the abortive presidential elections,
General Babangida stepped down as president, and handed power to an Interim
National Government, a non-elected administration whose members were
handpicked by himself. Chief Ernest Shonekan was named as its head. The term
of office of the new administration was set to end for March 31, 1994, during
which time it would organize fresh presidential elections. On November 17,1993,
Chief Shonekan was ousted in a bloodless coup by Defense Minister General
Sanni Abacha. The next day Abacha banned all political activity, scrapped the
two political parties, dissolved parliament and dismissed the 30 States Governors.
He signed a decree on November 21, 1993 establishing a Provisional Ruling
Council and ordered the restoration of the 1979 Constitution.
Public Administration
The starting point of indigenous public administration in Nigeria is the
"indirect rule" in which officers of the colonial administration ruled through
intermediaries of Nigerian tribal leaders. While there was no doubt during the
colonial period of Nigeria’s history about the ultimate authority of the colonial
officers, what "indirect rule" meant was that traditional structures were left intact
and tribal leaders played administrative roles in the colonial government at the
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local level. Indirect rule was styled as a colonial regime division of labor. On the
one hand, the colonial rulers were supposed to attend to foreign affairs, the
development of national institutions - such as the legislative councils and civil
service - and the management of the macro-economy. On the other hand, it fell
to the emirs, obas, and chiefs (where these existed) to carry out judicial and
policing tasks, raise local revenues, administer the social units under domain and
in general carry on the development process determined by the higher authorities.
In this way, the traditional society was supposed to advance gradually and
effortlessly towards modernization, development and ultimately independence and
self-rule. The pattern of "Anglc-African" administration and partnership varied
in different parts of the country. The pattern in the northern parts of the country
was regarded as a fairly successful model, whereas varying degrees of difficulty
were experienced in the southern parts. When the decolonialization process set
in after the Second World War, the colonial administration officers agreed on the
transplantation of the British-style parliamentary government commonly referred
to as the Westminster model (Adamolekun and Ayeni, 1990).
At independence in 1960, it was accepted that the government and
administration of Nigeria would follow the Westminster-Whitehall arrangement
in Britain. For various reasons, the experiment collapsed in January 1966, and
it was succeeded by a military government that remained in power (with four
different heads of state) until September 1979. With these four heads of state
and three recent military governments, the country has passed through seven
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different military regimes since independence.
Nigeria has a three-tiered government structure consisting of federal, state
and local levels. There are 36 states and 589 local governments in 1996. The
number of local governments was increased to 772 in January of 1997, excluding
the mayoralty of Abuja, which has four mayoral districts. The federal system has
been restructured periodically since 1966, when the military took power from
civilian politicians. The uneven structure of four regions was reorganized first into
12 states (1967), 19 states (1976), 21 states (1989), 30 states (1991) and then into
the current 36 states in 1996.
The Nigerian civil bureaucracy has played a prominent role both during
periods of military rule and periods of civilian rule, in part because of the
frequency of regime oscillations (Heady, 1991). Nigeria is an example of a nation
characterized by greater stability and continuity in its public administration than
in its politics.

At both the federal and state levels, the central feature of

governmental administration is the ministry, an administrative organization whose
structure and functioning have remained largely unchanged since ministries were
first constituted in the 1950s. The number of ministries has changed over the
years, but the hierarchical organization of the ministry and the division of the
work within the ministry have broadly remained unchanged. The structure of the
presidential executive of the Second Republic differed in some important respects
from what had existed under the parliamentary government during the First
Republic, and the structure of the military executive has added certain character
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istics that were unknown under the various civilian governments.
During the parliamentary government, the prime minister, as head of the
federal government, was responsible for the coordination of government work.
The secretary to the government was the prime minister's key collaborator in
carrying out this function. In addition to his role as the head of the government
secretariat, the secretary to the government also served as the head of the federal
civil service whose members staffed the individual ministries. At both the federal
and regional levels, the coordination of government activities proved difficult.
The president and prime minister competed for dominance. Cabinet ministers,
legislators, and civil servants retained autonomous powers. Higher bureaucrats
such as the permanent secretaries, deputy permanent secretaries, assistant
secretaries provided whatever coordination that did emerge from this pluralist
network.

The ministries were then headed by ministers.

This structural

arrangement was replicated at the regional/state level, and the coordinating role
of the premiers (title of regional heads of government) was the same as those at
the federal level.
The major change introduced under the presidential form of government
was the heightened emphasis placed on the executive office of the president. The
president was intended to serve as the center of power of the federal government
in a manner that was different from the coordinating role of the prime minister
in the parliamentary form. A vice president and a number of special advisers
assisted the president. The executive office of the president was headed by a
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secretary to the federal government who coordinated the work of government.
The head of the federal civil service provided leadership for the career civil
servants who staffed the individual ministries (Ademolekuc rnd Ayeni 1990). At
the state level, there was an executive office of the governor headed by a
secretary to the government, as well as a deputy governor and a number of
special advisers to assist the governor.
In 1988 General Babangida reformed the Nigerian civil service structure.
He abolished the post of permanent secretary because it had become too
political, and designated the minister/commissioner as the chief executive and
accounting officer of the ministry. A senior civil service position called DirectorGeneral was created to assist the minister in each ministry. The reform also
prescribed that a Director-General should leave office with the administration
which appoints him (Phillips 1990). One major implication of the 1988 reform of
the Nigerian civil service is the enhanced professionalism. The former administra
tive class was abolished, and all civil servants now belong to a professional class.
Th-; previous Administrative Officers and General Executive Officers now
specialize in one of the newly established professional divisions. These divisions
include: personnel management, finance, supply, planning, research, informa
tion/data management, operations and so on. In fact, the title "administrative
officer" no longer exists and has been replaced by professional titles such as
Personnel Officer, Economist, Supplies Officer and Planning Officer (Phillips
1990). The staff structure in the civil service has been broken down into three

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

professional categories: namely. Assistant, Officer, and Director. The Assistant
is a sub-professional; he is not required to have a university degree or other
professional qualifications. The Officer, however, is a full professional and he is
required to have a university degree or equivalent professional qualifications. The
Director is also a full professional who has been given general management
functions as the head of either a Branch, a Division or a Ministry.

The

Professional officer requires regular periods of in-service training and retraining.
Therefore, staff training is an obligatory and periodic exercise in the Nigerian civil
service, and as such it appears to have enhanced administrative reform.
Nigerian civil bureaucrats have played a major role in public policy making,
supported both by pre-independence tradition and post-independence practice.
Peter Koehn asserts that higher civil servants have been central, and often
dominant, participants in the polity making process throughout Nigeria’s history
(Koehn 1984). In a political setting with frequent shifts back and forth from
transient military to weak civilian governments, civil administrators have found an
optimal environment to participate in polity making and to profit personally and
collectively from their polity implementation opportunities.
Structural Adjustment/Make-or-Buy Polity
Nigeria introduced a Structural Adjustment/Make-or-Buy Polity in July
1986. This polity represented the culmination of a series of efforts by the Federal
Government of Nigeria to encourage the development of an indigenous
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technological capability in the country. The Structural Adjustment policy marked
a watershed in Nigeria’s economic history. It represented the beginning of the
adoption of conscious policies aimed at drastically changing the structure of the
nation's economy which since the mid 1970s has been suffering from the "Dutch",
or more recently, the "Nigerian" disease. This disease refers to the damage done
to the economy as a result of a reliance upon one sector. The modem economy
of Nigeria, heavily dependent on oil earnings, is overlaid on a traditional
agricultural and trading economy.

The colonial regime from 1900 to 1960

introduced cash crops, developed harbors, railroads and roads, and sought to
develop a market for consumer goods. At independence in 1960 agriculture
accounted for well over half of GDP and was the main source of export earnings
and public revenue, with the agricultural marketing boards playing a major role,
a role that has now been taken over by the Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation (NNPC). The overwhelming importance of oil in recent years is
evident from the fact that this one commodity accounts for about three quarters
of federal government revenue and well over 90 percent of export earnings
(Central Bank Report 1991). During the 1970s, the world oil price rose, Nigerian
oil exports grew rapidly, and Nigeria had a balance of trade surplus almost eveiy
year. Although most of the exploration and production was undertaken by
foreign oil companies, Nigeria kept a majority share holding in the oil industry
through the nationally owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC),
and so was able to restrict the proportion of the profits that left the country. The
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economy grew by about 8 percent annually, more than twice the rate of growth
in the United States during the same time period.

As a member of the

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Nigeria was one of the
countries that engineered the oil price rises of the 1970s, which resulted in huge
new profits. Nigeria today is the fourth largest petroleum producer in OPEC, and
the second largest exporter of oil to the United States, after Saudi Arabia.
As a result of the price rises, annual Nigerian oil income grew from $400
million in 1965 to $9 billion in 1970, and to $26 billion in 1980 (Central Bank
Report, 1991). With money flowing into its coffers, the government launched the
biggest development plan ever considered by an African country. The plan called
for spending $100 billion to transform Nigeria from a traditional to a modern
society in five years. The minimum wage was doubled, all civil servants were
given a 60 percent pay raise, 50,000 Nigerians were sent to the United States and
Europe to learn new skills, and plans were announced for seven new universities,
three new airports, thirteen new television stations, and a new federal capital at
Abuja. The United States, the former Soviet Union, and Western Europe showed
new interest in closer ties with Nigeria, which was now seen as a major regional
economic power.
The collapse of O PEc unity, however, led to a collapse in the price of oil.
This collapse in oil prices caused Nigerian oil revenues to drop from $26 billion
a year to $10 billion a year between 1980 and 1983, just as its foreign debt was
coming due. Nigeria’s oil share of GDP fell from 25 percent in 1980 to 14
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percent in 1988. Moreover, Agriculture was still the principal activity of the
majority of Nigerians but it only accounted for 30 percent of the nation's GDP (at
factor cost) in 1988. By 1992, Nigeria's foreign debt stood at S34 billion and
servicing the debt was costing $5.5 billion annually, the latter accounted for nearly
one-third of Nigeria’s export earnings (McCormick 1995).
Through this "Nigerian disease" phenomenon, the petroleum sector of the
economy had become more profitable than the agricultural export sector. This
difference in inter-sectoral profitability induced resources to move from the
agricultural export sector into the petroleum and service sectors and therefore led
to the decline of agricultural production and export. Technological development
was ignored. Instead the government concentrated on the provision of physical
and economic infrastructure refinements. Some of these economic infrastructures
(i.e., stadia, airports, seaports, army barracks, etc) were later found to be nonviable, and others were beyond the capacity of government agencies to execute.
Instead of making the economy more self-reliant, the policies pursued during the
1970s made the economy vulnerable to further external shocks. Price distortions
created by a highly over-valued currency and inappropriate institutional
arrangements led to inadequate pricing of agricultural and other local products.
The polity incentives and control measures only encouraged the setting up of
manufacturing ventures based on wholesale imported inputs. The public sector
involvement in economic activities became pervasive such that it accounted for
half of the GDP and two thirds of Nigeria’s modern sector employment (Central
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Bank Report 1991).
By the mid 1980s, the economy was in shambles. The public services were
so poorly maintained that water and electricity supplies broke down on a daily
basis. Nigeria’s roads and railroads were in a poor state of repair. Although
education had been one of the priorities of the government, Nigeria’s educational
system was foundering for lack of funds, and some schools in some states had to
be closed for months. There were few teachers and classrooms, and the provision
of education was uneven: for example, southerners had better facilities and more
graduates than the northerners, and too few scientists and professionals were
being turned out by the universities. According to the Central Bank Report
(1991) 38 percent of Nigerian men, and 60 percent of women were illiterate,
hindering Nigeria’s hopes of building a modem, successful society. Health care
was also inadequate. Nigeria had one doctor and four nurses for every 100,000
people, infant mortality was 12 times the rate in the United States (McCormick
1995). Only one in five rural people had access to safe drinking water. While
these figures are not unusual by sub-Saharan African standards, they show how
far Nigeria had yet to go to meet the basic needs of its people.
In order to prevent a collapse of the economy, the government initially
introduced various demand management measures i.e., abandoning major capital
projects (but those at Abuja, the new federal capital city were allowed to
continue). When it became clear that the economic situation would not improve,
General Babangida’s administration attempted to negotiate a $2.5bn loan from
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the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF listed a number of conditions
Nigeria would have to meet to get the loan. Although many of these conditions
made good sense, the idea that they were conditions to be levied on the nation,
led to their being opposed in the Nigerian press. The vehemence of opposition
led the government to abandon the loan talks with IMF, but the military
government nevertheless introduced several IMF style austerity measures which
called for a large reduction in petroleum subsidies, the reordering of the national
economy into a market system, the devaluation of the currency, a reduction of
government size, privatization, the encouragement of agricultural export and
handicrafts and investment in the manufacturing of local products.
The structural adjustments introduced in Nigeria were typical of the types
of adjustments being recommended to and adopted by developing countries
throughout the world at the time. They represented a change in strategy on the
part of international assistance organizations - led by the World Bank. In the
early 1980s these organizations shifted their priorities from programs to increase
the income, productivity and living standards of the poor to those for macroeco
nomic restructuring.

Structural adjustment policies were aimed at helping

developing countries cope with their severe debt problems by stimulating rapid
economic growth. They sought to overcome problems associated with severe
international recession and inflation, declining demand for exports, rising prices
for imports, and decreases in international financial assistance. The shift in
concern among international organizations from the alleviation of poverty to
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promoting macroeconomic growth also refocused their perspective on develop*
m ent For example, the World Bank (1983) moved from the equity concerns that
it had been pursuing for a decade to reforming monetary, fiscal, exchange-rate,
trade, and wage policies.

World Bank structural adjustment loans (SALs)

provided funding to support a comprehensive program of economic reform
agreed to by a government and the Bank. The solution to the debt-servicing
problem was defined by the IMF and World Bank as drastic economic reforms
that would accelerate the growth of GNP. The reforms would promote open
trade, export production, deregulation of industry, reduction of public expenditure
and the public wage bill, and expansion of private-sector output. Many of the
IMF’s austerity programs and the World Bank’s structural adjustment loans
(SALs) were aimed at drastically cutting back the role of government in the
economy.

But in the rush to reduce the size of government in developing

countries, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank overlooked the
critical role governments had played in western economic growth and in the
success of the Hast Asian economies.
The Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP) including the Make-or-Buy
provisions, was adopted in July 1986 by the Nigerian government in response to
its debt crisis and the declining state of the domestic economy. The policy has
two interrelated aspects. The first aspect aims at stabilizing the economy by
ensuring external balance and fiscal viability.

The second focuses on the

restructuring of Nigeria’s technological and production patterns. The policy was
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also designed to redress the fiscal imbalances and structural distortions in the
economy with the view to propelling Nigeria towards self-sustainable growth. The
general implementation format of the structural adjustment/make-or-buy policy
is based on neo-liberal strategies - which emphasize deregulation, devaluation,
denationalization, trade liberalization and technological development. Although
many of the reforms prescribed by structural adjustment policies were needed to
create an economic environment conducive to development, it remains to be seen
how effective they will be in transforming planned economies into market
economics, and in improving the incomes and living conditions of the poor in
Nigeria.
Purpose of the Study
This study examines the Federal Structural Adjustment/Make-or-Buy
Research and Development Polity. It uses a hybrid version of a political system
decision making model to analyze the formulation and implementation of the
policy. The purpose of this approach is to evaluate the relationship between the
military and the bureaucracy in public policy formulation and the subsequent
interpretation and implementation of polity in Nigeria. More particularly, the
study will attempt to account for variations in the degree of support for the
SAP/Make-or-Buy policy, by four major R & D ministries in the federal
govemmeet (i.e., Agriculture, Communications, Defence and Energy, Mines and
Resources).
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The primary focus of this study is the roles played by the military junta and
higher federal public administrators, and how they interacted and reacted to the
crises represented by Nigeria’s underdeveloped technology. The study has several
important compotents: (a) an historical examination of Nigerian political
development and its British colonial legacy; (b) the origin and development of the
Nigerian Military; (c) the structure and development of the Nigerian bureaucracy;
(d) the political economy of Nigeria and the situation that led the military regime
to formulate the structural adjustment program in 1986; (e) the objectives of the
SAP/Make-or-Buy policy; (f) the actions and reaction of the federal ministries in
implementing the policy; (g) the connection between the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy
and Nigeria’s quest for appropriate technology.
The centerpiece of this research is the formulation of the policy in 1986
by the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) and the role of the federal
bureaucrats in implementing it. The SAP/Make-or-Buy policy was enacted with
the intention that it would resolve the crisis of technological underdevelopment,
and perhaps the wider problem, the privatization of research and development
(R & D). The policy faced enormous problems from its inception. The public
was not immediately supportive because in the prior three decades, externallydirected policies had intensified poverty for the vast majority of Africans
(Olukoshi, 1992).

Foreign directed programs had also brought wealth and

privilege to the few.
The implementation of a policy is faulty and questionable if it does not
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have a solid base of domestic support. Most important, some of the federal
m inistrie s

appeared to oppose the policy. The reasons why certain ministries

supported and others opposed the policy will be investigated. Also important to
this study is the role played by international institutions and their influence on the
outcome of the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy.
Deliberate efforts to bring about changes in public policies and in the
structure and function of public institutions are normal and ongoing processes of
government.

In this study I intend to use a framework that helps us to

understand the emergence, implementation, and sustainability of reform
initiatives. In particular, I focus on the role played by military and bureaucratic
elites in shaping and making policy decisions, how they consider available options,
and how they manage the political and bureaucratic questions of implementation.
By analyzing the military/bureaucracy role in the change process, I attempt to
show how the Nigerian government functions, and how it determines the range
of its policy choices.
Organization of the Study
This study centers on Nigeria’s military-bureaucrats relationship, and their
role in policy formulation and implementation, their need for cooperation as well
as the potential for conflict between military junta and bureaucrats.

The

dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter I has provides a general introduction to the study.
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It briefly

discusses the history and problems Nigeria faced prior to 1986 when the
SAP/Make-or-Buy policy was enacted.
Chapter II discusses the related literatures of political development,
military intervention, government bureaucracy, political economy and decision
making.
Chapter HI describes the research design used in the study, including the
hybrid political systems model, the research questions, the sources of the
information used in this case study of Nigeria and its SAP/Make-or-Buy policy,
and how the research questions have been addressed.
Chapter IV focuses on the British colonial period in Nigeria and its legacy.
It covers both pre-independence politics and

post-independence political

development and its consequences.
Chapter V describes the origin of the Nigerian military and examines the
factors that galvanized them to intervene in post-independence politics.
Chapter VI concerns the historical development of the Nigerian
bureaucracy, the various post-independence reforms of the civil service and the
role of the bureaucracy in policy formulation and implementation during a
military regime.
Chapter VII focuses on the political economy of Nigeria since indepen
dence. It examines the historical trend of the manufacturing and industrial sectors
of the nation. It describes in detail the economic crisis, including the technology
crisis, which led to the development of the Structural Adjustment/Make-or-Buy
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policy.
Chapter V m uses a case study to examine the relationship between the
military and the bureaucracy in the formulation and implementation of the
Structural Adjustment/Make-or-Buy policy with the aid of the political system
decision making model.
Finally, in Chapter DC the dissertation is reviewed in its entirety. There
are some concluding observations offered on the primary research questions and
on the strengths and weaknesses of the hybrid system model as a tool for
assessing policy making and implementation. Particular attention is given the
relationship between decision-makers (the military) and the subsequent
interpretation and behavior of the implementers (bureaucrats) of the policy.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
The review of literature focuses on political development, bureaucratic
development, military intervention, economic development and decision making
models. Nigeria’s experience with democratic government reflects the nature of
its own beginning as a nation. The nation is a product of an attempt by the
British colonial administration to merge historically separate territorial groups into
an artificial union. Nigeria, therefore, emerged as a nation of regionally based
political factions whose strident competition could not help but weaken the
federal government. Twice the nation has undertaken to govern itself under
liberal democratic constitutions following carefully staged transitions. Both of
these efforts were ruined by anti-democratic actions, which ended in military
coups. Despite popular support for military intervention, Nigerians have never
been content with authoritarian rule, and no military regime that has failed to
immediately commit itself to a transition to democracy has been able to survive.
The ruling elites after independence in 1960 rose to power in a situation where
the traditional pattern of loyalties and identities ran deep. Nigerian elites were

23
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caught between conflicting obligations issuing from their broad customary
relations with traditional associations and their political relationship with the
national government. Throughout Nigeria’s 36 years of political turbulence which has encompassed nine governments, six successful military coups, a civil
war, and a dizzying economic boom, followed by a depression - Nigeria
nevertheless has experienced a steady growth of social infrastructure.

This

includes a rapidly expanding education system, a sophisticated legal system, and
a diverse array of autonomous social, cultural, and economic organizations. The
ethnic complexity of Nigeria has often generated intense political conflict and an
irrepressible social pluralism that cannot be effectively managed by a military
regime. Therefore, in the struggle between pluralism and statism in Nigeria the
search for a viable system of democratic government which can do so continues.
Political Development
Politics is described by David Easton (1971, 143-4) as the "authoritative
allocation of values" and by Harold Lasswell (19S0) as "who gets what, when, and
how." Thus, individuals participate in politics in order to pursue their own selfinterest, in order to receive the values, to get the "what". Some scholars (the
structural functionalists) also conceive politics as a self regulating system existing
within a large social environment and fulfilling necessary tasks for that social
environment (Easton 1971: Almond and Coleman 1960). According to this view,
politics involves the performance of a number of functions without which society
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could not exist. Mitchell (1967) identified four critical political functions: the
authoritative specification of system goals; the authoritative mobilization of
resources to implement goals; the integration of the system, and the allocation of
values and costs. Easton (1971), as well as Almond and Coleman (1960), offered
a more expansive list including interest articulation, interest aggregation, rule
making, rule application, rule adjudication, political recruitment, political
socialization and political communication.
Pluralists argue that individuals engage in politics to maximize their own
share of a wide range of values. While some political actors may pursue their self
advantage exclusively, others may seek altruistic ends such as equality, justice,
welfare, and an unpolluted environment or the preservation of forests. They also
suggest that politics is an activity through which values and interests are promoted
and preserved. Pluralists such as Lindblom (1965) emphasize that politics is a
process of partisan mutual adjustment. This involves a process of bargaining,
negotiating, conciliation and compromise through which individuals seeking
markedly different objectives arrive at decisions with all willing to live by those
decisions. Crick (1962) contends that politics is a moderating activity, a means of
settling differences without recourse to force, a mechanism for deciding policy
objectives from a competing array of choices. Thus, stable political development
depends on some combination of mutual satisfaction felt by participants within the
system and the legitimate use of both external and internal force.
A review of the tortured history in the political development of Nigeria as
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a nation, offers insight into the difficulties of operating a democratic system in a
setting where democratic values are not yet firmly established. Nigeria's political
leaders only partially internalized the rules and roles associated with a proper
functioning of a democratic system, and their replacement by military regimes is
not surprising or unique in the literature of political science.
The Nigerian political experience also offers an illustration of the violence
and turmoil that can result from the co-existence within a single nation of several
competing ethnic groups. The attempted integration of 250 ethnic groups with
different cultures in Nigeria by the British colonial administration resulted in its
long history of conflict among the various cultures. National political leaders only
partially internalized the rules associated with the colonial system. The relations
between sub-ethnic groups grew tense after the attainment of independence in
1960 because there were perceived regional imbalances in opportunity and wealth.
These perceived imbalances in opportunity and wealth became a source of
continuous pressure on the weak national political structure. Tamuno (1981)
contends that opportunity and wealth were not concentrated together favorably
for any given ethnic group. The political relations between the regional ethnic
groups were, however, bom out of fear of not being able to control the political
effects of these opportunities and wealth. The struggle to control wealth and
opportunity led to the intensification of ethnic conflict, gross electoral manipula
tions, the deepening of social tensions, growing crime and violence, disillusionment
among elites, and increased reliance on the nation's "oppressive" military
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machinery to keep peace.
One of the conclusions to emerge from an analysis of the political
development of Nigeria is that groups from which we expect considerable political
influence in Western countries (Le., labor, professionals, farmers etc.) have had
far less direct influence in Nigerian politics. According to John Ostheimer (1973),
these groups tend to reflect the ethnic divisions that fractionate the society, and
the politicians seem inclined to view them as bases of communal support rather
than as independent power groups with concrete demands. Okion Ojigbo (1980),
contends that this is true as well for the Nigerian academic elite, the last group
one would look to for exclusivist ethnic

affilia tio n s .

As soon as the important

issue of staffing is at stake, ethnic loyalties become paramount.
The real powers behind Nigerian politics since independence have been
(a) the top political party leaders before 1966; (b) the military leaders since 1966;
and (c) the bureaucracy throughout the past three decades. The exercise of
political power by these three groups has not been notably successful. Nigeria
since independence has been characterized by an absence of strong governmental
direction and effective bureaucratic performance. Military intervention has been
a recurring phenomenon.
Military Intervention
The concepts of regime type and legitimacy brings us to one of the crucial
political problems in so many contemporary African countries, namely the
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problem of governance, or the ability, of a civilian government to maintain order
and simultaneously solve the problems that confront it without the necessity of a
military intervention. James Malloy (1977) contends that political problems
emerge when societies are in transition from traditional modes of state
organization to modem modes. He argued that during such transitional periods
many experience a more authoritarian type of regime, usually defined as some
form of military regime. Whereas, when they attain a modem mode, the regime
type is more likely to be a representative democracy. Amos Perlmutter (1981,97)
asserts that military governments are not totally military but usually have a large
civilian component - bureaucrats, managers, politicians and technocrats, so the
dichotomy between military and civilian regimes ought not to be promoted too
rigidly in the literature. Modem military regimes should instead, he argues, be
regarded as fusionist, that is they are military-civil regimes.
Morris Janowitz (1964,32) attempted to use the organizational characteris
tics attributed to the military institution, such as centralized command, hierarchy,
discipline, and cohesion to explain the reasons for military intervention. Decalo,
another organizationist, contends, it is not the organizational strength of the
military but rather the decay of military organization that often creates conditions
in which various factions within the military launch sudden and swift raids on the
government (Decalo 1976, 14-15).

According to Samuel Finer, military

intervention results from the existence of a low or minimal political culture in the
society concerned (Finer 1969, 110-39). Samuel Huntington also argues that
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military explanations may not explain military interventions. H e asserts that
military interventions are only one specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon of underdeveloped societies, i.e., the general politicization of social forces and
institutions (Huntington 1969, 194).
A group of scholars who attempt to explain the reasons for military
intervention are referred to as skeptical behavioralists. They assert that the
internal dynamics of military hierarchies, cliques within the army, corporate
interests, personal ambitions, and idiosyncracies of particular military officers, are
the cause of military intervention (Maniruzzaman 1987; Decalo 1976, 7-22).
The studies of Robert Jackman (1978), and Londregan and Poole (1990)
on military intervention are closely related to the situation in Nigeria. Jackman’s
study shows that military coups in Africa are the function of structural factors
(social mobilization, cultural pluralism, party dominance and electoral turn-out)
almost in a deterministic pattern.

The idiosyncratic factors emphasized in

commentaries by Zolberg (1968, 7) and Decalo (1976, 22) account for only onefifth of the variance in coups when combined with structural factors in a multiple
regression analysis done by Robert Jackman (1978, 1273). Londregan and Poole
assert that a high level of income and a high level of economic growth are
separate factors inhibiting coups. According to their study, the incidence of coups
is twenty-one times more likely in the poorest countries than among the
wealthiest. They contend that once a country has experienced a coup, it will have
a much harder time avoiding further coups (Londregan and Poole 1990, 175-8).
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In Africa and Latin American countries where the military has held the
formal reins of government, soldiers occupy the most important decision making
positions and are therefore critical members of the policy elite. Even where the
military does not hold formal decision making positions, it is often an essential
and frequently dominant member of the governing coalitions.

Further, the

politically active military often becomes so at the behest of civilians and is
frequently maintained in power through considerable civilian support.

This

relationship is often referred to as "civilian-militarism." Because of its political
importance to the establishment and the survival of governing coalitions, the
military has the capacity to influence the allocation of government resources and
to act also as a veto group on specific public policies for a wide variety of
objectives, even in regimes with a well established tradition of civilian rule. Thus,
a military regime is only the most visible form of military involvement in decision
making (Grindle 1987; Bienen 1978; Crouch 1986; Stepan 1971). An expanded
system transforming role of the military emerged after the coups in Brazil (1964),
Argentina (1966), Peru (1968), and Chile (1973). The key feature of military rule
in Latin America was the close interrelationship between national security and
national development.
Despite the various reasons for military intervention in a country’s political
life, all regimes are concerned not only with political stability, but with positive
economic performance. They therefore remain dependent on the administrative
apparatus for the implementation of their decisions and policies.
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Bureaucratic Development
The bureaucracy phenomenon was studied by Max Weber (1922). Weber’s
study of bureaucracy argues that the existence of a neutral bureaucracy based on
hierarchy and rule is essential if a country is to become modern. In accordance
with Weber’s usage, bureaucrats are public officials who acquire their positions
on the basis of their qualifications and skills and are primarily responsible for the
implementation of public policy, not its creation. In Nigeria, the term "bureau
crat" generally refers to all government officials who are not elected to a
legislature or to a chief executive’s post, and who are not judges or soldiers. The
main characteristics of a bureaucratic type of organization as envisaged by Weber
are as follows:
1. Workers operate within fixed jurisdictions.
2. Authority is exercised within a firm system of hierarchy. Subordinates
are clearly under the control of their superior, a fact known by subordinates and
superiors alike.
3. Hierarchy also strengthens accountability, since each person is
responsible to some specific boss.
4. Bureaucracy operates on the basis of written rules.
5. Bureaucrats assume theirs position through expert training.
6. Bureaucrats are primarily responsible for the implementation of public
policy.
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To Weber, a bureaucracy or organization possessing these features is the
most superior form of organization. He believed that such an organization is
capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and utilizes the most rational
means of carrying out control over human beings. It is customary to define
bureaucracy in ways that associate it with large-scale and complex organizations.
In their search for neutrality, some writers have gone so far as to identify
bureaucracy with organization (Simon 1958; Etzioni 1967; Blau 1956; Presthus
1962). Herbert Simon (1958, 1960) presented a major challenge to Weber’s
understanding of bureaucracy by emphasizing the psychology of decision making
and by introducing a cost calculus to test the criterion of efficiency rather than to
simply assume, as Weber did, that bureaucracies are efficient. The fact that the
Weberian concept of bureaucracy has been widely adopted does not mean that
his ideas were not criticized. In fact the attack which has been mounted upon
Weber’s conceptualizations is formidable. Some writers have questioned the
rationality of Weber’s rational bureaucracy. They have particularly noted the
informal organization which often develops within a bureaucracy and the
dysfunctional consequences of bureaucracy, for example its too rigid adherence
to rules (Mouzelis 1967,43-53). Other criticisms have been concerned with the
cultural and political limitations of administrative rationality, or the absence in his
writing of the importance of values and attitudes (Rose 1984,157; Friedrick 1963,
471). Other scholars who have been particularly interested in issues of change,
especially the problems of change in developing areas, have challenged the
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Weberian conceptualization more seriously. Martin Albrow (1970,54-61) asseru
that the degree of rationality a bureaucracy might have depends on the cultural
context in which it is located. Therefore, he considers invalid for developing
countries the basis on which Weber constructed his "ideal type" of bureaucracy.
Victor Thompson (1964, 91) challenges the relevance of a Weberian-type
bureaucracy to a developing country more seriously. He contends that in the
western industrialized countries, administrative practices and principles were
derived from an established professional occupation and a system of accountabili
ty.

As a result administrative practices have little value for development

bureaucracy where the need is for an adaptive administration, one that has to
incorporate changes constantly. Other scholars argue that not only is bureaucratic
organization incompatible with the socio-political culture of most non-Western
developing countries, but that from an economic point of view, it is not actually
an efficient model suited for development activities. They might agree with
Bernard Shaffer, who argues that it is likely that administration in less developed
conditions will not be bureaucratic (Shaffer 1969, 189).

Indeed some non-

bureaucratic forms of organization are emerging in less developed countries
(Ilchman 1969, 472-526). Bernard Schaffer’s argument reminds us that nonbureaucratic administration has, after all, worked and survived as much in the
West as in the rest of the world. Many alternatives are possible and almost none
are wholly without merit.

One may also cite non-bureaucratic methods of

organization in East Asia, East Africa and elsewhere which aim at placing some
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portion of public administration in the hands of the citizens, and which now
includes some lower courts, some police functions, as well as some significant local
roles in economic administration. These self-help ideas represent a modem more
politicized version of the older approach of community development.
Recognition of cultural variations that bear upon the operation of
bureaucracies has prompted analysts to devote considerable attention to
comparative public administration. It is hoped that by doing so, it will eventually
be possible to analyze the effects of environmental and cultural factors on public
bureaucracies.

Still, these criticisms should not be taken as rendering the

Weberian analysis useless. All one needs to do is to belong to an organization,
or better yet, try to form one, to realize how dependent Nigerian society is on the
principles of bureaucratic organization. Specialization (often by committee),
hierarchy (for coordination, often by a governing board or council of some type),
and formalized procedure (Robert’s rules) are well-known attributes of
contemporary organizations, whether they be social clubs, university departments,
or governmental units.
The general ability of bureaucracies to defy change, innovation, and any
other kind of leadership by the heads of organizations they serve has become a
focus of study by several prominent political analysts in the past three decades.
Graham Allison (1971) analyzed on presidential decision making at two different
levels to come up with, (1) the organizational process model, and (2) the
bureaucratic politics model. He concludes that large bureaucracies tend to divide
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complex functions into a ^

of small fragments, each fragment surrounded by

its own sub-bureaucracy. What is often described as "decision" at the top is little
more than the sum of many small decisions made in relative isolation to other,
related decisions.
Allison (1971) states that these low-level decisions are often made in ways
that, first and foremost, bring comfort to the sub-bureaucracies and sometimes
actually frustrate the goals sought by the overall leadership. Thus, the watch
words of small organizations within larger ones are "standard operational
procedure" (SOP), the maintenance of masting programs, and a general and
instinctive resistance to any change. He argues that, even at the top levels of
government, the heads of separate bureaucracies are often more intent on
maintaining the importance of their particular activities than they are on arriving
at some integrated policy among the sub-bureaucracies. In addition to such "turf
protection", there is also the instinct for agency heads to compromise on what,
professionally, they know to be the best policy. They do so in order to maintain
their links to other agencies, as well as to the chief executive. Again, rational
executive decision making can be undermined by such bureaucratic complexity.
The administrative bureaucracy has been the single most important arm
of government in Nigeria. Some writers contend that it is appropriately so in a
developing country.

Dennis Rondinelli (1993) asserted that development

bureaucracy is concerned with achieving national advancement. Development
bureaucracy therefore, manifests itself in the process of directing change towards
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the achievement of economic, social, and political objectives which have been
authoritatively determined in one way or another. Bureaucracy is an indispens
able part of the Nigerian governing process, but it also is slow, complex, and
impersonal, hence frustrating to those dependent on its services.

Most

bureaucrats have the necessary self-esteem that enables them to get the job done
but many are victims of their own bureaucratic complexity rather than the cause
of it. As modem economic planning begins to drive the development of Nigeria,
the bureaucracy as well as the military become inseparable agents of social,
political and economic change.
Political Economy Perspective
Third World structural adjustments according to Adedotun Phillips (1992),
are prompted by collapsing local currencies, mass unemployment, spiralling
inflation, a rapidly dwindling industrial base, the persistence of agrarian crisis,
capital flight, deepening debt payments problems, very sharp declines in living
standards for the majority of the people, and widening budget deficits. These
issues have in turn created or worsened existing social and political problems, not
least among them, the imposition of or the return to military rule in the recently
independent states.

Adebayo Olukoshi (1992) contends that it is generally

military leadership who have promoted adjustment programs.
Scholars have approached the crisis of underdevelopment in Africa from
many diverse perspectives including dependency, developmentalism, imperialism,
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modernization, Marxism, neocolonialism, classical and neoclassicalism, instability,
ethnic conflict theories, Keynesianism, and combinations of two or more of the
above. Each perspective attempts to identify the causes of underdevelopment in
Africa

and to suggest strategies under which they can be reversed.

Each

approach differs in some ways from the others, but most of the time, what
differentiates one strategy from another is the extent to which the crisis of
underdevelopment is perceived to be causally linked to internal African conditions
(Modernization theory) or external influences and manipulations (Dependency
and Marxist theories). Eisenstadt (1966) describes modernization as the presence
in a nation of a highly differentiated political structure and the diffusion of
political power and authority into all spheres of society. In his early work Apter
(1965) considered modernization as a particular form of development, involving
a stable social system, differentiated social structure, and social skills and
knowledge adaptable to a technologically advanced world. Later he described this
form of modernization as the attempt of traditional societies to replicate the
institutions and values of advanced industrial societies.

Parallel to this was

another form of modernization that takes conflict and inequality rather than
integration into account (Apter, 1987). These approaches, generally tend to
assume the stages of growth (from traditional to modem forms) posited as part
of the historical development in advanced industrial societies. For much of the
Third World they became ideal types rather than accurate descriptions of reality.
Although modernization theory has been largely discredited, some observers (So,
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1990) believe that it has transcended its crisis of criticism of the late 1960s and
assumed a new role as a fruitful line of inquiry.
Development strategies in Nigeria have relied heavily on classical and
neoclassical economic ideas as basis for national development which stresses the
roles of trade and capital accumulation and view agriculture as secondary. While
the various regimes have differed in the degree of priority they give these factors,
they are in basic agreement on the centrality of these factors in determining
development.
These modern theories ignore some of the basic elements of Malthus
(1951) classic analysis of underdevelopment where he conceived of an economy
as consisting of two major sectors: industrial and agricultural. In his view of
economic development, capital is invested in agriculture until all the arable land
is cultivated, stocked, and improved. After that, the opportunities for profitable
investment are viewed as existing only in the industrial sector. Therefore, to avoid
diminishing returns from increased employment on the land and to enhance the
profitability of investment in industry, the following conditions are thought to be
required: First, technological progress in the industrial sector must be rapid
enough. Second, enough investment must take place to absorb most of the
population growth in the industrial sector and to reduce the cost of living of the
workers on the land, permitting reduction in their wage rates (Malthus, 1951).
Malthus also made some suggestions about sectoral interaction in
underdeveloped areas, explaining why they remain underdeveloped. He pointed
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out tiiat each sector constitutes a market for the output of the other sector (in the
absence of international trade). Thus, the failure of either sector to expand tends
to impede the growth of the other. Growth in both sectors is essential in order
to have growth in all (Malthus, 1951).

How Malthus’ proposition could be

applied in Nigeria seems to rely upon the making and implementation of
appropriate policy.
Managing growth in a nation is frequently a matter of public policy,
according to Thomas Dye (1976), public policy deals with a wide variety of
substantive areas, including defense, energy, environment, foreign affairs,
education, welfare, research and development, taxation, housing, health, economic
opportunity, and urban development. He stresses that public policy is whatever
a government chooses to do or not to do. Dye explains that governments do
many things. They regulate conflict within society, they organize society to carry
on conflict with other societies, they distribute a great variety of symbolic rewards
and material services to the members of the society, and they extract money from
society, most often in the form of taxes (Dye, 1976). Thus, public policies may
regulate behavior, organize bureaucracies, mobilize the military, distribute
benefits, or extract taxes, or do all of these things at once. Most public policies
in some way impact on the economic development of a nation.
Schumpeter, in his book, The Theory of Economic Development
(published in German in 1911 and in English in 1934), was the first to single out
economic development as an important public polity area for detailed study and
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analysis. Schumpeter links innovation to the entrepreneur, maintaining that the
source of private profits is successful innovation and that innovation brings about
economic growth. He felt that the entrepreneur carries out new economic
combinations by: (a) introducing new products, (b) introducing new production
functions that decrease inputs needed to produce a given output, (c) opening new
markets, (d) exploiting new sources of materials, and (e) reorganizing an industry.
His ideas can be found in the economic nationalism that swept Africa, Nigeria in
particular.

Nigeria’s planning efforts were focused on trade and capital

accumulation in order to stimulate rapid capitalist development, yet its leaders
were convinced that capitalism was defective with respect to distribution and
equality questions.
Like earlier theorists, Schumpeter’s interpretation of the economic
development process was strongly influenced by the economic conditions of his
time. According to Schumpeter (1942), the development of capitalist economy
is jerky rather than steady, owing to the erratic interaction of the entrepreneur,
planned or unplanned innovations, and questionable availability of credit. Where
the unevenness of change can not be resolved leaders are likely to resort to
socialist techniques. This is because of socialism’s capacity for mass production,
mass education, and command decision making. Schumpeter, however, gives
special importance to the role of the entrepreneur as an innovator who is willing
to take risks to experiment with new ideas and to make the necessary technical
changes (Schumpeter 1942: 139).
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The "Missing Component" approach is predicated on the idea that
development can be effected by identifying the critically weak or missing element
in a developing country’s assets and by subsequently adding this component to the
development equations (Myint, 1971).

Such missing elements typically are

identified as domestic savings, foreign exchange, education, and new technology.
The stimulation of a propensity for saving in the developing economy, by both
public and private entities, is viewed as essential to development goals. The
problem with a development strategy that emphasizes the acquisition of foreign
exchange is that it leads to foreign monetary over-capitalization at the expense of
a more balanced use of domestic resources. Resulting negative effects may
include an excess of productive capacity, over borrowing with heavy debt servicing
requirements, and under-utilization of labor as a substitute for capital. This latter
condition is the basis for much of the argument supporting the appropriate
technology concept. The efficacy of technology in the drive for development is
of paramount importance. Ultimately, it will prove to be the means by which a
developing nation like Nigeria can lift herself from underdevelopment and achieve
the goals that are dramatized in the basic human needs strategy.
The use of any particular technology is not an end in itself. The criterion
for an appropriate technological choice must be found in the essential goals and
processes of development in countries like Nigeria. Jequier views technology in
its private, community, and public aspects (Jequier, 1976). "Private technology,"
is that which is utilized in a small, domestically owned enterprise. It is related to
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the production of consumer goods, and its introduction is largely a decision by the
individual entrepreneur. "Community technology" concerns local infrastructure,
such as water systems, sewerage, and health delivery services, which affects the
citizen profoundly and which requires individual cooperation in production and
operation. "Public technologies" are represented by the large industrial firms that
produce consumer goods or capital equipment and by the national institutions
that supply basic services, such as railway transportation, flood control and
irrigation systems, power grids, higher education, and banking and credit systems.
Jequier states that the community technology situation is the most difficult area
in which to effect change because the forms of organization are less well defined
and are less likely to provide incentives to the individual participant.

It is

believed however, that the community technology area provides the greatest
return on investment if appropriate technology is narrowly defined.
The product areas that are the recipients of technology inputs are divided
into categories: (a) capital and intermediate goods production (including the
production of materials, heavy industrial, manufacturing equipment and machines,
and automotive products); and (b) consumer goods (including durables such as
appliances, shelter and transportation items, and consumable goods such as food,
clothing and medicines). Infrastructure (public technology) and agriculture (which
comprise both the private and community-type categories) traditionally have
received the most concentrated foreign assistance inputs.

Foreign private

investment is concentrated in the public technologies sector.
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Donald Evans (1989) categorized the methods of technology transfer to
developing countries as: (a) multilateral assistance which includes the develop
ment banks, the specialized agencies of the United Nations, including the
principal funding agency, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP);
and (b) the various implementing agencies such as the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO), the International Labor Organization
(ILO), and the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP). Although not
directly involved in giving assistance itself, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) is an important source of research and
policy studies on development assistance.
A principal source of technology transfer to Nigeria is through privatesector direct investment by the industrialized nations.

In addition to direct

investment on a sole ownership basis, there are joint ventures where significant
transfers are made through the licensing of technology on a royalty or direct
payment basis. Also, technical products that are sold to a developing country
constitutes a technology transfer in the physical sense.

Engineering and

technological consulting firms are a significant source of transfer because they
accept commissions for the design and installation of manufacturing facilities,
infrastructure, and the specification of technical equipment and processes in the
developing country.
In the Nigerian context, the issues embraced by appropriate technology,
both conceptually, and as a movement, are eclectic and questions of organization
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al form, social relations, political bias and human experience, among others, are
integral to an exploration of the concept. Raphael Kaplinsky (1990,212) contend
that one of the major issues affecting institutional design in appropriate
technology development is whose needs are represented in defining developmen
tal goals. Although technological developments takes time, the main factor
affecting the choice of technology in Nigeria is the identification of genuine
entrepreneurs. Thus, appropriate technologies in Nigeria should be the domain
of indigenous and small scale capitalists not foreign investors.
International trade theorists such as Gottfried Haberler, Jacob Viner, Alex
Caimcross and Peter Bauer expanded and reinforced classical and neoclassical
economic views. These scholars share the neoclassical belief that trade can
promote the growth of the rest of the economy, and that an expansion of trade
in any type of product produces spillover effects that are favorable to the other
sectors.
Haberler (1968) emphasized that international trade has several indirect
and dynamic benefits, apart from static gains to the trading countries. Among the
benefits has been the introduction of new technologies in less developed
countries.
However, the emphasis on trade and capital accumulation as the means
for development has been called into question, and the ideas of the theorists
who are pessimistic about the ideas advocated by neoclassical theorists are equally
known to planners. Nigeria had several perspectives from which to choose in its
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quest for autonomous development. The masses, not atypically, have been kept
innocent of competing economic theories, and the processes of policy initiation
and implementation. The whole process of development planning has been a
distant and alien activity to most of the people of Nigeria.
John Maynard Keynes, wrote The General Theory of Employment, Interest
and Money (1936) at a time when reduced output and the massive unemployment
caused by the Great Depression plagued the Western World. Keynes focused his
attention on the contradiction, inherent in capitalism between savings and
investment. He asserted that in a situation where savings were high in relation
to the availability of opportunities for investments, depression or unemployment
was likely to result because consumers would also be spending less on immediate
consumption. Further, this condition creates idle money which entrepreneurs,
because of their unsold stocks of goods, cannot convert into profitable invest
ments. On the basis of this analysis, Keynes came to the conclusion that laissez
faire policies which rest on independent competing units pursuing their rational
self-interest would not always be able, by themselves, to strike the correct ba
lance between savings and investment. What is needed he argues is an interven
tionist state that tackles the problem of market failure by, for example, regulating
the level of demand through fiscal and monetary policies. Keynes’s recommenda
tion for deliberate state action to take care of any recession or depression —even
at the risk of sacrificing a balanced-budget concept —were contrary to the laissezfaire attitude of neoclassical development theory.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Keyne’s idea that government planned expenditures could stimulate
investments was a key to revising the developed world’s understanding of the basis
for sustained economic growth. No longer was it necessary to rely on market
forces to establish the basic rate of growth or the composition of growth. The
various national development plans of Nigeria reflect this idea.
There are two principal reasons explaining why primary export products
have not expanded Nigeria's overall economy. First, the operation of unfavorable
"terms of trade" tends to reduce the purchasing power of a unit volume of
primary products exports by the developing country. This creates a harmful and
unfavorable situation for the developing nation by increasing its import bills at a
faster pace than its export earnings. And second, the factors of production
argument stresses the point that the consequences of factor inflows into
developing countries have not been favorable to these nations.
The concern for the relationship between underdevelopment and
dependency evolved from earlier writings on imperialism and it effects.
Relationships of dependency and descriptions of exploitation and deformation
were prominent in the writings of Marx, Lenin, and Trotsky. In the first volume
of Capitalism. Karl Maix foretells the dependency school’s idea of underdevelopment:
A new and international division of labor, a division suited to the
requirements of its chief centers of modem industry springs up and
converts one part of the globe into a chiefly agricultural field of
production, for supplying the other part which remains a chiefly
industrial field (Marx 1967, 451).
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Thus, Marx foresaw that within the world system, there would be pre-capitalist,
capitalist, and post-capitalist relations of production. He asserted that external
and internal participation must be combined with social and political mobilization
to bring about rapid structural change.
Lairson and Skidmore, who in 1993 developed the concept of the
cumulative mechanism of causation — to dependency theory —have argued that
as a mechanism international trade has, by its very operation, led underdeveloped
countries to stagnation or impoverishment, and developed countries into
automatic cumulative growth (Lairson and Skidmore, 1993).
Dependency theory views modernization in less developed countries as
simply the adoption of economic and political systems developed in Western
Europe and North America. According Celso Furtado (1973) the global change
in demand resulted in a new international division of labor in which the
peripheral countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America specialized in primary
products in an enclave controlled by foreigners while importing consumer goods
that were the fruits of technical progress in the central countries of the West.
The increased productivity and new consumption patterns in third world countries
benefitted a small ruling class and its allies who cooperated with developed
nations to achieve modernization.
Andre Gunder Frank (1969), a major dependency theorist argued that
underdevelopment does not mean traditional economic, political, and social
institutions but the subjection of third world countries to colonial rule and
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imperial domination. In essence Andre Gunder Frank sees underdevelopment
as the effect of the penetration of modem capitalism into the archaic economic
structures of the third world. He feels that the eventual development of the
underdeveloped countries will be stimulated by indiscriminately transferring
capital institutions and values from developed countries.
In the 1980s, the governments of economic conservatives, British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Germany
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, United States President Ronald Reagan, and a series
of Japanese liberal Democratic Party prime ministers encouraged the neoclassical
counter-revolution in economic policy and analysis. Classical and neo-classical
economists such as Adam Smith, Milton Friedman, and Ludwig von Hayek had
earlier stressed the freedom or hands-off policy of the state from economic
activities.
The neoclassical economists contend that slow or negative growth results
from poor resource allocation from nonmarket prices and excessive third world
nation intervention. They argue that promoting competitive free markets,
privatizing public enterprises, supporting export and free international trade,
liberalizing trade and exchange rates, allowing exchange rates to attain a marketclearing rate, removing barriers to foreign investment, rewarding domestic savings,
reducing government spending and monetary expansion, and removing regulations
and price distortions in financial, resource, and commodity markets, will spur
increased efficiency and economic growth. The governments of Canada, Britain,
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Japan, United States, Australia were largely supportive of the market, privatiza
tion, supply-side economics, and the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund adopted the neoclassical economic ideology.

The latter international

institutions point to Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong
Kong and Thailand as examples of the free market approach to economic
development
Neoclassical economic ideology is what the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) adopted as their structural adjustment
program (World Bank, 1985). The objective of structural adjustment programs
is to establish a market-friendly set of incentives that can encourage the
accumulation of capital and more efficient allocation of resources. Structural
adjustment and privatization measures are often concurrent, yet they entail
different policies and objectives. In this context, privatization can be construed
as the divestiture of state assets to private receivers, the transfer from state
management to private auspices, and/or the consignment of state-run services to
private suppliers. In essence, privatization denotes a shift in ownership and
substantial control from public to private hands.

According to Bienan and

Waterbury (1989), privatization is frequently rationalized in terms of efficiency:
the divesture of state roles and state assets purportedly confer net gains in
productivity, asset utilization, fiscal performance or service delivery. An additional
argument for privatization stresses potential equity gains from the dispersal of
shares, the rationalization of subsidies or the improvement of services (Suleiman
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and Waterbury, 1990). In the analysis of distributive policies, the imperatives of
efficiency and equity are potentially confh'ctual. Socio-political concerns directly
contend with economic and technological exigencies.

This distinction has

animated the debate over privatization in Nigeria.
Privatization is typically recommended as a policy which will enhance the
efficiency of the enterprises involved while alleviating the government’s budget
constraints. In many instances, however, privatization is likely to do very little for
efficiency because the private sector is unlikely to pay more for an unprofitable
public enterprises. Another argument for privatization is that it will restrain the
government from meddling in the enterprises once ownership change hands. In
Nigeria, however, where the boundary between the private and public sectors is
ambiguous, privatization may not serve as an entirety credible commitment of
non-interference. Without such credibility, the transfer of ownership may end up
deteriorating the government fiscal budget. All privatization, however, is certainty
not bound to worsen the government budget.

But the presumption that

privatization create resources for the government has been questioned, and de
emphasized where evidences point in the direction.
Critics of the structural adjustment program in Africa argue that cutbacks
in government spending may depress the economy, and usually requires that
spending on education, nutrition, and social services be reduced. The structural
adjustment programs concerned with decontrol and deregulation may turn a blind
eye toward preventing industrial concentration (Olukoshi, 1992). Even where
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privatization is desirable, government may want to proceed slowly to avoid a
highly concentrated business elite being created from newly privatized forms
falling into a few hands, as was true in Nigeria and many other African nations
in the 1980s and 1990s.
The contrast between economic performance in Indonesia and Nigeria
raises worrisome questions. The two countries are militarily ruled, populous oilexporting nations with distinctive poverty rates. Wayne Nafrdager (1997) contends
that the differences between Indonesia and Nigeria are a result of dissimilar
economic growth patterns and income distribution. For example, while Indonesia
invested substantial amounts of government funds in agriculture, including a
General Rural Credit Program which provided loans to rural people at
commercial rates, Nigeria spent less than 10 percent of its capital expenditure on
agriculture. Differences in agricultural pricing and investment help to explain
Indonesia’s more favorable agricultural development.
Furthermore, while Indonesia relied on oil as much as Nigeria did, but it
diversified into some 35 to 55 export manufactures or non-oil products (Pack,
1994).

Economic growth in Indonesia shows what can be achieved with

appropriate government policies, a disciplined and a hard working population that
responds to positive incentives. By contrast, due to the frequency of army coups,
Nigeria’s insecure military or civilian political elites must rely on the state’s
economic levers and build patronage networks to survive.

Indonesia enjoys

greater political continuity, (the same government has been in power since the
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mid 1960s) and policy predictability.

Thus there has been less political

intervention in economic policy decisions from the 1960s to 1990s. In Indonesia
under Suharto, the military provides a framework of order and stability favorable
to economic development. It has also can drawn upon technical advice in the
pursuit of pragmatic economic policies.
Similarly, Ghana’s economic development is one of the most successful
stories of structural adjustment programs in West Africa. Since 1983, a decade
of stabilizing policies has yielded broad budget balances, strong export growth, a
reasonable international position, and substantial structural reforms, including
privatization. Ghana also has moved aggressively to close some of its loss-making
public-owned corporations. Ghana has not only improved its financial manage
ment of the public sector but also encouraged private investment. The World
Bank report of 199S shows Ghana is making serious efforts to improve private
sector confidence with clearer business procedures, speedy divestitures and
investment incentives. Ghana’s growth rate increased from 0.7 percent in 1983
to 5.5 percent in 1990. The rate of inflation as measured by the Consumer Price
Index (CPI) declined from 122 percent in 1983 to 25 percent in 1994 (Olukoshi,
1994). The production of cocoa doubled between 1983 and 1990. In the mining
sector, Ghana’s gold production improved from the 282,300 ounces produced in
1984 to 542,900 ounces in 1993. While the production of diamonds which stood
at 15,306 carats in 1989, by 1994 it had increased to 414,519 carats. Foreign
exchange earnings from the export of goods and services increased from $460
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million in 1983 to $1.2 billion in 1990 (World Bank Report, 1994). Nevertheless,
the fortunes of most African countries have not improved in spite of their
structural adjustment programs. Even Ghana, the success story of structural
adjustment policy in Africa, continues to face formidable socio-economic
challenges.
A theory can offer explanation of existing conditions. Not a few economic
development theories have been interpreted as suggesting strategies for the
successful development of less-developed nations.

Some even identify the

conditions under which technological development is most likely. Often there is
synergy between policy reform and a country’s level of development. Greater
technical and institutional capacity makes it easier to adjust policies to changing
conditions, and speed up the development process. Moving to a higher level of
development is the challenge facing Nigeria. The stimulation of technological
development is likely, but not guaranteed, when governments make decisions to
support it and supply the resources to speed the process. How such decisions are
made is the concern of decision making theory.
Decision Making Models
Decision-making is ordinarily formalized as a means-ends relationship:
means are conceived to be evaluated and chosen in the light of ends selected
independently of and prior to the choice of means. For decades critics have
lamented the fact that government often seems unable to manage major policy
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problems comprehensively. In Nigeria, the critical outcry has become particularly
shrill, as the military/political system struggles with complex new issues, such as
technological advancement, educational development, trade imbalance, agricult
ural decay, foreign debt crises, unemployment, inflation, corruption, and political
instability. These and other complicated issues would seem to require integrated,
long-term answers, instead of piecemeal and short-term adjustments. Some of the
decision making models which might have been used to tackle these problems are
summarized below:
The rational decision making model identifies a series of steps that
individuals or governments can follow to increase the likelihood that their
decisions will be logical and well-founded. A rational decision involves the
following elements: (a) The identification and description of a problem; (b)
Ranking and clarification of the goals, values, or objectives that guide the
decision-maker in assessing a problem and seeking alternative solutions; (c) The
identification of the various alternatives for dealing with a problem and the
ranking of each with respect to goals, values and objectives; (d) The assessment
of the consequences (costs and benefits, advantages and disadvantages) associated
with each alternative; (e) The comparison of each alternative, and its attendant
consequences, with other alternatives; and (f) The decision-maker then chooses
that alternative, and its consequences, that maximizes the attainment of his goals,
values, or objectives (Anderson 1984, 8).

Once these steps are completed, a

rational decision will permit the maximum achievement of an objective within the
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limitations imposed on the decision maker (Anderson 1984,46-7). This definition
addresses the rationality of means (how to best achieve an objective) and not the
ends (the objective itself).
According to Thomas Dye (1987) a rational policy is one that achieves
maximum social gain. Governments choose policies which result in gains to
society that exceed costs by the greatest amount, and governments refrain from
policies if costs are not exceeded by gains. Two guidelines are provided in this
definition. First of all, no polity should be adopted if its cost exceeds its benefits.
Second, among polity alternatives, decision makers should choose that polity
which produces the greatest benefit over cost. Rational polity making also
requires information about alternative policies, the predictive capacity to foresee
accurately the consequences of alternate policies, and the intelligence to calculate
correctly the ratio of costs to benefits (Starling 1977, 162-7). Thus, rational
decision-making requires that policy makers consider a complete range of options
and full information. Yet policy makers rarely attain this goal. Several aspects
of bureaucracies such as organizational parochialism, the search for organizational
and personal influence, the constraints of hierarchy, standard operating
procedures, limited time, failure to use available information, and secrecy, can foil
rational analysis.
Herbert Simon (1958) and James March (1978) argue that when dealing
with some types of problems, individuals do not always follow the rational model’s
six steps.

Herbert Simon introduced the bounded rationality model.
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The

bounded rationality model is particularly useful because it emphasizes the
limitations of the individual’s rationality, and thus provides a better picture of the
day-to-day decision making process used by individuals and governments.
Bounded rationality or optimal policy making uses the process identified with
comprehensive rationality, but instead of searching for all possible alternatives, it
searches for alternatives only within some limited range. Also, it does not seek
the best possible policy, but rather searches for an optimal policy. Because of the
many constraints on the process of searching for and evaluating alternatives,
policy makers "satisfice," that is, they stop their search for policy alternatives upon
discovery of an acceptable option. Simon coined the term "satisficing" to describe
this type of behavior.
The incremental policy making model views public policy as a continuation
of past government activities with only incremental changes. Charles Lindblom
(1963) argues that policy-making is an ongoing process. Policies are modified
incrementally as a result of successive limitations of time, information, and cost.
The incremental model recognizes the impractical nature of rational policy
making and describes a more conservative process of decision-making. Since
decisions generate incremental change, policy in a given area is not made once
and for all, rather it is made and remade continuously in a chain of incremental
steps, as in the annual budgetary review.

David Braybrooke and Charles

Lindblom (1963) argued that, not only is incrementalism an accurate depiction of
the way decisions are really made, but that it is preferable in many ways to
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alternative forms of decision-making. Incrementalism has become a form of
conventional wisdom especially in the budgetary process of institutions. Accord
ing to Aaron Wildavsky (1992) budgeting is incremental because decision- makers
generalfy consider last year’s expenditures as a base. It becomes possible to swap
an increase here for a decrease there or to increase all categories if the resources
are available without having to start the ultimate budgeting process every year
from scratch. Decisions for incremental change are relatively easy to make.
Policy makers do not expect to solve problems through such decisions, they just
try to make improvements in an evolving situation.
Amitai Etzioni (1967) has presented a mixed-scanning decision making
model. He argues that governments really make two different kinds of decisions fundamental and incremental. Fundamental decisions are radical changes in
polity, while incremental decisions are used to fine-tune fundamental decisions
after some of their consequences have been identified. This model permits
decision makers to utilize both the rational and incremental models in different
situations. In some instances, incrementalism will be adequate, in others, a more
thorough approach along the lines of fundamental changes not necessarily linked
to rationalism, often result from revolutions, and major political economic and
social changes. Thus, mixed scanning is a kind of compromise approach that
combines the use of incrementalism and rationalism.
Game theory is the study of rational decisions in situations in which two
or more participants have choices to make and the outcome depends on the
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choices made by each of them. It is defined as "the formal study of rationality
and consistent expectations that participants can have about each other’s choice"
(Schelling, I960; Bram, 1975). According to Thomas Dye (1987) the idea of a
"game" is that decision makers are involved in choices that are interdependent.
Players must adjust their conduct to reflect not only their own desires and abilities
but also their expectations about what others will do. Game theoiy is relevant to
the study of conflict situations - situations where two or more actors are
competing for values. A decision maker might use game theory to help formulate
the best strategy in a situation in which the prior decisions or actors of the
opponent are known. Game theory can be applied to decisions about internation
al diplomacy, war and peace, bargaining and coalition building in legislatures or
the United Nations, however, it has not been very useful in analyzing administra
tive decision making.
The political process model identifies the various processes occurring
within a political system when decisions are being made. Charles Jones (1984)
and Randall Ripley (1985, 48-55) describes the stages as follows. The first stage
is problem identification. This stage begins with a demand for government action
to resolve a problem or take advantage of an opportunity: it is an attempt to get
government to see that a problem or opportunity exists. The second stage of the
policy process is agenda-building. The policy agenda consists of those items that
policy-makers are discussing and seriously considering.

According to John

Kingdom (1984) issues become part of the agenda through the conjunction of
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problems, political and policies or solutions streams. The key to agenda and
policy change is the coupling of the streams at critical points, or windows of
opportunity. The third stage is policy formulation. Policy formulation is the
stage where steps are developed and plans are made to remedy a problem. The
expected result of the policy formulation is a solution to the problem. The fourth
stage is policy adoption. This is the stage where the proposed solution is
accepted by some person or group that has the power and authority to make
decisions. Policy adoption may occur through the legislatures, courts, or directly
by the chief executive. Budgeting is the fifth stage. To achieve the policy goals,
programs require funding. Implementation is the sixth stage. It involves carrying
out or executing a policy that has been adopted through legislation or by
executive or judicial order.
Jones (1984) argues that implementation involves three activities:
organization, interpretation, and application. Policy implementation is the stage
of policy making between the establishment of a policy - such as the passage of
a legislative act, the issuing of an executive order, the handing down of a judicial
decision, or the promulgation of a regulatory rule - and the consequences of the
policy for the people whom it affects. Without effective implementation the
decisions of policy makers can not be successfully carried out (Ripley, 1985). The
seventh stage is policy evaluation. The evaluation of policies is carried out by
government agencies, outside consultants, the press, and the public. The essence
of evaluation is to find out the impact of the policy. If the results are favorable
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the policy might continue, but, if not, it might be terminated or modified to
effectively solve the problem. In describing these processes, it is important to
remember that the activities of the various political actors are greatly constrained
by political, cultural and socio-economic conditions.
Public policy may also be viewed as reflecting the preferences and values
of a governing elite (Dye and Zeigler, 1981). The basic contention of elite theory
as a decision making model is that every human organization is controlled by a
small, cohesive minority. This is sometimes referred to as the "Iron Law of
Oligarchy".

Theorists of elitism agree that the development of an elite is

inevitable - pluralism is a myth. Power can never be widely distributed. The few
who govern are not typical of the masses who are governed. Elites are drawn
disproportionately from the upper socioeconomic strata of society. Thus, public
policy at times does not reflect the demands of the masses but rather the
prevailing values of elite. Changes in public policy will be incremental rather than
revolutionary because that is the preference of the elites.

Another way to

conceive of public policy is to think of it as a response of a political system to
forces brought to bear upon it from the environment (Easton, 1965). Systems
theorists agree that every system has several components. The elements of a
political system could be individuals, groups, or nations, depending on the scope
of the system. Systems theory portrays public polity as an output of the political
system.
activities

The concept of system implies an identifiable set of institutions and
in society that function to transform demands into authoritative
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decisions requiring the support of the whole society. Inputs are received into the
political system in the form of both demand and support. Demands occur when
individuals or groups, in response to real or perceived environmental conditions,
act to affect public policy (Easton 1965, 105).

Support is rendered when

individuals or groups accept the outcome of elections, obey the laws, pay their
taxes, and generally conform to policy decisions. Regardless of how the political
system copes with the stress, the point is that environmental disturbances can be
aggregated and unified through their influence on the level of support for a
system. The great advantage of systems tkeoty for the understanding of polity is
that it requires a consideration of how crucial information is in the business of
politics. By moving beyond formal institutional processes, systems theory can
account for the informal processes that connect the political system to external
influences.
The usefulness of systems theory for the study of public polity is limited
by its highly general nature. The greatest omission in the model is the conspicu
ous blank space labeled "the political system". It does not say much concerning
how decisions are made and polity is developed. Nonetheless, systems theory is
a useful aid in organizing our inquiry into polity formulation in Nigeria.
Public choice is one of the newest models of public policy or decision
making. Dennis Mueller (1979) asserts that public choice is the economic study
of non-market decision-making, or simply the application of neo-classical
economics to political science. Public choice uses the concept of the market
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except that, Instead of seeing a market for tangible goods and services, public
choice theorists think in terms of a market for votes and for specific public
policies. The market for votes and other political activity leads politicians who
want to be elected to espouse policies which will please voters. The aim of the
public choice model is to explain collective decision making in terms of the selfseeking behavior of rational individuals. The desire to maximize income and
security for more general utility is the motivating force behind all actions including voting. Public choice theory explains the behavior of individual voters,
politicians, and bureaucrats, but it can also be used to explain the interactions of
these groups. Edwards and Sharkasky (1978) asserted that public opinion is a
potential criterion for decision makers to determine policy. To utilize this gauge,
they need only consult and evaluate public opinion, and make their decisions in
line with the public’s wishes. Indeed, much of democratic theory assumes that the
public generates policy.
The garbage-can model of organizational choice is another decision making
model. The garbage-can model assumes that problems, solutions, decision makers,
and choice opportunities are independent, exogenous streams flowing through a
system (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972). They come together in a manner
determined by their arrival times.

Thus, solutions are linked to problems

primarily by their simultaneity. Relatively few problems are solved, and choices
are made without connecting problems with others (oversight), or, after problems
have been abandoned (flight). This situation of extreme loose coupling, called ”an
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open structure" in the original discussions of the garbage-can model has attracted
considerable attention in the literature, and empirical studies have revealed
decision processes that appear to approximate such an open structure (March and
Olsen, 1976).
Not all decision situations are quite so unstructured, however.

The

structures can be characterized in terms of two types. The first is the access
structure, i.e., a relation between problems (or solutions) and choice opportuni
ties. The access structure may require or not allow a particular problem, if
activated, to be attached to a particular choice (March and Olsen, 1976). The
second structure is the decision structure, i.e., a relation between decision-maker
and choice opportunities. This structure may require, allow, or not allow that a
particular decision-maker participate in the decision-making of a particular choice.
Access and decision structure can be imagined in any kind of arbitrary configura
tion, but two special forms have been considered. A specialized decision structure
is one that is decomposed into substructures that are open. Thus, a specialized
decision structure is one in which it is possible to divide choice opportunities and
decision-makers into subgroups, the process proceeds by matching the two sets
of subgroups so that every decision-maker in a particular subgroup of decision
makers has access to every choice opportunity in the marched set of choice
opportunities.
The principal-agent model is an analytical expression of the agency
relationship, in which one part, the principal, considers entering into a contractual
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agreement with another, the agent, in the expectation that the agent will
subsequently choose an action that produces an outcome desired by the principal.
According to Terry Moe (1984), and David Weimer and Aidan Vining (1992), the
principal-agent model attempts to explain why principals (such as shareholders)
employ agents (such as managers), to whom they delegate discretion. Other
examples of principal agent relationships are - lawyers and clients, patients and
doctors, citizens and politicians, executives and bureaucrats and so on.

A

principal may seek out an agent for various reasons; he may lack the special
knowledge or legal certification that the agents possess or may be unable to deal
with the size and complexity of the task required to coordinate action. Thus, the
agent knows something the principal does not, and there is a danger that the
agent will exploit this edge strategically. There is no guarantee that the agent,
once hired will in fact choose to pursue the principal’s best interests or to do so
efficiently (Weimer and Vining, 1992). The agent has his interests at heart, and
is induced to pursue the principal’s objectives only to the extent that the incentive
structure imposed in their contract renders such behavior advantageous. The
essence of the principal’s problem is the design of such an incentive structure.
This must be bound up with the development of monitoring systems as well as
mechanisms for inducing the agent to reveal as much of his privately held
information as possible. Terry Moe (1984) asserted that the principal must weave
these interrelated components into a contractual framework so that, in mitigating
the informational asymmetries and structuring rewards, it prompts the agent to
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behave as the principal himself.
The principal-agent model is ideally suited for the analysis of hierarchical
relationships, as well as facilitating an understanding of the core elements of
decision-making in any organization. Economists have long pointed to the supply
of public goods as a major justification for the existence of government and its
power to tax - but the problem that public goods pose, of course, is the failure of
markets. Citizens have inadequate incentives to reveal their true demand and to
contribute accordingly. Potential suppliers have inadequate incentives to produce.
A solution is for the government to act as the citizen’s agent, whereby it will
arrange for the optimal supply of public goods and tax each individual according
to the benefits they receive. Rational behavior then leads to various sorts of
contractual arrangements and cost effectiveness.
Whether the decision process selected by a policy-maker is rational,
incremental, driven by public opinion, or involves mixed-scanning, those who
make choices among alternatives must have some basis for doing so. Moreover,
policy makers, bureaucratic units, and special groups each have their own interests
to protect, and those interests influence the choice of options and information top
used by decision makers. No matter how rational decision-making may be, policy
makers’ options are severely restricted. Decision-makers need each other to
make policy, because they must bargain and negotiate to reach a decision. The
flow of information up a bureaucratic hierarchy and its collection through
standard operation procedures can distort the final outcome.
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While some

decisions may be the product of chance, inadvertence, random selection, or
inaction most decisions will involve conscious choice. The question then becomes:
What kinds of criteria (values or standards) influence the actions of decision
makers? Graham Allison's model will help us examine this question.
In his book, Essence of Decision - Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,
Graham Allison (1971) utilized a bureaucratic politics decision-making model to
describe how state policy is the result of competing activities among bureaucratic
entities and actors. He, and later Halperin (1974) contended that these actors are
constrained by their organizational roles and capacities.

Executive and

bureaucratic "players" compete over preferred solutions to particular policy
problems and use the resources available to them through their positions - for
example, hierarchy, control over information, access to key decision-makers, to
achieve their goals. Their views on what policy should prevail are shaped by their
positions within government; that is, the issue position of each player is defined
by the bureaucratic position he or she occupies, so that "where you stand depends
on where you sit" (Allison 1971, 171). Goals usually involve winning agreement
on the player’s preferred policy, but it can also involve the players gaining more
power, or acquiring more resources for their organizational unit. Winning can,
of course, lead to the achievement of all these goals, but losing can threaten even
greater losses, including those of power, access, and budgetary resources. For this
reason, players are encouraged to negotiate and compromise with one another in
order to minimize the impact of losing. Thus the bureaucratic decision-making
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model indicates that change in polity results from the potential for variable
outcomes in bargaining, negotiation, and conflict among actors involved. From
this perspective, polity clearly originates in the bureaucratic and policy-making
apparatus, not in societal relationships of power and domination.
The bureaucratic-authoritarian decision model focuses on the interaction
between the military and the civil administrators.

Increasing and intimate

communication between the military leaders and higher civilian technocrats,
couple with their growing frustrations with political and economic conditions
encourages the "coup" mentality that results in repressive bureaucratic-authoritari
an systems (Collier, 1979).

According to Alfred Stepan (1976) and Guillermo

O’Donnell (1973) military-bureaucracies have shaped the sustained policies of
Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uraguay, Ghana, Nigeria, Egypt and Indonesian
governments.
Under the bureaucratic-authoritarian model, bureaucrats supply the
administrative framework that enables a ruling military junta to maintain its power
and direct economic change. In the bureaucratic-authoritarian system, however,
the state exerts more centralized power. Army officers and civilian administrators
dominate both central and regional government, and they often try to coordinate
the policy process (Bienen, 1978). Although families, churches, universities, the
media, and especially large-scale domestic private business enterprises and
multinational corporations retain some autonomy, the civil-m ilitary institution
regulates their actions. In Nigeria as well as in many Latin America and Asian
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nations, the military, the civil servants, the police, and the technocrats from largescale domestic private firms and multinational corporations influence the policy
malong process. The underlying concern of this dissertation is whether or not
such centralized military-bureaucratic systems can effectively describe the
relationship between the Nigerian military junta and the traditional bureaucracy
in the process of decision making and implementation.
The central research question in this study is: What is the relationship
between the Nigerian military junta and the country’s bureaucracy in the decision
making and implementation processes and how has that relationship been shaped
by the colonial legacy?
In order to answer this question a hybrid system decision-making model
has been developed for an analysis of the Nigerian SAP/Make-or-Buy policy. The
model draws attention to the relationship between the decision and its environ
ment, and it views that relationship purely in terms of a feedback loop that is
based on a sequential (output-feedback-input) type of coalition. The relationship
between higher bureaucrats and the Nigerian military junta cannot be captured
by simply examining the larger institutional network; it must also account for the
influences working in the Nigerian environment. That environment in this study
means: (a) Nigeria’s political instability, economic pressures, debt crisis, ethnicity
dilemmas and religious divisions; and (b) the international environment such as
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the London and Paris clubs.
Such an approach provides the starting point for a different definition of the
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problem that is based on an awareness that the Nigerian "environment" influences
the political system. The hybrid model focuses attention on important and salient
input considerations by Nigeria’s military decision-makers whose strategies are
directed at reducing their margin of uncertainty.
Summary
The purpose of this chapter has been to review the literature relevant to
this study.

This examination of scholarly works centers on the problems

encountered in the political development of newly independent nations, the fragile
nature of their political systems, and the considerable difficulty they confront in
making and implementing public policy that serves the needs of their citizenry.
Nigeria is a very young country, weighted by a colonial legacy and challenged by
ethnic and tribal divisiveness that has been even more exaggerated in the period
following independence. The country’s political system functions in the absence
of a developed civic culture, and its legitimacy has been questioned irrespective
of who controls it, whether civilian or military.
While much of the economic development literature is focused on internal
development, the role played by international forces and institutions cannot be
ignored.

The pressures exerted by the International Monetary Fund, the

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on the Nigerian political
system, as well as on the country’s economic and financial structure, cannot be
and is not ignored. The chapter also analyzes how on one hand, Ghana and
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Indonesian military regimes have enacted sound structural adjustment policies,
while on the other hand the Nigerian'army in the process of correcting the
economic crisis caused by previous civilian governments, turned out to create a
general atmosphere of corruption and poor quality of life.
Finally, the literature is concerned with bureaucratic decision-making, and
in particular how the bureaucracy and the Nigerian military establishment share
responsility in the shaping and making of public policy.
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CHAPTER HI
RESEARCH DESIGN
The central concern of the study is the relationship between the Nigerian
military junta and the country’s traditional bureaucracy in the process of decision
making and implementation. After first reviewing the legacy of colonial military
and bureaucratic patterns, the study describes the factors which weighed heavily
on the Nigerian Federal Government when it decided to decree the structural
adjustment (SAP)/Make-or-Buy policy in 1986. It then analyzes in detail the
higher decision making processes and assesses the effectiveness of the implemen
tation of the structural adjustment/make-or-buy policy. The study discusses how
and why this policy decision-making departed from the normal policy making
procedures in some ways, yet was typical in others. The implementation process
is also explored and efforts made to determine why the ministries responsible for
the execution of the policy behaved so differently in putting it into effect. The
indigenous factors explored are political, economic, ecological, ethnic, environ
mental and socio-cultural.

External factors involve the World Bank, the

International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the consideration given to import
substitution, employment creation, the availability locally of a particular
technology, and the possible saving of foreign exchange.

71
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The Historical Context
The legacy of the British colonial administration in Nigeria is examined
first in Chapters IV through VI in order to provide the necessary background for
understanding Nigeria’s current political, military and bureaucratic institutions.
The policy-making roles played by these institutions as well as their responsibility
for the implementation of policy are examined to illustrate Nigeria’s attempt to
escape dependence on external interests.

The character of the military -

bureaucracy relationship from the colonial period to the present frames Nigeria’s
decision-making and policy implementation.
The kind of context-setting research questions that needed to be answered
here include:
1. How did British colonial policy influence Nigeria’s post-independence
political life? (Chapter IV).
2. How did British colonial policy affect the development of the Nigerian
military during and after independence? What are the reasons for the frequent
military interventions? (Chapter V).
3. How did British colonial policy affect the development of the Nigerian
public bureaucracy? What has been the role of the bureaucrats in making
decision or public polity? (Chapter VI).
4. What circumstances in the political/economic environment of Nigeria (a) internationally, and (b) domestically - prompted the development of the
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Structural Adjustment/Make-or-Buy policy? (Chapter VII).
5.

To what extent did instability in the political/economic environment

constitute pressure on the nation’s leadership to examine and re-evaluate its
policy? (Chapter VI and VII).
Background on the Structural Adjustment/Make-or-Buy Policy
The introduction of the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy occurred at a time when
Nigeria’s economy could be regarded as approaching collapse. However, in what
way can we measure the impact of political instability or disturbances that affect
the functioning of a political system? The hybrid system model is intended to
show diagrammatically the functioning of the Nigerian political system prior to,
and during the making of, as well as the implementation phase of the SAP/Makeor-Buy policy. It depicts the major domestic and international relationships and
pressures upon the government. The domestic pressures include: economic
conditions, the organizational pressures, the intra-societal environment, and the
debt crisis. The international pressures include: the debt crisis, the political
pressures exerted by the World Bank and the IMF that hastened the making of
the policy.
Internal and external environmental pressures caused the Nigerian military
government to develop the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy. The external environmental
pressures that led to the formulation and implementation of the policy caused the
military to neglects or limits important aspects of an ongoing decision-making
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process wherein the Nigerian bureaucracy augments, facilitates or resists the full
implementation of the policy. The hybrid system model makes provision for the
roles played by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and the Ministry
o f Trade and Industry (MTI), but does not explain the different reasons for the
internal resistance that developed among some of the ministries that were charged
with the policy’s implementation.
Use of political and bureaucratic-authoritarian systems analysis proved
helpful in explaining, at least in part, the various responses to the SAP/Make-orBuy policy. The bureaucratic response to the policy was largely reinforced by
perceptions of their institutional mandates. Each ministry performed its tasks as
a self-contained sub-unit of the government. This is substantiated by the fact that
while all the ministries were involved in the implementation of the SAP/Make-orBuy policy, each ministry pursued its own objectives, according to its own light
and irrespective of the requirements of the policy.
In the general area of technology and R&D, the Federal Government of
Nigeria called for a uniform action that could not be achieved in the different
ministries. Each ministry had its special constituents who encouraged it to, or
discouraged it from implementing the policy. Each ministry viewed itself free to
decide whether the development of new technologies would be performed inhouse or contracted out. The autonomy represented by the different ministries
in effect neutralized the military junta’s call to privatize all new R&D monies.
The relationships between the military leaders and the higher bureaucrats

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

varied from ministry to ministry. The Ministry of Defense and Communications,
which have close links exercised significant influence over the location of
departm ental^ funded R&D, and they responded relatively well to the policy.
The Ministries of Agriculture and of Energy, Mines and Resources, however,
which possessed sim ila r powers in locating departmentally funded R&D, had less
access to the junta, and they responded less well, and, in fact, openly opposed the
decision.
A Hybrid Political System Model
To analyze the above points and processes in greater dept, a hybrid system
model has been developed and applied to the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy to help
explain policy inputs and outputs in the Nigerian political system. This hybrid
political system model (Figure 1) shows the major reletionship between external
and internal decision making. It also helps to illustrate how a set of fairly
consistent inputs from the international environment (the recognition of Nigeria’s
debt crisis and the efforts of the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund in instructing Nigeria how to deal with it), as well as from the domestic
environment (i.e.,the recognition by organized citizens organized groups,
government agencies that the country has a serious debt crisis) induced the
military junta to decree the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy. The task is then to describe
and analyze these relationships in Chapter VIII. Given the magnitude of the
problems challenging the Nigerian political system, two assumptions can be made:
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(1) The political system is subjected to a number of influences that are generated
both internally and externally, and they in combination will have bearing on the
future of Nigeria’s current political system; and (2) The Nigerian political system
suffers from the considerable strain caused by frequent military coups, and the
country’s economic dislocation can be attributed to the failure of that political
system to adapt successfully to international and external pressures.
The federal ministries that were involved are strictly concerned with public
sector management which includes policy making and implementation. They
specialized in health, science and technology, education, sanitary engineering,
agriculture, defense, mineral exploration and extraction and so on. Through their
professional contacts, the bureaucrats in the ministries generate challenges to
existing policies on the basis of new ideas or the diffusion of policy innovations.
The ministries also push agendas which commonly involve mandated or suggested
standards of service. Thus, the ministries provide government with a set of
coherent policy intentions and implements those intentions in the political system
of Nigeria.
The study will also shows that a number of ministries charged with the
policy’s implementation resisted doing so while others proved more supportive.
Among the reasons for compliance or non-compliance are the relative differences
in input from the military juntas, but it may also be a consequence of different
perceptions of responsibility or different allocation of resources between the
ministries.
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Tensions were also found between statutory mandates where ministries are
required to obey or comply with a law and a mandated policy. In the case of
SAP/Make-or-Buy policy, the statutory mandate is superseded by the decion of
the Armed Forces Ruling Council. The statutory mandates of the ministries, and
the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy mandate represent conflicting inputs in those
ministries charged with implementing the policy. The Armed Forces Ruling
Council expected the policy would be implemented as decreed. The ministries,
however, as subsidiary authorities within the political system, also made decisions,
and thus affected the outputs impacting the political system. The relevance of
political system response to these cross pressures cannot be underestimated
particularly when the survival of Nigeria as a nation may be at stake.
Two things becomes clear from the use of a this model. First it allows one
to account for the enormous variety of influences coming from the environment
and impacting the political system. Second, it posits that these influences obtain
whether the political environment is stable or fluctuating wildly. To fill in and
apply the model a series of general questions need to be answered.
1. How are we to systematize our understanding of the way in which the
disturbances or influences from the Nigerian environment are transferred to a
political system?
2. Do we have to treat each change or disturbance in the political
environment as a particular or general type, and must we examine their specific
effects in each instance?
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3.

If the answer to question two Is positive and the enormous variety of

influences are acknowledged, what are the limitations for systematic analysis?
The answers to these questions lay in carefully sifting and reducing the
enormous variety of influences to a relative few and, thereby giving the study
manageable proportions. This is what this study seeks to do with respect to the
decision-making process in Nigeria’s structural adjustment polity. The research
will assist in clerifying the problem encountered in evaluating both in the
academic sense of "explaining" polity, and in relation to the day-to-day monitoring
of Nigerian polity performance.
Operational Research Questions on Current Decision Making
The operational research questions developed to apply my hybrid political
system model are:
1. Does lack of consultation with the implementators in a bureaucraticauthoritarian system produce different degrees of resistance or support in the
implementation of development polity? (Chapter VIII)
2. What decision making procedure did the Nigerian government follow to
enact the Structural Adjustment/Make-or-Buy polity? (Chapter VIII).
3. What was the polity? What was it intended to accomplish? Why did
the military government expect this polity to achieve its stated purpose?
(Chapter VIII).
4. What was the relationship between the Nigerian military and the career
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administrators in the formulation of the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy? Did the
ministries, possess adequate resources for implementing the SAP/Make-or-Buy
policy? (Chapter VU1).
5. Did the individual ministries view the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy as
consistent with the mandates of their particular ministry? Why and how did the
ministries support or resist the policy? What do the financial data reveal about
the various ministries’ implementation of the policy? (Chapter VIII).
6. After nine years of implementation have any new technologies emerged
to justify the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy? (Chapter VH3).
7. Has the national economy improved as a direct consequence of the
SAP/Make-or-Buy policy? (Chapter VTII).
8. If the purpose of the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy is the economic
development of Nigeria, has it succeeded in (1) the public sector, and (2) the
private sectors (Chapter VIII).
9. What is the future of the structural adjustment policy? (Chapter IX).
Procedure and Treatment of Data
To address the above questions this study has used both structured and
unstructured interviews, as well as published government documents and books
about Nigeria. I administered 100 questionnaires and conducted 100 interviews.
The interviews were designed to obtain the insights and opinions of those senior
government officials who, in the past, played important roles in the decisions
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regarding the choice of technology in government projects. Government officials
as well as military officers who are currently engaged in that role were also
interviewed. All of the interviews were conducted in Lagos and Abuja in the
1995-96 academic year. Most of the interviews were confidential and designed to
shed light on the early development of the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy, but they also
complement published reports and analysis on the appropriate technology debate
in Nigeria.
The interviews took two forms. One form involved the use of a prepared
questionnaire. This approach was used for technical officers, most of whom are
experts both in the ministries and on project sites. The questionnaire was
administered to the officials or was completed by them in private. The former
approach was mostly used to ensure immediate and personal response. The latter
was used only when the respondent was not immediately available, and there were
very few instances of this. A less structured form of interview was used for the
very top government officials of the grade of Director-General to gain their
opinions concerning the SAP/Make-or-Buy decision making process. The sources
of documentary information used from within the federal government were: (a)
Federal and Local Publications; (b) Specific Government Ministries Officials (i.e.,
Ministries of Agriculture, Communications, Defence, Energy, Mines and
Resources, and Trade and Industry; (c) Central Bank of Nigeria Publications; (d)
Industrial Sector Reports; (e) Nigerian Federal Office of Statistics Publications;
and (f) Embassies, Consultants; and (g) Libraries - National, States and
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Universities. The non-government sources of information came from (a) Trade
Association; (b) Technical Reports; and (c) Media.
A study of documents from the Central Bank and Official files of the four
ministries studied proved very useful in providing information on categories of
officials who were directly involved in the decision making process.
Data on contracts awarded by the four ministries (i.e., Agriculture,
Defence, Communication and Energy, Mines and Resources) between 1987 and
1994, were analyzed to find out the amount and/or number of R & D contracts
that were contracted out to the private sector. The financial data of federal
ministries and the Central Bank of Nigeria were utilized to assess the compliance
of the ministries with the policy.
Combining interview and public record data offers significant advantages.
Interviewing in general, allows the me to study a complex situation in great depth,
and provides the opportunity to gain insights that may not be possible using other
methods. The use of documents and records allows the researcher to collect
more accurate and detailed data than any other method. The researcher does not
need to rely on the memories of respondents, and as such the use of documents
and records are particularly appropriate for the study of the decision making
process. Only the participants in a decision making process can know what
information was relied upon, what options were available, and why the final
choice was made.
A disadvantage of employing the interviewing technique is that there might
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be a selective perception and interpretation on the interviewee's part (Miller,
1969; Bonoma, 1985). Being careful to record everything that is said and using
structured responses where appropriate helps to overcome the disadvantages.
There also may be reactive effects of the researcher’s presence on the interviewee
(Babbie, 1992). Babbie explained that there is no complete protection against
this effect but sensitivity to the issue may provide partial protection.
Whenever the selection of a data collection technique is made, there is a
trade-off between data integrity (error and bias factors) and currency (real-world
applicability or external validity). To the extent possible confirmation of a fact
has been established through its repetition in several interviews or through
documents.
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CHAPTER IV
COLONIALISM AND NIGERIA’S ETHNIC LEGACY
Introduction
Nigeria was until October 1960 a British colony, and from the colonial
experience, it inherited a number of British institutions and values. The political
tensions which Nigeria has experienced since independence are rooted in part in
the regional structure of administration imposed by the British. The territory of
present-day Nigeria was defined, not on the basis of shared historic, economic or
social experiences, but by the arbitrary amalgamation of a number of disparate
ethno-cultural units which happened to occupy contiguous land areas then under
British colonial administration.

Nigeria’s independence exaggerated and

intensified ethnic and tribal rivalries, and a savage civil war threatened its
republican status between 1967 and 1970.
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how British colonial polity
influenced Nigeria’s post independence political life. Two aspects of this legacy
and their consequences are noteworthy. The first is what we will refer to as pre
independence politics. It will trace the stages of British entry into the area now
known as Nigeria. It will also show how the integration of several ethnic groups
by the colonial regime in tandem with the emergent nationalist elites created an
84
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early tendency towards tribal rivalry in the political system. Second, the post
independence federalism section shows how development needs permitted wide
discretion for public intervention. This also led the nation to formulate policies
geared towards stimulating demands for public amenities, protection, subsidy and
patronage. The consequences of these policies further led to the struggle for
opportunities and wealth among the different ethnic groups.
Pre-Independence Politics
The existence of people within the territory of what is now Nigeria can
be traced back to 5,000 BC, when some groups appear to have settled and
practiced agriculture. The existence of large states such as Kanem Bomo Empire
and the Sokoto Caliphate (Muslim Kingdom) with centralized governments
beginning about the 19th century is well-known (Tamuno, 1972). Between the
11th and 15th centuries a series of Islamic Hausa states flourished in the north
of Kano, Kasina, Zaria and Nupe (see map in Appendix A). In the south there
were empires centered at Ife, Oyo and Benin. Ife, despite a later decline in
political influence, retained a spiritual and institutional importance. Its bronzes
and terracotta sculptures are world famous. Folklore has it that descendants from
Ife founded the Kingdoms of Oyo and Benin. Economically Oyo became an
important trading and crafts center, and with the aid of a strong cavalry it soon
forged a powerful empire. The Benin political system rested much more on a
sacred monarchy and palace bureaucracy whose powers were checked by
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associations of title holders. Its main period of imperial expansion was in the 14th
and 15th centuries and is well illustrated in the famous bronzes produced in
Benin. In the south-eastern part of Nigeria, the Ibo and other ethnic groups
evolved societies that were loose federations without a strong central authority or
king. In fact out of the 250 ethnic groups in Nigeria the vast majority had their
own societies based on subsistence agriculture with appropriately strong political
or military establishments as their geographic proximity fo others groups required.
The first European contacts date from the late 15th century, when the
Portuguese had their first meetings with the kingdom of Benin (Nigerian
Factfinder, 1995). Trade was initiated in peppers and later in slaves. The arrival
of other Europeans furthered the rise of the slave trade: the British began to
replace the Portuguese as leading traders on the coast of West Africa, and slaves
rapidly became the major export (Ikime, 1969). According to Ajayi (1965) and
Tamuno (1972), estimates of slaves that were exported from West Africa range
between 30 and 40 million people. Many of these were Nigerians. The internal
effects of the slave trade encouraged military instability and severely discouraged
agriculture and economic advancement. The exported adults constituted the
source of manpower for economic development in the West African region.
Biobaku (1965) asserts that the northern part of Nigeria was largely
untouched by the Europeans. Trade was still conducted principally with North
Africa.

In the 19th century the north witnessed a series of revolutionary

upheavals within the Hausa Kingdoms, initiated by Usman Dan Fodio, a Muslin
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leader of the Fulani ethnic group. The result was the replacement of the Hausa
Kings with Fulani rulers and the establishment of the Sokoto caliphate. There
was clearly a moral, intellectual, religious and reformist thrust to Jihad (holy war)
exemplified in the North by Usman Dan Fodio. Under his leadership the Fulani
formed a cohesive group with superior cavalry to police the whole Sokoto
caliphate.
The slave trade on the coast of West Africa came to an end in the 19th
century when Britain became economically ready for a changeover from a
mercantile sugar-based trade (which centered on an exchange between slaves and
sugar) to an industrial economy, which required raw materials like palm oil from
West Africa and could utilize a potential market for manufactured goods there,
as well (Ikime, 1969). Fearing challenges to its economic supremacy in Africa
and desiring to control future economic prospects, Britain prepared to undertake
direct political control (Tamuno, 1972). At the 1883 Conference of Berlin,
European powers reached agreement on how they would partition Africa, and
Britain set about the military conquest of the Nigerian people. The decisive
factor in the conquest according to Ikime (1969) was clearly the superior
European military technology, but there was strong resistance in many areas, and
the conquest was not achieved without the bloody and ruthless use of modem
weapons, especially in Benin (Niger delta area).
The British conquest of Nigeria, one of the world’s most ethnically diverse
societies with its over 250 identifiable ethnic groups, led to the establishment of
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a colonial administration in 1900 which was not particularly sensitive to the variety
or history of these groups. Before the British conquest, these ethnic groups had
never been under a single administrative system. The Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Ibo,
Kanuri, Tiv, Edo, Nupe, Ibibio, and Ijaw groups together account for almost 80
percent of the population. There are however three very large ethno-linguistic
groups - the Hausa-Fulani in the north, the Yorubas in the west and the Ibos in
the east. Each of these major ethnic groups are surrounded by smaller groups
known as the minorities which, added together are more numerous than the
major groups combined. The overwhelming majority of the northern population
is Muslim, and Muslims are widely thought to comprise more than 50 percent of
the total population. Christianity is strong in the south, accounting for perhaps
35 percent of Nigeria’s total population, while the balance of the population
practice traditional religion. The ethnic groups which have now been resurrected
to constitute the component units of a confederation were different sovereign
nations before the colonial era. The British overlooked the importance of this
history. Larry Diamond (1983), contends that for half a century - from the time
that separate protectorates were declared for Northern and Southern Nigeria in
1900 to the Constitutional Conference of 1950 - Nigeria was ruled in an essentially
authoritarian fashion by the colonial power. But that fashion of ruling was not
uniform across the country. The colonial government’s policy was not to dissolve
traditional political structures but rather to rule through the aristocracy of the
conquered peoples - it was this idea that lay at the heart of the concept of
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"indirect rule". Even after the formal am alg am ation of the two protectorates in
1914, the British continued to rule Nigeria, in effect, as two countries.
British companies began to promote trade and support missionary work
in the coastal areas of Nigeria in 1885. According to Rolf Theen and Frank
Wilson (1995), the British seem to have been motivated by a European notion of
"dvflizrag" Africa by ending the slave trade. British companies operating along
the valley of the Niger River had come together to form the Royal Niger
Company. In order to take proper hold of their trade along the Niger River
valley, the British Royal Niger Company asked for the King’s authority, i.e., a
charter, to administer the area. This Charter was granted to the Royal Niger
Company in 1885 and withdrawn in 1900. The area came under the supervision
of the colonial office in 1900. That same year the British Foreign Office changed
the name of the Niger Coast Protectorate to the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria.
The land formerly administered by the Royal Niger Company became the
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria.
The third phase of British entry to Nigeria also involves trade. The British
established an extensive market for Nigerian palm oil beginning in 1861. As their
political and economic interests in Nigeria expanded, the British formally acquired
control over the area. Lagos became a British colony in 1861; all Yorubaland
became a British protectorate in 1888, and the Iboland was added to what was
called the Niger Coast Protectorate in 1893 (see Figures 2 and 3).
Northern Nigeria resisted British penetration because they felt that the
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British colonial rule would destroy their well developed political, homogenous and
religious communities. It was not until the conquest of Sokoto in 1903 that the
Sultans and Emirs of the north accepted British rule. The strong pre-colonial
political structure in the north made the British colonial government decide to
establish "indirect rule" there. Such a policy appealed to the parsimonious minds
of Treasury officials as being less costly, but more importantly it provided an
effective guarantee of a stable means for the extraction of economic surplus.
According to William Graf (1988), the underlying motives of colonialism was thus
to ensure the effective and unchallenged exploitation of the colony to the benefit
of British finance and industry.
Indirect rule perpetuated inter-ethnic and inter-regional differences.
Moreover, the traditional authority of the rulers rested largely upon their ability
to maintain ethnic-group cohesiveness, tribal customs, and their distinctiveness
from adjacent groups. Indirect rule therefore, reinforced the most conservative
aspects of traditional political organization, and shut out other tendencies towards
multi-groups cooperation. The system worked well in the North where there was
Fulani aristocracy but, in the South, things did not work so smoothly because the
British did not understand the southern forms of political organization where
there were no clear ruling groups as such. William Miles (1994) asserts that the
irrationality of colonial-era world politics is well illustrated in the northern Niger
ian case since part of Hausaland, one of the more developed pre-colonial political
entities in Africa, ended up in the British colony and another part further north
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came under French rule in the colony eventually known as Niger.
The first error of the federal structure of Nigeria sprang from the British
colonial heritage. It was characteristic of most British colonial policy making that
it failed to have any long term plans, but rather extemporized and reacted to
nationalist or regional pressures. Throughout this period the British government
did not prepare for the time when the different geographic regions would become
one nation, the largest in Africa. From 1900 to 1914, Northern and Southern
Nigeria were treated as separate entities, although the British government had
already recognized the confined territories by the name Nigeria. The name
"Nigeria" was invented by an African correspondent of the Times of London as
a convenient means of identifying the diverse West African peoples and regions
that had been added to the British empire. Nigeria was derived from the word
"Niger” which is the name of the river that constitutes the most remarkable
geographical feature of the country. Together with their tributaries, the Niger
River and the River Benue have served as the most important means of
communications linking the peoples, through whose land they flow.
In 1914, Northern and Southern Nigeria were amalgamated under the
governorship of Lord Lugard. To assist him oversee the two Protectorates,
lieutenant-governors were appointed and stationed in Kaduna and Enugu.
Kaduna and Enugu became the new capital of the Northern and Southern
respectively. The Southern Protectorate was split into two in 1939 and renamed
the Western and Eastern group of provinces. Ibadan became the capital of the
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Western Provinces and Enugu continued to be the capital of the Eastern
Provinces. Lagos also retained its status as a colony.

The amalgamation,

however, did nothing to unite the peoples of Nigeria, and successive governors of
Nigeria in Lagos had the utmost difficulty in persuading the lieutenant-governors
of the North to follow their policy (White, 1981). The Eastern and Western
groups of provinces were named Regions in 1946 and this was the setting until
Nigeria attained independence on October 1, 1960.
The Northern region comprised roughly 56 percent of the population and
almost three-quarters of the area of Nigeria in 1960. This was one of the reasons
why Amadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and Premier of the North, assumed
a powerful position most incompatible to Nigeria’s unity at independence.
The South was divided into two regions in 1939, so that at independence
in 1960 the new federal state of Nigeria was made up of three regions each with
a political center of gravity in its major ethnic and historical group: the Hausa,
Fulani and their Kanuii allies in the North, the Yoruba in the West and the Ibo
in the East. Each of these majority groups comprised some two-thirds of the
population of their region while the remainder consisted of a number of different
minority tribes. For example, in the Eastern region, there were non-Ibos such as
Ijaw, Efik, Ibibios, Idomi and Ogoja people. In the North, there were the Tiv,
Idoma, Igbira, Igala and Jukun peoples, together with those of the plateau area,
Adamawa and Southern Zaria, and a number of Yoruba peoples in Ilorin. All
of these peoples differed from the ethos of the dominant Hausa-Fulani empire.
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As independence approached, the minorities became more restive, and although
some identified with the regional power and accepted its patronage, others
campaigned for a Middle Belt Region comprised of Non-Muslims and Non-Hausa
Fulani people.
According to James Coleman (19S8), despite the internal tensions in the
region, the Northern ethos was an attractive one to most of its inhabitants. The
empathy between British administrators and Northern Nigerians was considerable
and characterized by mutual respect. This is probably because of the pre-colonial
well established political system in the Northern part of Nigeria. All the northern
administrators were able to speak Hausa, the main language of the region, and
had a considerable pride in the North and its rather conservative ethos of indirect
rule, which nonetheless allowed for considerable development by native
authorities in partnership with district officers who were British. At indepen
dence, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Federal Prime Minister, spoke of the
changing relationship between the British and the Nigerians as being one "always
as Friends". By this statement, he was drawing on his Northern experience. The
sense of Northemness extended even to the Middle Belt people who were neither
Hausa nor Muslim. Okion Ojigbo (1980) asserts that creation of the Northern
ethos was a thing of value but the North as a governmental unit should have been
abolished and replaced by a larger number of constituent regions or states if
Nigerian federal unity was to survive. The British colonial administration had its
last chance to break up the large regions with the establishment of the Willink
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Commission of 1957-1958. Lennox Boyd, however, as the Colonial Secretary,
tilted the balance against the creation of new states by saying that to do so would
involve putting off independence for two more years, which nobody wanted to do
(Coleman, 1958).
After World War II, Britain began making arrangements for a staged
withdrawal from Nigeria. The country was in theory more or less unitary because
the governor in Lagos had formal authority over all Nigeria, but in practice the
degree of suspicion between regional governments was considerable. When the
British colonial administration started reforming the nation, it produced a series
of constitutions which ignored the obvious balances of federalism and were
therefore unworkable. The first Constitution was the Clifford Constitution of
1922 to 1945. This Constitution provided for a Legislative Council for Nigeria.
This Council made laws for the western and eastern protectorates, as well as for
the Lagos colony. The Governor-General of Nigeria was empowered to make
laws for the northern group of provinces, the rationale for which is not known.
The order establishing the Legislative Council in 1922 was amended in 1928 and
in 1941. On each occasion the number of legislators and of Nigerians participat
ing in the council was increased.
The second constitution, the Richards Constitution, was enacted in 1946.
The constitution was named after the then Governor-General of Nigeria,
Governor Arthur Richards (later Lord Milverton). It provided for a central
legislature for the whole of Nigeria and three Regional Houses of Assembly, one
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for each group of provinces, with advisory powers only in regards to legislation.
The Richards Constitution made it possible for the first time in the history of the
nation for representatives of the northern and southern regions to have direct
contact in Lagos. The Richards Constitution failed to provide for a proper
federal legislature since its members were to be co-opted from local native
authorities or elected by the regional legislative councils. One very serious defect
of the Richard Constitution of 1946 was that the Governor-General was not
required to consult with the people he was authorized to administer, according to
constitutional stipulations. As a result, the constitution was widely criticized by
the emerging political class as unfit for Nigerians.
The third constitution was the Macpherson Constitution which came into
effect in 1952. The constitution was named after Sir John Macpherson, the
governor-general who succeeded Arthur Richard in 1951. The Macpherson
Constitution created, for the first time, a Council of Ministers with twelve
Nigerian members. These twelve council members were chosen on regional
bases. The constitution afforded increased regional autonomy and extended to
Nigerians a fuller share in making policy and in the direction of executive
government action.
The desire for greater regional autonomy and the need for precise
assignment of functions between the center and the regional governments made
it apparent that yet another constitution was required almost immediately.
Conferences on a fourth constitution (the Federal Constitution) were held in
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London in 1953 and in Lagos in 1954 (Nigerian Year Book 1993, 78). Under the
Federal Constitution, the central government bad occlusive jurisdiction over such
matters as aviation, census, customs, defence, exchange control, external affairs,
immigration, police, shipping, mines and minerals, post and telegrams, railways
and trunk roads, trade and commerce between Nigeria and other countries, and
between the regions. Jurisdiction was shared between the federal and regional
governments on matters relating to bankruptcy, electricity, industrial development,
insurance, labor, registration of business names, scientific and industrial research,
statistics and water supply.
The obvious lack of cohesion resulting from the constitutional allocation
of functions was apparent in the 1953 cabinet crisis over the proposed resolution
for self-government in 1956. The resolution was sponsored by the Southern
members of the cabinet who considered 1956 to be an appropriate time. This
resolution was rejected by the Northern members who wished for self-government
as soon as practicable. The North, was outnumbered in educationally qualified
persons by about ten to one and it feared close union would give control to the
better educated southerners. Two explanations can be given for the difference
in educational achievements between northern and southern Nigeria. The first
explanation is that the British entered the country from the sea and introduced
Christianity and English education in the southern territory long before their
influences reached the north. The second explanation has to do with the way the
British colonial administration managed the affairs of the country. They ruled
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Nigeria as two countries and their educational policy may well have been designed
in that fashion. Therefore, the North’s mistrust of strong federal power was
basically a fear of losing jobs, contracts, government patronage and strong
religious identity. In the latter instance, the spread of Christianity in the Islamic
north was resisted given the strength of Muslim religious commitment and their
belief that Islam was superior to Christianity.
Following the self-government debate in 1956, Northern ministers were
harassed in Lagos and at every southern railway station on their return home. A
campaign team of the Action Group, the party of the Western Region, led by
Samuel Akintola, at that time a lieutenant of Awolowo, came to Kano (a
Northern City) and was deliberately waylaid by thugs organized by local leaders
of the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC), the ruling party of the North (Dunn
1977, 135). The resultant riots and two-day war between the traditional city of
Kano where the Muslim Northerners lived and the New Town (which is called
Sabo Gari) where Southerners or Christians lived caused at least thirty-five
deaths, and made it clear that many in the North would react violently if they felt
they were likely to be ruled by Southerners in Lagos.
Nigeria’s effort to achieve independence from British rule began almost as
soon as the colony was consolidated in 1914. Nationalist groups seeking home
rule and later independence had begun operating as early as the 1920s. Within
the independence movement was a group headed by Herbert Macauley (Tamuno,
1972). He founded the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) in 1923.
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The NNDP was the first Nigerian political organization to advocate independence
from Britain. By the mid-1930s, the NNDP was challenged by a new and more
militant nationalist group led by Dr. Nnamdi AzDdwe, the Nigerian Youth
Movement (Theen and Wilson 1956, 491). Although their goals were similar
their timetables and their degree of militancy differed.
Regional and ethnic differences were evident in the various groups
associated with the independence movement. Eventually, separate nationalist
groups were formed in each area: the Ibo dominated National Council of Nigeria
and the Cameroons (NCNC - Known as the National Congress of Nigerian
Citizens after independence) in the southeast; the Yoruba-led Action Group (AG)
was formed in the southwest, and the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) among
the Hausa-Fulani people of the north. Even in their efforts to oppose British
imperial rule and to seek independence these groups found it diffic u lt to unite.
Each nationalist group became involved in political struggles in its own region and
defended regional interests in national politics.
At constitution conferences held in London in 1957 and 1958 respectively,
it was agreed that the Eastern, Western and Northern regions should become selfgoverning by March 1959. The British government also agreed that if a resolution
asking for independence was passed by the Federal Parliament early in 1960, her
Majesty’s Government would agree to that resolution. The British government,
in pursuance of this undertaking, introduced the required Bill in Parliament to
make Nigeria a fully independent country on October 1, 1960. Elections to the
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new House of Representatives were held in December, 1959. The victories of the
NPC, the AG, and the NCNC in their home regions established a close identity
between the region, its political party, and its dominant ethnicity that was to
heighten over the course of the 1950s.
The results of the 1959 election led to an alliance within the federal
legislature between the NPC and the NCNC When the office of federal prime
minister was created in the late 1950s, NPC President Sir Ahmadu Bello chose
to remain the premier of the North, and the party’s vice president^ Abubakar
Tafawa Balewa, became prime minister. He then constructed a coalition cabinet
embracing all three major political parties. Oyeleye Oyediran (1979) asserts that
even though the two southern political parties had a sufficient number of seats to
have formed a coalition government, the NCNC found it more expedient
politically to join with the NPC in a coalition government. Tafawa Balewa, deputy
the leader of the NPC, became prime minister and Nnamdi Azikiwe, president of
the NCNC, was president of the Senate, and later, Nigerian Governor-General.
Lariy Diamond (1983), contends that despite the significant anti-democratic
currents in the 1959 elections, the colonial administration maintained some
semblance of political order and electoral integrity, and the keen anticipation of
independence produced a post-election spirit of accommodation.

Although

battered by the extraordinary bitterness of the campaign, the tacit preelection
alliance between the NPC and NCNC matured into a coalition government led
by the former, which was only a few seats short of an absolute majority in
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Parliament. The alliance was facilitated not only by the NCNC’s desire to bridge
the North-South divide on the eve of independence, but also by both political
parties’ resentment of the AG’s aggressive effort to mobilize ethnic minority
groups in their regions. Unknown at the time was the outcome o f the first
elections after independence which were to confirm the domination of the new
nation by the northerners.
Post - Independence Federalism
At the meetings of the Federal Legislature in January 1960, both the
Senate and the House of Representatives unanimously passed the resolution
calling for independence. The British government approved this resolution and
granted Nigeria the status of an independent and sovereign nation. Thus, Nigeria
achieved independence on October 1,1960, but with minimum internal cohesion.
The constitution of this First Nigerian Republic was based on British parliamenta
ry government with a prime minister and cabinet dependent upon the support of
a majority of the parliament. William Graf (1988), contends that the sheer size
and diversity of Nigeria, particularly after a half-century of indirect rule, precluded
any total transference of the unitary Westminster model to the post-independence
nation. The homogenous nature of British society, its consensual political culture
and its advanced degree of industrialization - the latter achieved partly at the
expense of the colonies at the periphery- ensured the proper operation of
parliamentary government there. None of these conditions were present in post-
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independence Nigeria (Gra£ 1988). The British, therefore, in consultation with
Nigerian successor elites, superimposed on the Nigerian territories a system of
federalism which, like federalist governments elsewhere, were to permit a degree
of autonomy to the different units. But binding the different ethnic groups into
a voluntary association dominated by a central government was another matter.
And in spite of numerous objections and protests, particularly from Nigeria's
minority group representatives, the British expected the federal model to unify the
various territorial sub-sections under a single government.
Post-independence experiences, however, soon demonstrated that more
meaningful factors than federalism and the common colonial heritage had to be
utilized in the effort to achieve that degree of national cohesion that could assure
a politically developed and stable society. The problems of nationhood, revolving
around the issue of power sharing, brought Nigeria to the brink of fragmentation
and disintegration soon after independence. The most pressing issues of nationbuilding which Nigeria faced were the questions of defining the new nation and
the related issue of creating an effectively integrated polity. These issues arose
because the concept of the "nation” among "Nigerians" was still very abstract.
Although the various groups that composed the independence movement had
shared a common goal and often acted as a common front, they did not air or
resolve their disagreements. Thus, their shared identity was for independence, not
for an integrated Nigerian nation.
The elimination of the British colonial administrators at independence,
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intensified ethnic competition. Powerful new positions and rewards came within
the grasp of the new elites, and ethnic competition for these positions was intense.
Added to this scramble for power was the fact that regional imbalances induced
by the colonial attractive economy persisted and in most cases became more
pronounced (Graf, 1988). These imbalances generally spilled over ethnic group
boundaries, thus reinforcing inter-ethnic competition and creating a further source
of instability. The wealthier Yoruba and Ibo (western and eastern) regions feared
that the poorer northern regions which in Nigeria happened to be the most
populous regions, would use their political power to force a redistribution. At the
same time, the poorer regions resented their status which they tended to see as
the outcome of ethnic politics.
No sooner was independence achieved than Nigeria’s post-independence
political experience became a particularly turbulent one.

Several factors

contributed to political instability. These included a shaky tripartite federal
structure with strong regionalism, disparity in the size and populations of the three
regions, tribally sustained political parties, ambitious politicians, most of whom
were unfamiliar with national politics, and a weak constitution. These were the
major contributory factors to an unhealthy political development in Nigeria.
According to Adedeji Adebayo (1981) and Ladipo Adamolekun (1986),
social groups maintained their indepedence from government control after 1960.
As in the colonial period, ethnic groups exerted considerable political power,
particularly over the regional governments. The Hausa-Fulani controlled the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

north, the Yoruba the west, and the Ibo the east. The Bini, Ibo, and Urhobo
formed the three largest ethnic groups in the smaller midwestem region.
In a similar manner, religious groups maintained the political independence
they had secured during the colonial period. In the north, Muslim leaden
controlled the educational and judicial systems and reinforced the power of the
Hausa-Fulani aristocracy. In the south, hurehes played a less important political
role. Even though Muslims and Christians competed for conversions among the
Yoruba people, their ancestral city (family birthplace), not their religious
affiliation, shaped political allegiances. Most Ibo joined Christian churches, which
provided the educational opportunities needed for upward social mobility into the
governmental and private business sectors.
Post-independence occupational pluralism also characterized the first
Nigerian republic. Dominant economic groups included the Fulani business elites,
Hausa merchants, and Ibo and Yoruba executives. Below them in the economic
stratification system came some lower-ranking professionals (doctors, lawyers,
teachers), small-scale traders, and clerics. A few Nigerians worked in coal mines,
textile factories, construction firms, ports, and railroad networks. Around 80
percent of the labor force farmed the land, raising for either for their subsistence
needs or for the export market. Even though all these economic groups had the
freedom to articulate their policy prefemces, the business elites possessed the
greatest organizational ability to press their claims on government officials.
Nigeria’s major problem was the distribution of political power, a situation
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that was aggravated by the existence of several political parties and a multiplicity
of ethnic groups. It was not so much that the competitors for power were too
many. Rather a basis for the equitable distribution of power was either lacking
or ill-defined. The major competitors for political power were the Northern
Peoples Congress (NPC) and Hausa-Fulani in the North, the Action Group Party
(AG) and the Yoruba in the West, and the National Convention of Nigerian
Citizens (NCNC) and the Ibo in the East. Also competing were the virile but
minority ethnic groups such as the Edo, Urhobo, and Isoko in the Mid-West, the
Tiv and Idoma in the Middle Belt, and assorted others in the Calabar-Ogoja-River
(COR) area.
Another weakness of Nigerian federalism in the First Republic (1960-66)
was the fear of the South that it was being dominated by the political power of
the North not only because of its tradition of assumed right to rule, but also
because its share of the population (more than SO percent), which gave it a
majority of seats in the Lower House of Parliament on which executive power
depended. In a federal system the Upper House provides a way of checking the
threat of majority domination by giving equal representation to states of unequal
population size. Under the First Republic, the South, with its two, and later,
following the creation of the Mid-West, its three regions, enjoyed a majority in the
Senate. The Senate’s powers however, modelled after those in the British House
of Lords, was a more ceremonial body with little effect on law making.
Obafemi Awolowo’s failure to become the prime minister can be regarded
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as the original source of the Action Group crisis of 1962 and the accompanying
treason trial (Oyediran, 1979).

As leader of the opposition in the federal

legislature, Awolowo accused prime minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of wasting
the country’s resources, with giving preferences to the North, with operating a
spoils system that benefitted his northern constituents, and with overall misman
agement and corruption. The defence pact signed between Britain and Nigeria
formed the central focus of Awolowo’s attack on colonialism (Oyediran, 1979).
Awolowo claimed that the pact had been extorted from the Nigerian government
by Britain as a condition for granting independence. As Action Group party
leader, Awolowo also had differences with premier, Samuel Akintola. Their
disagreement centered on Akintola’s acceptance of the federal prime minister’s
idea for strengthening national unity through the three major political parties.
Awolowo strongly opposed this idea and used his newspaper to criticize Akintola
as well as the policies of his Western Region government. This dispute resulted
in fighting in the Western Region’s Parliament and it caused Balewa to declare
a state of emergency.

Balewa also suspended the regional legislature and

executive, and sent Dr. Majekodummi, as his special administrator. But when the
state of emergency was lifted, the federal government ignored Majekodummi’s
advice to hold regional elections and instead reinstated Akintola who obtained a
majority in the Regional House with his new party, the Nigerian National
Democratic Party (NNDP).
The non-Yoruba peoples of the Western Region, the Edo, Itsekiri, Isoko,
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Urhobo, Mid-west Ibo, Ishan, Ijaw and other peoples of the Mid-west region were
likewise attracted to the regional government by ties of power and patronage.
When the opportunity arose they voted overwhelmingly for the creation of their
own Mid-West state in 1963.
In the Eastern Region the non-Ibo peoples, the Ibibio, Efilt, Ijaw, Idomi,
and Ogoja people, looked to the regional capital Enugu for patronage as long as
political power was exercised from that regional capital. But when two states
were created for the minority peoples o f the East in 1967 fay Colonel Yakubu
Gowon, they, for the most part, welcomed this dispensation and identified with
the federal side in the civil war. Thus, the Nigerian case has been a great and
continual pressure for the creation of new federal units. To every minority the
prospect of the creation o f its own state is both a chance for patronage and for
government position, as well as spiritual enhancement.

Thus, the First Republic (1960-66) failed to meet the challenges of
unification and development Regional and ethnic conflict overwhelmed efforts
of parliamentary government Corruption was widespread and the first democratic
government lost its legitimacy. Moreover, in the growing political crisis, the
government proved incapable of preserving domestic order as the politicians
ignored the necessary tensions and spreading violence.
The 1962 census became the focal point for much of the tension and
violence. The Southerners feared the census would result in the permanent
dominance of the more traditional and allegedly more authoritarian northerners.
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On the other hand, the northerners saw the southerners complaint as a tactic
aimed at their monopolizing control of the national government (Theen and
Wilson, 1996).

When these conflicting perceptions could not be reconciled,

tribal, regional and ethnic violence intensified. Attacks were launched against
Ibos in northern cities and the TV uprising of 1964-66 was a dear consequence
of this disorder. Election campaigns were also accompanied by violence and the
results of the elections were denounced as fraudulent or rigged. By the end of
1965, unrest and violence were common throughout Nigeria. In the Western
Region, the near total breakdown of law and order provided the army with its
opportunity to interpose itself between the waning parties.
Summary
Nigeria’s disunity is in pan a reflection of the form and character of the
governmental system and structure imposed by the British government during the
period of colonial rule. The development of southern and northern Nigeria
between 1898 and 1960 marked important stages in the evolution of the Nigerian
state. By 1914, when Lord Lugard amalgamated Northern and Southern Nigeria,
most of the 250 different ethnic groups had been forced to yield their pre-colonial
sovereign powers.

Nevertheless, the Northern peoples, with a well developed

culture and political structure, resisted European influence. The Yoruba, the
Ibos and several of the Southern ethnic groups, however, were more vulnerable
to European ideas. Given these circumstances, the British colonial administration
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did not prepare Nigeria for a democratic system of government before granting
independence. Thus, shortly after independence, politics resembled an ethnic
"tug-of-war", with the different regional parties structured not along class or
ideological lines, but reflecting the interests of rival ethnic groups.
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CHAPTER V
THE NIGERIAN MILITARY
Introduction
The Nigeria military has been the subject of a number of studies (KirkGreene 1964; Dent 1970; Luckham 1971; Ukpabi 1972; Odetola 1982; Graf 1988).
The Nigerian military has been described, variously, as a dictatorship, a body of
nation-builders, an all powerful "national watchdog", ineffective administrators,
change agents, politicians in uniform, and arbitrators, or guardians of Third World
countries. During the last two decades, students of Africa such as Oyediran
(1979), Mazurui (1986), Diamond (1993), Ihonvbere (1994), Theen and Wilson
(1996), have characterized the Nigerian military as corrupt, arrogant, ethnic
oriented, and responsible for the political decay and underdevelopment of the
country. Henry Bienen (1983) and Dent (1978) have also noted the inability of
the military regime to contribute to political and economic development. They
contend that the expansion of the role of the military into governing has seriously
impaired its professionalism. It is their opinion that military officers can indulge
in politics only at the cost of their fighting skills (Bienen, 1983).
Robert Jackman (1976) contends that military intervention in the politics
of Third World countries has no unique bearing on social change, regardless of
111
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either the level of economic development or geographic region. Other scholars
argue that the low pace of modernization and political development in a new
nation is what produces military takeovers, but such intervention will eventually
have beneficial consequences for the country. They believe that the military is
better able to organize a Third World country’s effort at modernization because
of its ability to impose political order in an otherwise tumultuous setting. The
military can provide discipline, organization, and hierarchical control that civilians
often find elusive as they seek to govern and change their societies (Maniruzzaman, 1987).
Critics of the military’s role as modernizer stress that the organizational
logic of the armed forces is different from that of political formation and
development (Janowitz, 1977). Samuel Huntington (1968) also has expressed
doubt on the ability of the military to develop effective political institutions,
especially those institutions like political parties that organize broader citizen
participation - that is, the very institutions that are needed for political develop
ment. The political skills needed for developing a viable and self sustaining
political system include, among others, ideological commitment, the capacity to
respond to new challenges and the arts of administration, negotiation, representa
tion, and bargaining. The Nigerian military has not demonstrated the requisite
political and economic skills needed in a developing country.
The purposes of this chapter are: (a) to analyze the development of the
Nigerian military during the colonial period; (b) to examine the reasons given for
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the frequent intervention of the army in Nigerian politics; and (c) to examine the
Nigerian army’s role in nation-building. This chapter examines the nature of the
military in Nigeria, military government, and the consequences to a society of
military rule.
The Colonial legacy
One of the prominent legacies of British Colonial Government in West
Africa is the Nigerian army. Many British companies operated along the valley
of the River Niger before 1850. The British, however, colonized Lagos in 1861
and the following year formed the Lagos constabulary. While this was going on
in Lagos, in 1862 all the British companies along the Niger delta merged to form
the Royal Niger Company. The reason for the merger was to achieve total
control and promotion of trade in palm oil along the Niger valley. During this
period palm oil was exported to Britain as a raw material for the soap and
margarine industries. In order to take complete control of their trade along the
River Niger valley, the Royal Niger Company asked the King of England to grant
it the authority to administer the area. Ukpabi (1966) contends that after the
Royal Niger Company was granted a Charter in 1886, it assumed administration
of the Niger delta. The charter authorized the company to raise the Royal Niger
Constabulary. This quasi-military power was used to enforce the authority of the
British colonial administration. When the British colonial government expanded
its influence into the hinterland and consequently came into conflict with the
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inhabitants, it found it necessary to increase the size and improve the training of
these forces. Kirk-Greene (1964) asserts that in 1892, the Niger Coast Protector
ate Force numbered about 40 ordinary ranks, but by 1900 this force had risen to
a strong battalion of nearly 1,000 men. This British colonial force was divided
into the police and the regiment forces.

While the police force was then

delegated to handle civil matters and the maintenance of law and order, the
regiments were deployed to deal with military matters such as the protection of
the territorial boundaries of the protectorates. In 1901, the various regiments and
dependencies o f Great Britain along the West African coast (Nigeria, Gold Coast
- now Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Gambia) were merged to form the West African
Frontier Forces (WAFF). In Nigeria the WAFF had two regiments - one in the
north and the other in the south. On January 1, 1914, on the day that the north
and south were amalgamated to form Nigeria, the two WAFF regiments were
merged. WAFF was changed to Royal West African Frontier Forces (RWAFF)
in 1928. RWAFF became the Nigerian Army in 1960.
The RWAFF was administered as a truly colonial force. British officers
and non-commission officers (NCOs) were deployed to serve in all units. The
Nigerians in the colonial military were mostly ordinary ranks and conditions were
required for the granting of a commission (i.e., high school diploma and the age
of 22 years) (Ukpabi, 1972). Before 1949, there were no officers of Nigerian
origin in the army. By January 1949, however, some Nigerian soldiers were
selected for training as officers (Jemibewon, 1978). Duke Bassey was the first
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Nigerian to be commissioned into the Officer Corp of the Nigerian Army in April
1949, followed by Aguiyi Ironsi and Sam Ademulegun in June 1949. Other
Nigerian officers later commissioned included Ralph Sodeinde (April 19S0),
Babafemi Ogundipe (August 1953), Adeyinka Adebayo (December 1953), Nwawo
(May 1954) and Francis Fajuyi in November 1954 (Achike, 1978).

David

Jemibewon (1978) asserts that out of the 250 officers in the Nigerian army in
1956, only 15 were Nigerians. The General Certificate of Education (ordinary
level) with an age limit of 22 years made it difficult to raise enough qualified
Nigerians to send for training to the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in
England, where the earlier group of officers were trained. While the officer corps
had few Nigerians, the other ranks were overwhelmingly staffed with Nigerians by
1958.
During the 1940s and 1950s service in the army was unattractive for a
variety of reasons. The people of Nigeria did not see the role of the military
during the colonial period as promoting civilization and humanitarianism. On the
contrary, they regarded the military as an instrument fashioned by an alien
authority for the purpose of destroying the political independence of the various
tribes and their cherished way of life (Ahmadu 1962, 23). Under the prevailing
situation it was not surprising that the colonial military had a negative rather than
a positive influence on the society. In many situations the army uniform was
depicted as only suitable for dubious children of tribal chiefs and traditional rulers
(Omojukun, 1979).
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The legal control of the RWAFF was firmly vested in the British
government, which was represented in each of the four member states by a
governor. While the governor exercised the power to deploy the local units in the
state, the British Army Council reserved to itself the powers for deploying the
army to international or foreign assignments (Achike, 1978). Thus, the General
Officer commanding in each region was responsible to the Governor (title
Commander-in-Chief of the RWAFF unit in the state) and also to the General
Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the West African Command, who was directly
responsible to the War Office in London. The RWAFF structure was transferred
to the Nigerian army in 1960, and this has become the structure of the Nigerian
army to the present day.
The transfer of the RWAFF military tradition was another matter,
however. First, a high standard of discipline and training was m ain tain ed . Most
of this was inherited through the numerous administrative regulations and
provisions of the British Army Act (Jemibewon, 1978). The system of documenta
tion and monitoring of accountability in the Nigerian army’s administration
continues to remain fashioned to the British model. It is also interesting to note
that after 36 years of political independence, Nigeria still uses official British
military acts like the Manual of Military Law and Queens Regulation as authority
in dispensing justice in the military. Secondly, the British tradition had the
characteristics of inspiring its troops with a sense of belonging to a united or
monolithic force. It had been deployed in action under a national army and had
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won battle honors which became a source of pride in the history of the nation's
force. Thirdly, the RWAFF has been a platform of interaction among the four
member countries (Nigeria, Liberia, Ghana and Sierra Leone) for over 90 years.
Such a long association must have contributed to the identification of
similar national objectives and the basis of military cooperation in the region.
The Royal West Africa Frontier Force units, however, were not insulated from
the internal politics of their respective states. Ukpabi (1972), contends that
British officers in the Nigerian Regiment played an important role in the political
development of Nigeria. Long before independence, a number of army officers
were appointed District Commissioners, and after the consolidation of British rule
many officers remained on in administrative or political posts. A few example of
such officers may be relevant. Major J. H. Burdon, who was the commandant of
the Royal Niger Company Constabulary in 1898-9, was appointed the Resident
of Sokoto in 1903-6, and 1909-10. In 1926, Major F. Jeffries was the Divisional
Officer of Onitsha Division while in 1943 Captain Glover, the first administrator
of Lagos and Frederick Lugard, the first commissioner and commandant of
Northern Nigeria, were military men (Ukpabi 1972, 73).
The attainment of independence by Ghana in 1957 led to the disintegration
of RWAFF, and on April 1, 1958, Nigeria assumed full budgetary responsibility
for its military. Okay Achike (1978) asserts that between 1958 and 1960 the
process of handing over control to the Nigerian army was gradual and the British
still made grants to augment the financial provisions of the military. Further,
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about 82 percent of the Officers corps was still British. However, with the
assumption of ministerial control by the Prime Minister in February 1960, the
transfer of the military to Nigerian administration was completed. The new
Nigerian administration of 1960 began to introduce policies aimed at correcting
certain defects of the military. For example, before 1958, when the Nigerian
government took over the primary financial responsibility for the upkeep of the
Nigerian military, the British government recruited most of the infantry from
Northern Nigeria while the technical units were staffed by men from Southern
Nigeria (Ukpabi, 1972). This British colonial practice did not make for the
development of a fully representative Nigerian army.
As soon as the Nigerian administration took over the control of the
military in 1958 efforts were made to ensure that ordinary ranks were recruited
from all parts of Nigeria. The prevailing regional recruitment quotas of 50
percent from the North and 25 percent from the West and East was agreed upon
when Nigeria took over the control of the military in 1958. The North was given
a quota of 50 percent because it was larger in size and population than the
southern regions. Policies were also enacted to ensure that each military unit was
mixed, that is each unit should contain men from several ethnic groups. In
addition military units were not allowed to stay too long in one place lest it
become engulfed in local politics.
The uniform of the colonial army which featured British emblems was
changed to a new green,and is comprised of a long-sleeve jacket, long pants and
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a peaked cap. The old RWAFF emblem of a palm tree was replaced with an
eagle and a star. Efforts were also made to recruit university graduates into the
military, in order to raise the quality of the Nigerian officer corps and the image
of the military. Ukpabi (1972) contends that this attempt to improve the image
of the military and to secure its loyalty to the government in power led to large
increases in army pay. It was hoped that these increases in pay would attract
many people to want to join the army, thereby giving the military the opportunity
to select only the best candidates to fill the various quotas allotted to the regions.
In order to further change the trends of imperial training and power and
to assert the independence of the Nigerian military, Nigerian troops were sent for
training to the United States, Canada, India and Australia, thereby abandoning
the practice during the colonial period of having such soldiers trained only in
Britain.
The strength of the Nigerian army in 1958 was only 7,600. The General
Officer Commanding of the army announced the plan to increase the size in May
1964, by about 2,900. Of the 10,500 in April 1965, only a little over 500 belonged
to the officer corps - 330 of whom were combatant status (Oyediran, 1979).
William Gutteridge (1964) contended that three to five hundred officers in a
country of forty million based mainly on five military stations, the majority of
which were far from the capital, could not be regarded as a political factor of the
greatest importance. The fact that this numerically small army was able to take
control of the political power without much difficulty less than two years later

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

shows that Nigeria political leaders underestimated the military custodian role.
The process of building a national army for Nigeria begin in 1958. The
Nigerianization of the officer corps was stepped up at the same time as British
officers were redeployed to the United Kingdom in anticipation of Nigeria’s
independence.

According to Ukpabi (1972), by 1960 only 60 British non

commission officers remained where four years previously there had been more
than 300. After 1963, all the battalions were commanded by Nigerians and in
1965, the last British commander of the Nigerian army left the country, to be
followed a month later by the last British serving officers in the Nigerian army
(Miner 1971,104; Peters, 1995). The composition of the military after that time
reflected an agreed upon regional quota system. Nigerian soldiers were recruited
on the basis of 50 percent from the Northern region, and 25 percent from the
West and East regions respectively. The same quota system prevailed in the
recruitment of officers. Robin Luckman (1971, 201) contends that Nigerian
soldiers saw themselves as citizens of the nation, and as such were affected by the
political circumstances challenging the nation. Because of the quota system,
however, officers and ranks had cause to represent their individual regions, not
the more abstract national state. This crisis of identity led some soldiers to
develop parochial attitudes that inclined them more to regional governments and
their political leaders, and less to national issues.
A review of the structure of the Nigerian military between 1958 and 1965
shows that it was divided along ethnic lines: a majority of the officers of the rank
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of major or above were Ibo, but most junior officers and ordinary ranks were
from the middle belt minority tribes of the Northern Region (Ostheimer, 1973).
The younger officers, lieutenants and captains, made attempts to redress the tribal
imbalance, but those predominantly northern and western officers preferred a far
slower rate of advancement. The building of a new Nigerian military after the
departure of the British colonial army opened vacancies for young officers at the
higher levels, and this made some of them superior colonels at young ages. Once
these vacancies were filled, however, the rank structure became frozen, stifling the
junior ranks by the mid 1960s. The frustration and anger of the junior officers
was seen in the killing of the superior Ibo officers in 1966 (Luckman, 1974).
The Government of Nigeria at independence in 1960 still regarded the
Queen of England as the Head of State, therefore the army was named the Royal
Nigerian Army. On attainment of a Republic in October 1963, the army changed
its name to the Nigerian Army. Many Nigerians were trained and commissioned
as officers to replace the outgoing British officers. During the transition period
the British government mixed political activities with those of the military. For
reasons which the British did not explain, most of the military facilities and
training grounds were located in the northern part of Nigeria, especially around
Zaria and Kaduna. Ukpabi (1972) contends that the location of military facilities
in the north might be due to political rather than strategic reasons. In 1914, with
the amalgamation of the South and North, Nigeria had four battalions. Two
military battalions were stationed in the North, one in the West and the other in
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the East. The Nigerian administration seems to have followed this British pattern
in locating military institutions after independence. The Military School was
located in Zaria (1960); the Nigerian Defence Academy (1964) in Kaduna; the
Command and Staff College at Jaji (1973), near Kaduna; the Institute of Policy
and Strategic Studies (1976) at Bukuru, near Jos; and the Nigerian War College
(1992) in Lagos. The Nigerian War College is the only military institution in the
southern part of the country. The politicization of the Nigerian army is also
reflected in the pattern of recruitment, promotion and discipline (Luckman, 1974).
This preferential location of facilities has led to the northern domination of the
army’s higher ranks for the last 25 years.
Post-Independence Intervention in Politics
Three major schools of thought have been developed in an attempt to
explain post-independence military intervention in the politics of Nigeria. The
"internal characteristics model" suggests that one can explain military intervention
in politics mainly by reference to the internal organizational structure of the
military (Janowitz 1964, 27-9). The social background of the officers, their skill,
centralized command, hierarchy and career lines, internal social cohesion and
cleavages, degree of professionalization, and political ideology within the military
are important factors which help explain direct military intervention. Morris
Janowitz stressed that intervention will also arise due to organizational decay in
the military.
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The "custodian" theory by Samuel Huntington (1965, 1969) contends that
the military is the custodian of the nation’s constitution and as such it feels
impelled to intervene when constitutional propriety is being violated. He asserted
that the military will usually be willing to return to the barracks after a dispute
has been settled. Thus, the military only acts as the guardian to check the
activities of corrupt civilian administrators, and to ensure political stability.
Huntington (1969), stressed that the military will intervene when civilian
government lacks legitimacy due to inadequate electoral support and ineffective
executive.
Thus, the praetorian army will tend to replace weak and unstable political
regimes. Samuel Finer (1969) argued that the most important cause for military
intervention is the low or minimal political culture of the society concerned. The
interpretation of military coups, both Huntington and Finer assert, relates to the
characteristics of the Nigerian army. Finer, more than Huntington, stressed the
role that corruption plays in intervention.

He noted that in Nigeria some

members of the ineffective military leadership have been found to be corrupt,
inept, and to pursue self seeking ambitions. The most vehement repudiation of
the "custodian thesis" is the argument made by Wole Soyinka (1972, 15) that the
Nigerian military is more corrupt than other institutions. He denounced the
military regime, proclaiming it to be a regime of humiliation and tyranny and a
dictatorship whose tyranny imposed a travesty of justice far beyond any ills which
have been witnessed in the civilian regime. Henry Brienen (1976) found similar
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opposition to the military among civilian politicians, though they still were willing
to work under a military regime.
The first military intervention in Nigeria was led by the late Major
Chukwuma Nzeogwu on January 15, 1966. The military’s main argument for
intervention at the time was that the civilian government’s loss of legitimacy
reduced its ability to deal effectively with the conditions which were destroying the
country. The statements of the majors who carried out the coup demonstrated
beyond doubt their deep concern with reforming Nigerian life.

Because

politicians were perceived by the officers to be at the center of corruption, the
military decided that the politicians must go. Major Nzeogwu, the coordinator of
the January 1966 coup, states: "Our purpose was to change our country" (Schwarz
1968, 191). The coup resulted in the death of the federal prime minister, the
finance minister, and the northern and western premiers. Other reasons given for
this intervention by the military included the succession of intense political crises,
the deepening polarization, the incessant political instability, and civil strife.
Further reasons given included the style and tone of political behavior and
conflict, the violence, the repression, and the failure to play by the rules of the
game. Nigeria by the time of the intervention had passed through six years of
civilian incompetence, inefficient executive leadership, gross abuse of office,
corruption, and a resulting lack of economic development. The precipitating
factor which galvanized the military to intervene was the violence which erupted
from the two political parties headed by Awolowo and Akintola in the Western
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Region of Nigeria. The attempt by Major Nzeogwu and other middle ranking
officers in Lagos, Kaduna, and Ibadan to take power was unsuccessful, but it
forced the civilian cabinet to hand over the administration of the country to
Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi.
In the course of the first military intervention four out of five of Northern
senior officers, two out of six Yoruba senior officers, and one out of ten of the
Eastern senior officers also were murdered. Among civilians, the deaths were
equally one-sided. Abubakar, the prime minister from the North, and OkotieEbor, the federal finance minister from the Mid-West region, were murdered in
Lagos. The Sardauna of Sokoto was killed in Kaduna, and Akintola was killed
in Ibadan. There was no violent coup and no deaths in Enugu and Benin, and
the premiers of the East and Mid-West regions, who were both Ibo, survived
unscathed (Dudley 1982, 79; Peters 1995). This one-sidedness may have been
partly due to operational considerations, since any group from one tribe tends to
associate more with its fellow tribesmen and not regard them as potential
enemies, but its effects were catastrophic to the Northerners. Major-General
Ironsi escaped the coup in Lagos and put himself at the head of the Northern
NCOs who had rallied with Northern officers to put down the coup. General
Ironsi later emerged as the new leader of Nigeria after the federal cabinet handed
power to him in an effort to restore order.
The demise of the First Republic was a severe blow to Nigeria’s political
system. Reactions to events differed profoundly between the East and the North.
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The distrust arising among Northerners and some Westerners, and the failure of
General Ironsi, himself an Ibo, to try the Ibo conspirators who had murdered
fellow officers and political leaders, made it almost impossible to reform the
federal system. William Graf (1988) contends, that the ease with which the
military was able to assume political power is astounding. A relatively small army
(10,500 men in 1965), lacking in experience (80 percent had no more than four
years in service), poorly educated (66 percent of combat and non-combat officers
had no more than secondary education before being commissioned), and
extremely young (62 percent were between 20 and 24 years old) had destroyed
the First Republic, eliminated many of its most prominent leaders, and assumed
the power to lead the nation (Dudley 1976, 36).
In spite of the carnage, the army was a popular institution and it initially
won over the Nigerian public. With its rigid discipline, austere nature, ability to
get things done, devotion to duty and seemingly more selfless attitude, the army
was regarded as the savior of the country. After the coup many things were said
and done to discredit the former politicians and some Nigerians prayed for many
years of military rule. According to Ladipo Adamolekun (1985), the Federal
Military Government under General Ironsi as Head of State and Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces moved from the federal model to an extreme
centralization of power. All legislation was by decree, and noncompliance to an
order was subject to strict penalties.

Decree Number One proclaimed the

doctrine of unitary government, which was strongly supported by radicals and by
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most Ibos who stood to gain from what was percieved to be an open job market.
General Ironsi declared the military government was only a "custodian regime"
(Finer, 1969), but that extreme measures were needed to correct problems in the
Nigerian political system. One of such problem, he noted, was the regionalism
that threatened national unity. He therefore appointed military governors in each
of the four regions. All regional governors were expected to be men under
authority obedient to their superior officers in Lagos.
In order to fulfil its task of creating greater unity in Nigeria the military
government needed a common purpose and a climate of trust among Nigerians.
Neither purpose nor trust existed among the people as a whole nor in the army
where the bulk of the combatant soldiers, the NCOs and the ordinary ranks were
Northerners.
The initial impetus of the military regime to rule decisively was soon
dissipated, and the Federal Supreme Military Council did not use its powers
under Decree Number One to legislate for the regions. Every issue was to be
interpreted in regional and tribal terms, thereby creating a continuing struggle for
power. General Ironsi proved less perceptive by appointing an Ibo to investigate
the prospects for rapid unification of the four regions and federal civil services.
Since control over the regional civil service was cherished by northerners as a
safeguard against Ibo infiltration and domination they disliked his plan. Popular
support for some of the government’s moves, such as investigations into the
corruption of politicians, was undermined by the sudden accumulations of wealth
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by elements of the military officer corps (Ohonbamu, 1970). The most important
factor in General Ironsi’s loss of popular support, however, was his haste in
proclaiming a new Unitary Constitution (Decree #34 of May 24, 1966) even
before the commission directed to study a new constitutional arrangement could
turn in their report. This decree galvanized people to riot in the north, and the
riot quickly became an attack against Ibo sectors of northern cities, where an
estimated three thousand people were killed. Whatever the Ironsi regime had
done to legitimate military intervention could not overcome the suspicion that
tarnished it. As a result, the distrust, riots, and bloodshed which took place in
various parts of the country led to a counter-coup organized by northern officers
in July 1966.
General Ironsi’s regime was short lived. He and the then Western Region
Military Governor, Colonel Francis Fajuyi, were kidnapped and killed by mutinous
troops in late July 1966. After several days of anarchy, Colonel (later General)
Yakubu Gowon an officer from the middle belt of the North, emerged as the new
Head of State. He promptly prepared a decree restoring the federal structure
and promised an early return to civilian rule as soon as a constitutional
conference could meet and agree upon a design for a new system of government.
Gowon rebuked the murderous soldiers of the May 1966 riots and slowly re
established discipline and control, but the basis of trust for his military regime had
been fatally undermined.
During riots in September and October 1966,30,000 Ibos were killed in the
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North, in a slaughter far beyond the scale of previous riots in May of the same
year (Ostheimer, 1973). The Hausa-Fulani were still incensed at the earlier
assassinations of their leadership, and the presence of thousands of Ibo traders,
businessmen, and civil servants living in the North presented a constant reminder
of this communal bitterness. The mass killings forced Easterners from all over
the federation to migrate in search of refuge (Oyediran, 1979). With close to a
million Ibo refugees fleeing south, it became clear that the Ibo dominated Eastern
region was considering secession under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel
Odumegwu Ojukwu. A constitutional conference was called to discuss the
political predicaments facing the nation, but no consensus was reached because
the various regions and ethnic groups demanded too much political power for
themselves. On October 3, 1966, the constitutional conference was adjourned.
Economic sanctions were placed on the Eastern Region when its leaders refused
to participate in further dialogue concerning the political impasse.

Non-

Easterners, other than Mid-West Ibos, were expelled from the Eastern Region.
Colonel Ojukwu announced that the constitutional arrangements of the national
government of Nigeria no longer represented a guarantee to the military
government of Eastern Region. Ibo lives, and property could not be protected.
The Ibos had lost confidence in a federated Nigeria and had no illusions about
the chances of welding Nigerians into a single nation. Therefore, secession of the
Eastern Region became inevitable.
In May 1967, Gowon tried to prevent the secession of the Ibos by
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appointing a National Reconciliation Committee which allowed Colonel Ojukwu
to express his concerns. Gowon therefore, accepted the committee's recommen
dation to end economic sanctions against the East. His government divided
Nigeria into 12 states, which included breaking up the North into six different
states. The changes, however came too late; the Ibos had seceded and the
consequence was a bloody and costly civil war that lasted 30 months, from July
1967 to January 15, 1970, and resulted in the defeat of the Ibos secessionists. The
war was called the Biafra civil war. The word "Biafra" was derived from the
region’s location on that section of the Atlantic Ocean called the Bight of Biafra.
Between 1967 and 1970 General Gowon directed the attention of the
Federal Military Government towards winning the Biafra civil war. In this process
the size of the Nigerian military increased from its pre-war size of about 8,000 to
more than 250,000 men by 1970 (Ukpabi, 1972). Such an increase was bound to
affect not only the influence of the military in the country but also its perfor
mance and general standing.
Ever since independence, strenuous efforts were made by successive
governments to weld the various ethnic groups together. These included definite
steps to shift the main power base from the regions, and later from the states to
the center, by increasing the number of regions or states so that each would
become more similar in size and area to the others. In 1963, the First Republic
increased the number of regions by one, making them four. In 1967, these four
regions were broken into 12 states. In 1975, the number of states was again
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increased, this time to 19. The total number of states in 1996 is 36. Given this
multiplicity of states, the power base has definitely tilted in favor of the central
government. No state now can hold the entire country to ransom as the Eastern
Region was able to do during the 30-months civil war (1967-1970). Other steps:
taken to hold Nigeria together as a nation have included the deliberate whittling
down of the powers of the states. The 1979 constitution, for instance, made the
states dependent on the federal government for their revenue, and with the local
government reform of the early 1990s, state government powers have been further
circumscribed. Thus, Gowon’s regime was instrumental in breaking down the pre
independence ethnic and regional powers, and in widening the platform for
integration among the various groups in Nigeria.
General Gowon was a capable and generally well regarded leader, who did
much to patch up the wounds caused by the Biafra war and who in 1970 set out
to oversee a return to civilian government (Oyediran, 1979). In the eyes of his
critics he moved too slowly however, and did too little to curb corruption,
inflation, and economic mismanagement. Much of the profit from Nigeria’s oil
boom of the early 1970s was squandered or stolen and the return to civilian
government was delayed.
Concerned with these developments and with the damage being done to
the reputation of the military, reform minded senior officers seized power in a
coup on July 29, 1975, the ninth anniversary of the original coup that brought it
to power. The government of General Gowon was overthrown without bloodshed
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while he was attending an Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in
Kampala, Uganda. This coup was met with widespread manifestations of relief
and elation. Only one military commander took steps to support Gowon, but his
efforts came too late.

The new regime was headed by Brigadier Murtala

Mohammed, with Brigadier Olusegun Obansajo as Chief of Staff Supreme
Headquarters and Brigadier Theophilus Danjuma as Army Chief of Staff.
Gowon was accused by the coup makers of failing to fulfill his promise to
hand over the government to a democratically elected civilian regime. General
Murtala Mohammed, an Hausa-Fulani officer and head of the new military
regime began drafting a new constitution for a civilian government. He removed
all state governors from power, purged the army, and announced a four year time
table for the return to civilian rule. Within two months of assuming office, he
dismissed 150 military officers and 10,000 civil servants who were found guilty of
corruption and abuse of office. Mohammed increased the number of states from
12 to 19 (see map in appendix), and decided to move the federal capital from
Lagos to Abuja. The fast moving programs of General Mohammed caught the
imagination of the public at large, but it also stirred forebodings and resentment
among those whose positions had been disturbed. As a result, a group of army
officers who feared for their own position attempted a coup on February 13,1976.
The attempt was unsuccessful, but General Mohammed was killed. His chief of
staff, General Olusegun Obasanjo, a Yoruba, assumed power. This was the first
time Nigeria had a Yoruba Head of State. As head of state, Obasanjo continued
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in the spirit of his predecessor.
The reasons for organizing a coup given by Major Nzeogwu, and those
given by General Gowon, Mohammed and Obasanjo, reflect the schools of
thought described earlier. For instance the 1966 coup was motivated by ethnic
rivalries and civil disorder, while other coups were either the result of rivalries
within the military or a measure to correct the corrupt practices of government.
The Nigerian military, in order to justify its ascension to power through coups
sought legitimacy by virtue of its avowed allegiance to the nation and its
commitment to nationalistic objectives. This is the notion of Samuel Huntington’s
custodian and praetorian theories, which postulate that the military might serve
as the guardian of the constitution of a country. The major speeches and decrees
issued by key military officers after they assumed control also used this rationale
reflects Huntington’s thinking.
In October 1979, the military regime of General Obasanjo stepped down
and ushered in a new democratically elected civilian government, called the
"Second Republic".

Shehu Shagari was elected president of Nigeria.

His

government, however, collapsed within a few years due to corruption, persistent
strikes, and rampant tribalism. New elections were held in August-September
1983. Whereas the 1979 elections had been generally accepted as fair, the 1983
ballot met with numerous accusations of vote rigging and violence.

This

weakened the legitimacy of the government. Julius Ihonvbere (1994) contends
that corruption reached its height during Shagari’s administration. Millions of
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Naira (the Nigerian currency) were misappropriated by government officials and
high level party members who were responsible for the Abuja (the new federal
capital) projects. This drained the country’s wealth, causing many ambitious
development projects to suffer.
On December 31, 1983, still another coup was staged by senior army
officers, which brought the second Nigerian Republic to an end. Major-General
Mohammed Buhari became head of state, and ruled through a Supreme Military
Council (SMC). General Buhari’s given reasons for the military intervention
included rigged elections, the inability of the second Nigerian republic to cultivate
financial discipline, to manage economic development, and the ever present
corrupt leadership (African Press, 1984). Table 1 shows the trend of military
intervention in Nigeria’s politics between 1960-1997
General Buhari’s regime instituted a "War Against Indiscipline Policy" and
emphasized prudent housekeeping in its economic management. He set an
objective to save the country from economic and political collapse. Buhari’s
regime also promised to put into place measures to eliminate massive waste in
economy caused by corruption within and outside the government, reduce the
need for the state to borrow money from external sources, and ameliorate
degrading domestic conditions. From such a vantage point, Buhari’s intervention
could be perceived as a guardian factor which could have been used to correct
the situation. General Buhari, however, was overthrown by his fellow senior
officers. Generals Babangida, Abacha, Diya, Kontagora, and Dogoyaro, declared
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Table 1
Nigerian’s Trend of Military Intervention in Government 1960-97
President/Head of Govt.

Period

Type of Govt.

Azikiwe/Tafawa Balewa

Oct. 1960-1966 Jan.

Civilian govt.

General Ironsi

Jan. 1966-1966 Jul.

Military regime

General Gowon

Jul. 1966-1975 Jul.

Military regime

General Mohammed

Jul. 1975-1976 Feb.

Military regime

General Obasanjo

Feb. 1976-1979 Oct.

Military regime

Shehu Shagari

Oct. 1979-1983 Dec.

Civilian govt.

General Buhari

Dec. 1983-1985 Aug.

Military regime

General Babangida

Aug. 1985-1993 Aug.

Military regime

Ernest Shonekan

Aug. 1993-1993 Nov.

Interim/mixedgovt

General Abacha

Nov. 1993-Present

Military regime

that his rule was too harsh, and too slow in moving to restore democratic civilian
rule.

Buhari was replaced by General Ibrahim Babangida in August 1985.

Taking the title of president, which is unusual for a military ruler, Babangida
retained almost all of the members of the Supreme Military Council, but he
renamed it the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). He also added officers
of lieutenant colonel rank. Babangida set up a Political Bureau composed of
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academics and professionals, which was asked to prepare a timetable for the
restoration of democratic rule. The target date of 1990 was later postponed to
1993 on the grounds that the initial deadline would not have given the authorities
enough time to lay the foundation for the transition.
Athough national and state elections were held, Babangida annulled the
June 12, 1993 presidential election, arguing that the elections were rigged. As
point of fact, the military leaders did not trust Moshood Abiola, the winner of the
presidential election. Moshood Abiola was a Yoruba and a Muslim as well the
presidential candidate of the Social Democratic Party. Abiola did not do well as
a candidate in the North which largely favored Bashir Tofa (an Hausa-Fulani), the
presidential candidate of the National Republican Convention Party. Abiola also
faced opposition in the south from Christians and Ibos who did not want to be
ruled by a Yoruba. The fundamental problem of electing a president through the
democratic process is the fear shared by Nigeria’s 250 different ethnic groups of
domination by one ethnic group. Unfortunately, these fears were exploited by the
Armed Forces Ruling Council.
In the face of mounting opposition, however, General Babangida resigned
his office and turned power over to a civilian interim government headed by
Ernest Shonekan. Shonekan’s government, however, was unable to stabilize the
political scene and the protests and demonstrations continued. This social unrest
set the stage for General Sani Abacha to intervene. General Sam Abacha’s coup
took place in November 1993 when civil disturbances, rising ethnic and religious
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tensions, economic collapse, and widespread riots plunged the country into near
chaos. Moreover, the situation worsened between 1993 and 1996. The frequent
coups and counter coups have only widened the ethnic and tribal differences in
Nigeria. Human rights violations have increased, including the killing, torture and
imprisonment of citizens who protest against the military government. Further
more, General Abacha’s regime strained its relationship with the western
countries when it hanged nine Ogoni minority rights activists in November 1995,
despite an almost worldwide appeal for clemency. The Ogoni activists had been
arrested for protesting against the social and environmental effects of drilling by
the Royal Dutch and Shell Oil Company. They demanded a share of the
country’s oil revenues when their land and fishing rivers were destroyed by the
drilling. Finally, Abacha’s regime is said to be the most corrupt of any on record.
Summary
The military, when it assumed power in Nigeria, called itself a corrective
regime. From interviews with government officials in 1995, it seems the military’s
concept of development is simply the maintenance of law and order, an increase
in the production of goods, and the amassing of personal wealth. Although
occasionally announcing economic development plans, its forte has not been
economic development.

Neither has it prepared citizens for democratic

participation. The military rules in an arbitrary manner, perhaps even more so
than did the British colonial government. The military relies essentially on civil
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administrators for advice. It will be recalled that these are the same public
officers who are immersed in the almost constant struggle for power. Moreover,
interviews conducted among key military officers, federal public servants, foreign
mission officials, and development program coordinators in Nigeria show that
resources have not been equitably distributed among the various groups in the
country.
The question then is what has the military corrected? The failure of
economic projects, the poor quality of life, the high inflation rate, soaring
unemployment, the breakdown of law and order, the gross violation of human
rights, the uneven development of the country, the decay of towns and villages,
the ever increasing incidence of robbery and brigandage and unbridled corruption,
clearly indicates the failure of Nigeria’s successive military governments.
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CHAPTER VI
PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY
Introduction
The development of Nigeria has required major input from its public
bureaucracy, and the British colonial experience played a major role in shaping
its character, and hence its performance following independence.

Nigeria’s

bureaucracy after independence was in all respects similar to the British
bureaucratic-authoritarian system which preceded it. Between 1954 and 1966, the
bureaucracy was thoroughly "Nigerianized". William Graf (1988) and Adebayo
Adedeji (1981) contend that the process of transferring power to "successor elites"
in the Nigerian bureaucracy produced several permanent structural deficiencies:
(a) a dearth of qualified personnel at all levels; (b) a stratified and ossified
bureaucratic structure not interested in popular needs and demands which,
moreover, was cleft between senior and juniors and rent by rivalries between the
older generalists and the emerging professional-technical cadres; (c) a bureaucrat
ic class separated by training, education and wealth from most of the population;
(d) a nucleus of a self-interested civil servant class attempting to transform the
political power which their positions conferred into the economic power which it
could buy; this of course implied the exploitation of ethnicity and sectionalism to
139
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entrench one’s political power; and (e) a network of patrons and clients, and
hence a great potential for corruption. Nigeria's experience with military rule also
influenced its structure and outlook. Successive military governments introduced
programs to reform and reorganize the bureaucracy, the objective being a more
professional corps that could work in close relationship with the military juntas.
Therefore although 70 percent of Nigeria’s citizens live in rural areas, government
resources have been concentrated in urban centers and a majority of the nation’s
public officials live and work in the larger cities.
To understand the process of policy implementation in Nigeria one must
begin with an examination of the pattern of colonial administration and its role
in ordering and structuring the contours of the Nigerian public bureaucracy. This
chapter will also describe the Nigerian bureaucracy as it exists today. The chapter
will focus on the pattern of colonial administration, the post-independence civil
service, the military and administrative reform, and the administrator’s role in
public policy making and implementation.
Pattern of Colonial Administration
The civil service in Nigeria had its origin in the British military occupation
and the first public officers were military personnel drawn from the colonial
regiments and occupation forces. In the early stages the civil service was mainly
concerned with the collection of revenue and the maintenance of law and order.
The main core of this British administrative service was composed of three
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branches, the Provincial and District Commissioners, the Police, and the Treasury
officials. These branches of the service were closely related functionally, and they
provided a country-wide administration of the services that existed. The civil
service was essentially one which was constructed to further British imperial
policies in Nigeria, essentially to exploit Nigeria as a source for primary
commodities and as a limited market for British industries.
Nigerian public bureaucracy has its origin in 1900, the year the British
government divided the area (now known as Nigeria) into three separate colonial
territories. These three colonies - Lagos, and the protectorates of Northern and
Southern Nigeria - were independently administered by different administrators
directly responsible to the United Kingdom (Coleman 1958, 46). The two
southern colonies were brought under a united bureaucracy in 1904.

The

protectorate of northern and southern Nigeria were amalgamated in January 1,
1914, to form modem Nigeria. The people of Nigeria became British subjects
owing allegiance to the British sovereign, and British laws were elevated over
Nigerian Traditional law. Lord Frederick Lugard became the first governorgeneral of the country.

The administrative areas of northern and southern

Nigeria were, however, placed under two lieutenant-governors, each with a
secretariat and departmental organization of its own. Adebayo Adedeji (1968)
contended that different policies regarding native land prevailed in the southern
and northern bureaucracies, and the only occasions in which the higher officials
of the two bureaucracies met were the annual sessions of the Legislative Council
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that were convened in Lagos.
The northern bureaucracy reflected somewhat the conservatism of the
Islamic culture and continually agitated for the distinct and separate development
of the north. It also often suggested that the North should be cut from the south
(Adu, 1982). Lord Lugard rationalized and imposed a system of local administra
tion known as indirect rule. The essential features of indirect rule were the
preservation of traditional African political institutions and their adaptation, under
the tutelage and direction of British administration, to the requirements of
modem units of local government. Until the post World War II period, when a
substantial devolution of political and fiscal authority occurred, the native
administrations were in effect made local extensions of the British superstructure.
Traditional rulers such as emirs, obas and elders realized that their positions and
perquisites depended more upon the goodwill of British district officers, residents,
and chief commissioners than upon the consent of their people. Lord Lugard
centralized only those departments which were invisible or whose functions
applied to the whole of Nigeria (for example, the Judiciary, Military, Railways,
Posts and Telegraphs, and Audit). These departments were under the control of
the Governor-General, and assisted by the Central Secretariat. The officials of
the North and South bureaucracies spoke different official languages. In the
South, because of the complex polytonic languages, English was spoken. Hausa,
not English, was spoken in the North (Coleman, 1958). Thus, there was a distinct
and independent administrative development between the North and the South
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which has continued till the present day.
The 1954 constitutional changes turned Nigeria into a federation of three
component parts. With this constitutional development, the Nigerian public
service was split into four public services - a federal bureaucracy and three
regional public services, one each for the three regions. Adebayo Adedeji (1968)
asserted that the central and unitary nature of the Nigerian public service was
considerably modified by the delegation to regional administration of certain
powers of appointment, promotion, posting and discipline. When the Mid-West
region was created out of the Western region in 1963, it too established its own
civil service.
The structure of organization adopted for the Nigerian public service is
similar to that of the British civil service. According to Humphrey Nwosu (1977)
the structure of the regional and federal civil service are very much alike. Each
service is divided into the following three broad classes:
1. The general service classes comprising, (a) the administrative class (b)
the general executive class, (c) the secretarial/stenographic classes, and (d) cler
ical, messengerial and miscellaneous classes.
2. The specialist classes are made up of people with a wide range of
professional, scientific and technical qualifications, including ancillary technical
staff.
3. Departmental classes consist of posts which are peculiar to particular
departments, e.g. nurses, health inspectors, tax officers.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The federal and regional governments are divided into a number of
ministries. The ministries are also divided into departments. The number of
departments in a ministry depends on the range and variety of functions for which
the ministry is responsible. Within each ministry there is a division which is
primarily responsible for financial control, accounting for expenditures, stores,
establishment, and organization matters. This department, which is usually called
Administration and General Division, is responsible for the overall management
of the individual ministries, and it relieves high-ranking professional and
administrative staff of day-to-day routine administration. The other departments
of the ministries are organized on a functional basis. For example, the Federal
Ministry of Education has seven departments - Finance, Establishment, Education
Administration, Students and Special Services, Registration Assessment,
Inspectorate, and Technical Education. Each ministry is organized hierarchically,
and this tends to reduce administration to a routine process. Documents and
memoranda are passed from subordinates to their superior officers, who in turn
are content to issue orders accordingly, or to forward the documents to their own
superior. The result of this is that most programs and policies are initiated at the
top echelon.
Every department is subdivided into branches, sections and subsections.
The Permanent Secretary is the administrative head of the ministry. He is also
the accounting officer, and responsible to the minister.

Thus, when the

parliamentary system was adopted in 1960, the structure of the British civil
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bureaucracy was transferred intact to Nigeria.
Post-Independence Civil Service
The British colonial administrative experience made a number of very
powerful impressions on Nigeria’s public administrators.

The first was the

tradition of a strong bureaucracy with an elaborate line organization of positions
and roles, and a structure which assigned direction and supervision to generalists.
Second, the colonial administrative inheritance stressed slow, thorough, risk
avoidance, mistake avoidance, and secretive public administration. The third was
a strictly adhered to single line organization from the top to the lowest level. This
excluded staff agencies and eliminated the possibility of outside or non-organizational influences. Fourth, the colonial bureaucracy serviced executive, legislative
and judicial arms of government. It also guided and assisted local governments
and agencies (parastatals) in the development of their management systems. And
fifth, the colonial bureaucracy was largely anonymous, presumed to be nonparti
san, loyal, committed, and subordinate to political and administrative leadership
groups (Adamolekun 1986, Adedeji 1981; Nwosu 1977).
The civil service in the First Republic was highly regionalized. As the
unified colonial civil service was gradually phased out in the mid-1950s and the
independence government was prepared for centrifugal federalism, the most able
and experienced civil servants joined the regional bureaucracies. There, they were
closely allied with the dominant political and economic elites and indeed in part
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merged with them. The regional governments recruited civil servants according
to their ethnic affiliations, and the bureaucrats implemented policies based on
their ethnic loyalties.

For example, business people from the ethnic group

represented by that administration received the greatest subsidies, contracts,
licenses, and loans. Even within the federal government, ethnic considerations
shaped personnel decisions. The quotas system for allocating military officials to
the general staff, defense headquarters, and field command ensured that the north
would secure 50 percent, the east 25 percent, and before 1964 the west 25
percent; after 1963 the west received 21 percent of appointments and the midwest
4 percent (Adamolekun, 1986). Thus, ethnic representation permeated both the
federal and regional governments.
Despite the ethnic and regional affiliation, the civil service, whose existence
antedated that of the other political institutions and which therefore by and large
attracted the best qualified people, was stronger and better organized than the
remaining subsystems such as the parties, executives and legislatures ( Graf, 1988).
In the national, state, and local governments, the civil servants played key policy
role. The most powerful bureaucrat in Nigeria, the secretary to the military
government and the head of the civil service, unified the whole a d m in istra tiv e
structure. At both the national and state levels, permanent secretaries wielded
the dominant power. The local government secretary, a civil servant, ran the
town councils. All these bureaucrats performed a wide range of activities.
Given this colonial legacy the central post-independence relationship
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between Nigerian civil servants and its military (or) political leaders is based on
the doctrine of political neutrality. The essential tenets of this doctrine are
described by Humphrey Nwosu (1977):
1. Politics and polity are separate from administration. Politicians or
military officers make polity decisions, while public servants execute/implement
the decisions.
2. Public servants are appointed and promoted on the basis of merit rather
than on the basis of party affiliation or patronage.
3. Public servants do not engage in partisan political activities.
4. Public servants provide forthright and objective advice to their political
masters in private and in confidence. In return, political executives protect the
anonymity of public servants by publicly accepting responsibility for departmental
decisions.
5. Public servants do not express publicly their personal views on
government policies or administration.
6. Public servants execute polity decisions loyally and zealously irrespective
of the philosophy and programs of the party in power and regardless of their
personal opinions. As a result, servants enjoy security of tenure during good
behavior and satisfactory performance.
The administrative structures, principles and motivation strategies of the
British colonial regime were retained after independence. Local governments
were, however, encouraged to develop their distinctive administrative systems: to
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hire and train their staff; maintain discipline and stimulate commitment. Similarly,
government agencies devised their respective organizational structures, training
programs, conditions of service, and work ethics. Ladipo Adamolekun (1983)
asserts that these were not generally modelled after the practice of the civil
service of a developing nation but rather after institutions in the United Kingdom.
The merit system in civil service recruitment and advancement, however,
was modified by the politicians who discovered that because of educational
imbalances between the northern and southern states of Nigeria, the strict
application of the merit system in recruitment and promotion would prevent some
Nigerians from being recruited or promoted (Adedeji, 1968).

What they

advocated was a simple quota arrangement that would reserve 50 percent of all
vacant positions and promotion posts to the North and South respectively.
Agencies responsible for recruitment and promotion in Nigeria were then
expected to do the same for candidates from the northern and southern part of
the country. A subsequent problem of this quota system relates to the other
ethnic minority groups. These minority ethnic groups argued that they were being
discriminated against by the majority tribes. Humphrey Nwosu (1977) contended
that these developments had a negative impact on staff motivation and leadership
supervision. The overriding consideration however, was that of national unity, and
it was agreed that sacrifices made by the minority tribes in pursuit of this goal
were worth making. Thus, regionalization of politics also necessitated some
measure of trade-off of the principle of merit in favor of those of representativen
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ess. For example in the process of developing the Northern civil service (a less
developed region in the late 195Qs and early 1960s), where the attempts flailed,
it attracted an influx of Ibo civil servants into the North, resulting in open ethnic
hostility (Oyovbaire, 1984). Public employment expanded substantially during the
post-independence period. The Federal public bureaucracy, shown in Table 2,
increased from 144,500 employees in 1975 to over 226,000 in 1980. By 1993 the
federal civil service employment figure had increased to over 389,717. Also, the
public enterprise sector (non-agricultural) employed at least 160,000 workers,
about 16 percent of public sector employment and 11 percent of the non-agricul
tural employment in the modem sector, as shown in Table 3. According to a
1995 estimate, wage employment in the Nigerian economy increased from 1.5
million in 1975 to 3 million in 1990, bringing the percentage proportion of the
"wage class" in the labor force to 10 percent in 1990 (Central Bank Report, 1995).
A large proportion of the Nigerian labor force - 27.8 million out of 32.2 million
or 90.3 percent were self employed workers in the agricultural sector (Nigerian
Annual Statistics, 1995). The absolute size of the bureaucracy has grown rapidly,
especially during the military regime. Another source of the growing bureaucracy
was the creation of new states in 1992. The federal government had to build its
secretariat in each of the new states and deploy civil servants. Thus, the size of
the bureaucracy continued to grow through the 1990s.
In a general way, the technical and planning evolution of the government
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Table 2
Employment in the Federal Civil Service 1975-1993
Year

# of Employees

1975
1978
1980
1984
1985
1990
1993

144,500
154,593
226,712
302,349
255,892
305,296
389,717

Source: Federal Office of Statistics, Annual Abstract of Statistics,
1994, p.82
Table 3
Public Sector Employment 1975-1994
1975

1985

1994

Federal Bureaucracy
144,500
State Bureaucracy
167,600
Local Government
92,500
Corporations/Universities 160,000
Teaching Services
195,000
Others
250,000

255,892
255,892
127,833
217,845
230,189
250,955

389,717
423,492
191,225
260,236
239,993
319,000

Total

1,338,566

1,823,663

1,009,600

Source: Federal Government of Nigeria, Office of Statistics, Annual Abstract of
Statistics, 1994, pp. 85-92.
bureaucracy in Nigeria tends to make public administration a more or less
autonomous political force. Federal civil servants in Nigeria continue to be
conscious of the general interests of the state in the struggle against individual
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interests as represented by political parties, pressure groups, ethnic interests and
the military.
Military and Administrative Reform
The role of the public bureaucracy in military regimes has been referred
to as a coalition of soldiers and civil servants. Edward Feit (1968) contended that
African armies are the apotheosis of administration, and be saw them as
structuring an administrative traditional order. He also saw the military/civil
service coalition as one without a consensus or basic legitimacy in which both
military officers and public bureaucrats often are reluctant to assume responsibili
ties through direct involvement in politics even after a military and civil servant
alliance has been established. The military elite uses the public bureaucracies to
help them establish their legitimacy while the latter look after their own personal
and institutional interests.

One will therefore notice a fluctuation in the

relationship between the public bureaucracy and the military in Nigeria.
Over twenty-five years of military rule in Nigeria has significantly
influenced the post-independence civil service. The governing coalition during
this period should be viewed as composed of the military and the civil service.
Jointly, they made policies and laws and implemented them. In reality, the civil
service has initiated a majority of the substantive policies and programs during
periods of military rule. One of the most important changes made by the military,
however, was the introduction of a single executive in the Nigerian public
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bureaucracy system. Before the advent of military rule in 1966, Nigeria had a
plural or collegial executive system in which the legislature consisted of the
executive and cabinet members of the federal government. Under the post-1966
single executive system (presidential system 1979-83, and the entire military
regime period), the President and state Governors have their ministers or
commissioners who serve as their advisers and agents, but not as colleagues with
equal powers.
Associated with the single executive type of administration is the
centralization of powers at the federal level. Before the first military administra
tion, Nigeria had a federal administration in which the functions and powers of
government were substantially shared between the federal and regional
governments. This allowed the regions to have a wide range of powers. Once the
long period of military rule began, however, military values of centralism and
uniformity were inculcated in the expanding civil service. There is now a tendency
to centralize most of the governmental powers at the federal level. The military
government tends to control and dominate national affairs, and the civil services
within the several states depend, in varying degrees, on directives, from the
federal government.
Another administrative imprint of the Nigerian military government is the
regular use of administrative commissions. The Gowon, Mohammed/Obansajo,
Buhari and Babangida military regimes, respectively, made enormous use of such
expert study groups to examine important administrative problems and to make
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recommendations to the government. General Yakubu Gowon, for example,
utilized bureaucrats and former politicians for important policy and linkage roles.
Gowon assigned strategic policy responsibilities to a coterie of senior civil servants
who became known as the "super" permanent secretaries, more commonly "super
permsecs" (Koehn 1983; Ayida 1987). The "super permsecs", who occupied key
positions in the Ministries of Finance, Economic Development, Petroleum,
Defence, Industry and Trade, were the de facto powers in matters of economic
policy. Though few in number, this group of civil servants embodied a technocrat
ic clique, and their entrenched position in the Gowon regime steered the country
through a dramatic shift in development strategy and economic policy.

The

military regime has often used administrative panels to investigate the activities
of ministries, departments and corporations of governments, including consider
ation of issues raised concerning these bodies. Junior civil servants agitated for
the introduction of a national minimum wage, for the abolition of the daily wage
system, and for general improvement in the condition of service, thus forcing the
federal government, to appoint the Morgan Commission.

The Commission

examined the various demands and made its recommendations which included a
small increase in salary and a modest improvement in the condition of employ
m ent It also identified problems in the non-salary condition of employment.
Between 1964 and 1970 no further review took place in the country. The lack of
attention to civil service concerns caused the formation of the Civil Servants Joint
Action Committee (just after the civil war in 1970) which called on the military
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government to improve the civil servant’s condition of service or face a nation
wide strike of government employees. To defuse the explosive situation, in 1970,
General Gowon set up the Adebo Commission. This Commission made larger
salary increase recommendations that were implemented immediately, but it failed
to acknowledge the non-salary matters (i.e.,training, motivational incentives,
promotion, grading and job evaluation) identified by the Morgan Commission.
In 1972, the Udoji Commission was created to undertake a comprehensive review
of standards of service and compensation in the civil service and state enterprises
(Public Service Review of Nigeria, 1974). The Udoji panel recommended a
phased increase of public sector salaries, a unified and integrated administrative
structure, the elimination of waste and the removal of deadwood/inefficient
departments, and the introduction of a result-oriented civil service, that functioned
on the basis of management by objective. The job grading and compensation
policies outlined by the Udoji Commission were extended to the major Federal
public enterprises as well. This measure reflected a movement toward increased
standardization of the public enterprise sector and its harmonization with the civil
service.

These policies were only discussed superficially and the strategies

planned by the military for their implementation were never introduced. In 1976,
the government of General Murtala Mohammed revisited the recommendations
of Udoji Commission after observing the extent to which efficiency in the public
service had fallen when compared with the private sector.
The Mohammed and Obasanjo regimes dismantled the Gowon economic
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programs, blaming senior technocrats and military governors of the states for
mounting corruption in the civil service. Many of the permanent secretaries
associated with the previous regime were ousted, and more than 10,000 others
were dismissed, retired or forced to resign from the civil service.

Public

enterprises were also purged, including the removal of 600 staff from the Ports
Authority. Military officers were appointed to replace and manage some of the
larger national ventures (Ayida 1987, 113-116). This massive "housecleaning"
exercise, while extremely popular, also created widespread insecurity, and caused
demoralization and disarray throughout the government bureaucracy, but it was
pressed nevertheless.
Along with other important elements of its fiscal strategy, the military
government of General Buhari (1983-1985) announced its intention to achieve
public sector reform, but failed to offer a detailed program for doing so.
Nonetheless, his downsizing of the civil service and the public enterprise sector,
by more than 15,000 people, constituted the single largest public staffing reduction
in Nigerian history. These reductions in personnel, however, represented more
cf an ad hoc response to budgetary constraints rather than an articulated scheme
of public sector reform. Needless to say it nonetheless helped remove corrupt
and inefficient employees from the public service.
In spite of these actions, the declining economy prompted officers within
the military government to oust General Buhari and his vice president General
Idiagbon. General Ibrahim Babangida assumed power, in a bloodless coup in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

August, 1985. He attempted to revitalize the demoralized civil service and to re
introduce some of the economic policies of his predecessors. He also appointed
a circle of economic advisors who had a strong technocratic credentials. In 1988,
General Babangida announced a system-wide civil service reform. Prior to this
reform the Nigerian bureaucracy at the federal and state levels was characterized
by a service structure that had remained largely unchanged for 70 years, even
though the civil administrator’s role and functions had changed significantly. The
civil service in spite of the earlier attempts at downsizing was still grossly over
staffed in what were perceived to be unproductive areas, while understaffed in
critical areas of economic and technological expertise. Policy making, personnel,
financial and general management practices also were too centralized. There
were too many conflicts between the administrative cadre and professionals, and
between political appointees and career administrative officials. And as Dotun
Phillips (1990) contends, before the 1988 civil service reform, appropriate and
effective information and data management systems were virtually absent.
The 1988 civil service reform was meant to enhance professionalism. The
new civil service rules required staff who hitherto had not specialized in their
duties must now do so. Such rules applied to bureaucrats who lacked appropriate
and recognized educational or technical skills for the jobs they were assigned to
perform, and who shuttled from one professionally distinct job to another, and
from one ministry to another. The new bureaucratic structure was broken down
into three professional categories: Assistant, Officer, and Director - all of different
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grades (Phillips 1990, 8). The Assistant was a sub-professional, and thus, not
required to have a university degree or equivalent professional qualification. The
Officer was a full professional who was required to have a university degree, or
equivalent professional qualification. The Director category was reserved for full
professionals who had been given general management functions as heads of
either a Branch, Division or Department. Professionalism also required regular
training and retraining for all Nigerian civil servants. Staff training was made
obligatory and a periodic exercise in the schedule of civil administrators. Staff
deployment was henceforth based on the bureaucrat’s degree of specialization and
qualifications for the position.
A major consequence of the civil service reform of 1988 was that the
Permanent Secretary became Director-General of the civil services (Civil Service
Reform Report 1988, 5). Appointment to the position of Director-General was
political and the duration of the appointment is at the pleasure of the president
at the national level or the governor at the state level.

Director-Generals

therefore were required to retire with the government which appointed them, but
an in-coming administration, could request re-appointment.
The reforms also were directed toward the reduction in the misuse and
abuse of authority. Checks and balances and procedures to promote accountabili
ty were instituted. Bureaucrats were required to notify the Accountant-General
of all pre-payment audit queries. Ministers also were required to be the only
persons permitted to issue expenditure instructions. Various internal discipline
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procedures were introduced for controlling civil servants. The use of political
institutions such as the presidency (military), legislature (1990-1993) and judiciary
to check accountability ranged from measures such as funds cutting, investigation
of abuse of office, executive power, reorganization, fiscal power and administra
tive law. The Civil Service Code of Conduct also stressed what should be the
appropriate behavior of the bureaucrat and included punishment for violations of
the code.
Despite this strong accountability policy, the post-reformed bureaucracy
has continued its corrupt practices.

The most notable consequence of the

accountability measures in the Nigerian public bureaucracy has not been
accountability but rather the widening of the scope of abuses. Politicians, military
and administrative functionaries continued to pursue, unabated, their self
enrichment activities.

Adamolekun and Ayeni (1990) contend that corrupt

practices in Nigeria include embezzlement, bribery, fraud, and outright theft.
Peter Koehn (1989) asserts that Nigerian public servants are more concerned with
self enrichment than with government service. He raises the question as to
whether the corrupt practices of the Nigerian bureaucracy ought to be cited as
one of the reasons for the nation’s underdevelopment or at least for its slow
development.
The public increasingly has come to view bureaucrats as corrupt and
inefficient.
bureaucracy.

There is a general distrust of and public alienation from the
The absence of a strong commitment to professional ethical
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standards on the part of the public bureaucracies, together with the absence of
business ethics on the part of the private sector entrepreneurs, has produced a
situation in which corruption flourishes both in and out of government. Although
the incumbent military government has demonstrated the will to expose and
punish persons guilty of corrupt practices, it has not yet tackled the fundamental
issues of rethinking the system of government contracts, setting limits to individual
wealth, and imposing clearly articulated professional ethical standards on public
functionaries.
The Bureaucrats Role in Public Policy
Nigeria’s bureaucracy is actively engaged in the decision-making processes.
The military leadership readily works with the bureaucracy in national decision
making. The military-run political institutions must bargain with the bureaucracy
in policy making and in policy implementation.

Nigerian governmental

bureaucracies are the repository for the information and expertise that the federal
and 30 state governments need for effective policy making.

The power

relationship between the higher bureaucracies and the military junta requires
constant tending and involves delicate political management.

While this

relationship undermines Nigeria’s legitimate political institutions, the bureaucracy’s
reservoir of talent and information provides it with extraordinary powers that it
is not reluctant to use.
Policy decisions are made each day by the Nigerian government on a
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variety of problems. Some of the decisions take a very short time, in terms of
hours or minutes to make; others require weeks and months, even years. A
crucial element in the making of a derision is the policy-maker, that is the person
who assembles and then processes the available information and arrives at a
particular policy decision. In the Federal Government of Nigeria, the polity
makers are frequently the senior civil servants and professionals at the grade
levels of Director to Director General rather than legislators or "legitimate"
political leaders. The Director General is generally regarded as the head of the
ministry, if no political head, a minister or commissioner, has been appointed by
a government. In the absence of a functioning National Assembly, not unusual
during the reign of military regimes, the Director-General or Managing-Director
(in the case of government agencies) exerts great influence over what the
government does. This is one of the reasons why the Directors-General, and the
senior civil servants, have become very powerful during the period of military rule.
The Directors-General are still very powerful because the current law-making
bodies (the Armed Forces Ruling Council and the National Economic Council)
are concerned with broader policy issues, not the day-to-day decisions. The latter,
therefore are made by government ministries and departments.
The power and autonomy of the Nigerian public bureaucracies have
expanded enormously during the years that the military has dominated the
political system. In particular, the public administrator role in policy making has
increased since the end of the civil war in 1970. In the absence of a legislature
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and elected representatives, the federal and state public bureaucracies have
acquired wide management functions.

They also play a major part in the

recommendation and formulation of social, economic, educational and political
objectives. Humphrey Nwosu (1979) contends that Nigerian civil servants hold
unique positions in the hierarchy of ministries, departments, corporations and
other state agencies, and these enable them to access a wealth of technical data.
Thus, a symbiotic relationship exists between Nigeria’s military rulers and its top
public servants.
Nigerian senior bureaucrats provide the military rulers with ideas, policy
proposals, information, and value premises for fundamental decisions.

The

military in exchange shields the bureaucrats, and allows them to increase their
power in both decision making and policy implementation. One effect of the
dominance of the top bureaucrats in goal setting and decision making is that most
decisions of government tend to be remote from the basic needs of Nigerians, the
majority of whom live in the rural areas. It is often difficult for senior civil
servants in the big commercial cities to articulate effectively the primary needs of
rural Nigerians, if they are aware of them at all.
Planning
Planning in the Nigerian military government is closely related to the
function of framing policies and their implementation. Since Nigerians are living
in an era when government activities have expanded and the resources for
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executing them are limited, planning becomes necessary to optimize the available
human and material resources for the accomplishment of social objectives.
Moreover, public administrators have been closely associated with Nigeria's
planning efforts since the adoption of the nation's economic and political
development strategy in 1946 (Nwosu 1977, 87-133). Also, since Nigeria attained
political independence in 1960, public servants have helped in the formulation of
five national development plans (1962-1968,1970-1974,1975-1980,1980-1985 and
1986-1990).
According to the popular image, bureaucrats in Nigeria have devised
solutions to national problems independent of the influence of interest groups and
by employing their professional training and experience. Scholars from Reinhard
Bendix (1946) to Theda Skocpol (1985) consider the pervasiveness of the
bureaucracy in modem times as a consequence of the increasing sophistication of
their technocratic skills. The Nigerian bureaucracy's monopoly of government
expertise has supposedly encouraged politicians in authoritarian (military) and
democratic regimes alike to depend on technocrats for the development of
national policies. Public servants, more than other groups of Nigerians, possess
the talents and skills necessary not only to implement and coordinate the planning
activities of the government, but to institutionalize social change. Bureaucratic
expertise is judged to have greater importance now that Nigeria is at the
crossroads of its development and is increasingly called upon to not only induce
increases in the available social products, but to ensure its equitable distribution.
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When the Nigerian military government restructured the federation in
1967,1976 and again in 1990, the federal and state civil servants were instrumen
tal in making the twelve, nineteen, twenty-one and finally thirty the states
structure a reality. Without the effective contribution of the various cadres of
public servants, it would have been impossible for the military junta to carry out
the division of the Nigerian federation in a cost effective and efficient manner.
The successful implementation of these policies by public bureaucrats contributed
immensely to the process of political integration at a time of considerable political
upheaval.
The major flaws in the Nigerian bureaucracy in the post-independence era
are not found in the collection of data or the identification of long term
objectives, but in the shortage of qualified personnel, especially in scientific and
technical fields. More significant, the shortcomings are seen in the lack of reliable
census data, ineffective coordination within and outside the government; and most
of all in bureaucratic corruption. Finally in spite of Nigeria’s desire to accelerate
economic development, bureaucratic accountability is still a distant goal.
Summary
The British colonial government played a critical role in the development
of government bureaucracy in Nigeria. Apart from the deficiencies of inherited
techniques and procedures, a review of public bureaucracy ineffectiveness
includes the following: The first is low productivity, which is seen sometimes as
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the result of the pursuit of private business activities by public bureaucrats and
sometimes as the result of resource-wasting rivalries between departments and
inter-ethnic group civil servants. It is also seen as the result of narrow bureau
cratic perspectives that place a premium on controlling resources, particularly
public expenditures, rather than on output or social and economic benefits
expenditure. The second is poor policy-making or decision-making. The third is
low execution or implementation capacity. The fourth is defective structures,
usually a reaction to over-centralization.
The doctrine of political neutrality in Nigeria public bureaucracy has been
discarded and public administrators have ceased to be non-partisan and neutral.
Today’s civil service is a formidable political force with strong role in policy
formulation, in the distribution of patronage, and the allocation of resources. The
vital role of the Nigerian public administrators in economic matters arises because
most military and political leaders have little alternative but to rely on their
advice. Unfortunately, however, Nigeria's bureaucrats have not used their power
to improve the management of government, but rather to satisfy their individual
and collective ambition.
A major question in Nigeria therefore is whether the public bureaucracy
can be transformed into a self-motivating, but rationally responsible institution
that is concerned with the country’s modernization needs. The SAP/Make-or-Buy
technology policy was intended to begin this kind of transformation.
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CHAPTER VII
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
Third World technological development is often confined to the search for
new products and processes as well as the adaptation of products and processes
acquired through technology transfer to local conditions (Fransman, 1985;
Moravcsik, 1983). According to Lall (1982), only a few Third World countries
have improved upon existing processes and products and thereby created
technological changes that are different from those in the industrial world.
Nigerian industrial units have operated within the pre-established international
technology frontier, adapting foreign technology to the local environment and
gradually building up a stock of proprietary technology and knowledge that is
specific to individual firms but they rarely move beyond that frontier type of
technological development.
In the years that followed independence, Nigeria concentrated on issues
of political development and only secondarily, devoted resources to economic
development.

Unable to maintain its intended democratic political system,

however, Nigeria’s political instability in the 1970s and 1980s inhibited serious
economic development efforts at the national level, and the earliest economic
165
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development programs originated in the regional governments. By the mid1980’s, Nigeria's economic problems could be characterized as follows: (a) A slow
rate of agricultural growth which failed to keep up with the rate of population
increase; (b) An export trade almost totality dependent on crude oil; (c) A
dependence on the importation of consumer goods, raw materials, and technolo
gy; (d) A widening gap between the very rich and the very poor; (e) Federal
Government’s inattention to the creation of a sophisticated indigenous technologi
cal capability; (f) The inflated role of the public sector in promoting and
managing economic activities; and (g) Conflicting views on the proper role of the
state in industrial development.
These problems raised serious questions about the future of Nigeria’s
economic development. Answers needed to be found for rising employment,
urban drift, basic food and raw material shortages, inflationary pressures, rising
external debt and the present political instability.
Many of these questions however are beyond the range of this study. The
purpose here is to examine: (a) pre-independence technology and national
development; (b) post-independence economic development, and (c) appropriate
technology.
Pre-Independence Economic Development
In 1960, when Nigeria attained political independence, there was no clear
policy for science and technology. Nigeria’s industrialization policy at that time
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was modest in nature. The concern of the British colonial administration had
been mostly commercial and was aimed at promoting the transfer of agricultural
commodities to Europe. Colonial policy did not permit indigenous technological
development and after the transfer of power, the new country continued its
dependance on imported technology.
Decisions concerning appropriate technology are critical responsibilities of
governments in the developing areas, and the absence of an agreed upon national
and industrial development policy has done considerable damage to the Nigerian
economy.

Acknowledging this problem, in the 1980s, the military junta

emphasized both industrialization and the development of an indigenous
technology. Moreover, the decision makers understood that the one could not be
successfully pursued without the other, and that a key issue lay in constructing the
nation’s technological base. The first need therefore was to end Nigeria’s almost
total dependance on the import of foreign technologies.
The fact that so much technology was imported did not mean Nigeria did
not possess a local technology base. But that base, and its more appropriate
character suffered as a consequence of the demand for the imported varieties that
were not as useful to the developing economy. Moreover, the preference for
imported technology had resulted in Nigeria's technological dependence on the
more developed nations, and in an outflow of capital that could have been better
invested at home.
Nigeria’s first attempt at development planning occurred in 1945, when,
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following the initiative of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the local colonial
administration prepared a plan to guide the allocation of Colonial Development
and Welfare Funds in Nigeria. This resulted in a Ten-Year Plan of Development
and Welfare for Nigeria’ which came into operation in 1946 (Adeniyi, 1987). The
plan was drawn up and executed mainly by colonial bureaucrats who were assisted
by a limited number of Nigerian civil servants. Therefore the plan was a product
of the colonial civil service both in its formulation and implementation, and its
principal concern was in the agricultural sector.
Prior to the colonization of Nigeria virtually all its constituent groups were
subsistence farmers, and during the period of British rule, Nigeria became an
agricultural exporter, providing cheap raw materials for Britain and other
European nations.

By contrast, finished manufactured goods were almost

completely imported and, this continued to be the situation even in the years after
independence.

Nigeria’s limited industrial capacity, initiated by foreign

companies, lay in the areas of produce merchandising and general trading.
Among these companies were United African Company (UAC), John Holt,
Peterson Zoconise (P.Z), Lever Brothers, Nigerian Breweries and the Nigerian
Tobacco company. It was these enterprises that later formed the nucleus for
Nigeria’s manufacturing sector.
Between 1954 and 1956, both the federal and regional governments began
to supplement the efforts of the foreign and private companies. The Western
Regional Government, through its finance corporation, took the lead by
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establishing industries at the Ikeja industrial park, now part of Lagos State. Ikeja
still has the highest concentration of industries in the country today.

The

investment promotion division of the then Western Region entered into jointventure agreements with foreign partners resulting in industries such as Dunlop,
Asbestos Cement Company and West Africa Portland Cement Company.
The Eastern Regional Government, also in 1955, set up a pharmaceutical
corporation, a printing corporation and a tourist corporation. The Nigerian
Cement Factory, Nkalagu, was established in 1954 as a joint-venture between the
Federal, Government, Eastern Regional Government and a foreign private
investor.

There were similar manufacturing establishments created in the

Northern Region which utilized local raw materials such as cotton, groundnut, and
limestone.
Post-Independence Economic Development, Oil and the Military
The relationship between democratic stability and economic development
is a theme that Lipset (1959), Almond (1970) and Bollen (1979) have pursued.
Their studies stress the need for institutional continuity and harmony, as a
prerequisite for economic development. Thus, development and order are critical
and disorder makes development difficult, if not impossible.

The Nigerian

experience is an example of a country moving back and forth from civilian to
military regimes. Military regimes, are no guarantee against frequent changes in
leadership that are due to coups and counter coups. Civilian governments have
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been weak and ineffectual. Therefore, one can argue that Nigeria’s recurring
ethnic and regional conflict, as well as its institutional weaknesses, and general
failure of leadership has done great harm to the nation’s economic programs.
Nigeria is one of the world’s major oil exporting countries. The drilling,
refining and marketing of high quality, low sulfur petroleum should be a boon to
the country’s economy, even during periods of lower demand, but Nigeria’s
political instability and the uncertainties caused by military rule have prevented
the nation from realizing its economic potential. Moreover, the climate of fear
and repression has dampened and discouraged the investment activities at home
and from abroad. From 1966 to 1996, except for four years of the Shehu Shagari,
civilian government, the army directed all facets of Nigerian life. A majority of
the governors of the Nigerian states have been military officers. Senior military
officers manage the country’s corporations, or serve on their Boards of Directors.
Military officers have been made ambassadors to different countries or lead Nige
rian delegations at international conferences. The military establishment has
always justified its intrusion in the country’s political life by asserting the need for
political stability. But while Nigeria has enjoyed little political stability, its higher
military has reaped substantial personal rewards. Having noted these circum
stances it would be useful to explore the military’s role in the country’s economic
development.
Soon after independence, the Federal Government introduced legislation
aimed at safeguarding the foreign investments in the country. This legislation led
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to an upsurge of investments which rose to US $45 million during the country’s
First National Development Plan - 1962 to 1968 (Imoko, 1990).
The government launched the 1962-68 Development Plan, in major part,
to stimulate the establishment and growth of national industries. In order to
ensure the success of this plan in 1964 the government created the Nigerian
Industrial Development Bank (NIDB) to assist private enterprises. Although the
full implementation of this program was affected by the Nigerian Civil War of
1967-70 it nevertheless recorded some successes. For example, private sector
investments rose from $1,237.6 million in 1962/63 to $1,452.1 million between
1968/69 (Imoko. 1990).
At the end of the Nigerian Civil War, the government launched the 197074 National Development Plan. This plan had several stated aims: (a) a united,
strong, and self-reliant nation; (b) a dynamic economy; (c) a just and egalitarian
society; (d) an increase in opportunities for all Nigerians; (e) the building of a
free, just and democratic society (Imoko 1990; Graf 1988). Unfortunately, these
aims were not realized in spite of the huge revenues derived from the sale of
Nigerian oil during the oil boom of the 1970s. In fact, the lucrative sale of
petroleum seriously distorted the implementation strategy of the development
plan and resulted in the utter neglect of meaningful national industrial develop
ment.
The Nigerian economy suffered greatly as a result of the civil war.
According to Oyediran (1979) investment dropped by 3 percent a year in 1966

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and 1967. Agricultural exports were seriously affected and the money supply
increased at the rate of 7 percent a year (Oyediran 1979, 53). At the conclusion
of the war, General Gowon promulgated the Second National Development Plan
(1970-1975), which projected a strategy of economic growth and diversification.
In 1973, world oil prices skyrocketed and Nigeria received a substantial increase
in revenue from its petroleum exports. The quadrupling of oil prices enriched the
Nigerian treasury, but the 1970s also witnessed the retardation of agricultural
growth, and the stagnation of the industrial sector. During the peak years of the
oil boom period, the Gowon, Mohammed and Obasanjo’s regimes followed a
strategy of state capitalism. The core of Nigerian state capitalism, according to
William Graf (1988), involved: pumping oil revenue directly into the economy, but
only on terms likely to benefit the military establishment. In effect the junta
reserved most public revenue for itself and distributed what remained to state and
local governments. Thus, the federal military government controlled the means
of production and monopolized all economic activity.
The junta expanded central planning and imposed a strict regulatory
authority. It encouraged public investment and called for diversification in the
industrial sector. Public enterprises, were developed in petroleum, capital goods
production and transportation, in large scale manufacturing, and light industry.
All were made possible by the oil boom.
The military government built bridges, roads, and expanded new port
facilities and constructed new airports. Most of these activities, however , were
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done with military needs in full view. Military installations were improved and
new facilities were constructed. The government modernized officers messes,
expanded offices and stores, and built sports fields, new living quarters and
shooting ranges. Only rarefy did the Nigerian military undertake the construction
of similar civilian projects. Olatunde Odetola (1982) contends that during the
Gowon regime the earnings from oil were enjoyed by a small elite composed of
senior military officers (especially ministers and members of the Supreme Military
Council), state Military Governors, their business friends and civil servants, and
to a lesser extent, army personnel.
The Gowon regime’s method of awarding inflated contracts to Nigerian
agents of foreign corporations became a major avenue for personal capital
accumulation. Income inequalities were ignored. Rising food prices and the
higher rent levels made life virtually impossible for the lower salaried classes.
The military did not restructure the Nigerian economy, or move it from its
dependence on the western industrialized nations. An indigenization decree
which purported to give Nigerians a say in the running of their economy and to
reduce foreign control and indebtness only served to regularize a relationship
between the Nigerian high command and foreign financial interests. Indigenizat
ion of the economy basically meant the selling of shares to Nigerians interested
and capable of buying into the foreign companies operating in the country. But
the military did not address the pervasive forms of foreign economic domination,
particularly as it affected the development of appropriate technology. The
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military government and active business community displayed an. appetite for
advanced technology that caused the country to become completely dependent on
foreign managers, technicians, machinery, raw materials, spare parts and
construction materials. This taste created a major drain in national finances
especially when oil prices started to drop. The manner in which contracts were
awarded produced an inflationary spirit and provoked new crises and uncertainties
in the handling of the economy. General Gowon’s downfall can be traced to the
resulting stagnation, corruption and drift The government failed to control the
high price of basic commodities, and the much needed infrastructure and
industrial development was delayed due to poor organizational skills and faulty
planning.
General Mohammed and Obasanjo’s regime, the successors to Gowon,
witnessed a deteriorating economic situation with a short fall in petroleum sales
and a massive rise in food imports. In April 1978 the military government
imposed an extremely stringent budget. The regime introduced a development
plan which was expected to right the wrongs of the Gowon government.
Unfortunately, however, the envisaged projects were rarely integrated with one
another, nor did they fit the socio-economic environment of the country. Unable
to address the country’s needs, in 1979, the military handed over power to the
civilian government of President Shehu Shagari. Shagari’s government was very
short-lived, however, and the problems associated with urban overcrowding,
unemployment, and extreme poverty continued to multiply.
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General Buhari’s military regime, followed Shagari’s and it imposed
stringent austerity measures.

It reduced capital expenditure as well as the

government budgetary deficit, but it did not curtail federal and state spending in
the military sector. As a consequence, the nation’s manufactures fell during
Buhari’s regime by 18 percent, and the construction industry was in a state of
collapse. Inflation rose to over 40 percent, unemployment soared, food prices
increased, and consumer products disappeared from the marketplace. Buhari was
compelled to take drastic action. He tightened the clamp on imports, introduced
counter-trade strategies with other nations, and even imposed financial discipline
on military spending. The latter policy proved unacceptable to his brothers in
arms, however. He was overthrown and replaced by General Babangida who
tried another approach, but he too failed to stabilize the economy. The further
collapse in world oil prices at the beginning of 1986 plunged the Nigerian
economy into deeper crisis.

Seeing a need for concerted action, Babangida

introduced the structural adjustment policy, expecting it might be one answer to
the country’s problems. But the minimal impact of this policy, coupled with the
political instability resulted in less than 40 percent utilization of the nation’s
manufacturing capacity. Babangida's policies caused banks to close and inflation
to rise, and his army successor, General Abacha, has not been able to reverse the
downward spiral.
Nigeria’s manufacturing sector provides employment for only a fraction of
the country’s work force and its light industries are limited to the production of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

consumer products for the limited internal market (Phillips and Ndekwu, 1992).
Despite the junta’s aspirations for rapid industrialization, Nigeria's unreliable
electric supply, restrictive policies (e.g. requiring foreign companies to accept
Nigerian partnership terms), foreign exchange controls, the fixing of arbitrary
price for finished products and a shortage of skilled workers have negated the
best of intentions.
Agriculture was another area for which successive military government
have declared their support, but in actuality did little. Agriculture was by far the
most important sector of the economy in the years immediately following
independence. It provided almost all Nigeria’s jobs and export earnings. It was
also the major source of government revenue. But while agricultural output
increased between eight and ten percent in the 1960s, it declined to three percent
in the 1980s and 1990s, (Dike 1994, 295) with the appearance of the military.
The military governments promised ambitious initiatives to boost agricultural
production, e.g. Operation Feed the Nation 1976-79), the Green Revolution
(1979-83), and Shagari’s Food Production Plan (1980). But inefficiency and poor
funding ruined chances for a successful programs.
The failure of the Nigeria’s agricultural sector is the most significant cause
for the country’s economic decline. Moreover, responsibility rests on the military
governors who have given lip service to the problem, but whose policies have only
accelerated the downward spiral. Henry Benien (1970) is correct in noting that
the military lacks the wisdom, the skills, the training and mind-set for genuine
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economic development.
Economic Planning
The institution responsible for handling Nigerian development planning
decisions in the late 1960s was the Supreme Military Council (SMC) comprised
of a few top military commanders. The expertise of the SMC was more military
than development administration, therefore SMC relied on the advice of the
senior bureaucrats in the Federal Executive Council (FEC) and
Permanent Secretaries in the federal ministries.

individual

The Federal Government

stressed the importance of locating industrial sites throughout the country in its
National Development Plans and Industrial Incentive Programs, e.g., the Nigerian
Industrial Development Bank (NIDB) was created in the 1970s to assist the
growth of private enterprises. Although the National Development Plans only
indirectly involved the Federal Government in the industrial development process,
after successive failures the Nigerian government became an active player in
almost all industry incentive programs. With these programs, Nigerian firms were
able to negotiate directly with government departments including Industry, and
Trade and Commerce. Moreover, they were made the recipients of funds from
the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank with which they could develop R & D
facilities.
The initiation of the industrial incentive programs was the first indication
that the Federal Government was willing to actively involve itself in the industrial
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development process. Moreover, these programs are now regarded as the first
step in the development of a comprehensive national development strategy. The
SAP/Make-or-Buy policy, ten years later, is a direct consequences of these earlier
developments.

The SAP/Make-or-Buy policy, which is geared toward the

development of a sophisticated national technology, would have been impossible
without Federal Government pressure on the federal bureaucracy.
In recognition of the perceived role which science and technology plays in
the development of the Nigerian economy, and in view of the failure of past
efforts, a separate Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) was created in
October 1979 to take over the responsibilities of the National Science and
Technology Development Agency. Today, the Ministry of Science and Technolo
gy is responsible for the promotion and development of scientific and technologi
cal research throughout the country. Its responsibilities include the formulation
of national policy on science and technology, the promotion of science and
technology research, liaison with universities and institutions of higher learning,
and promotion and administration of technology transfer programs.
The Federal Ministry of Science and Technology has passed through two
phases in the evolution of what might be termed a national technology policy
(Adubifa 1990, 27), and other more developed phases were destined to follow.
The first phase dates from the colonial and post-colonial years to the beginning
of the Indigenization Decrees. During this phase, ,as described above, the little
technology in use in local industries was foreign owned. The second phase started
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from the inauguration of the Indigenization Decrees of the 1970s and lasted until
the early 1980s, (The Indigenization Decrees are policies introduced by the
military government to nationalize all foreign owned business in Nigeria), and it
encouraged industrial incentive programs that gave modest attention to
developing Nigeria’s technology.
The more developed third phase focused on raising the proportion of
indigenous ownership of industrial investment for the purpose of maximizing local
retention of profit, while at the same time promoting foreign investment. This
new industrial policy, which was introduced in the 1980s, was intended to attract
foreign investment and technology, but also to insist on a high decree of
indigenous ownership. Overall, it fostered a review of the indigenization laws
which were perceived creating an undesirable hostile foreign investment climate.
The Manufacturing Sector
Import substitution confronted a manufacturing sector faced with low
employment capacity, and low productivity. Nigeria experienced little internaliza
tion of technical know-how and its industrial output had been confined to
consumer goods. Those production areas which constituted the core targets of
Nigeria’s manufacturing sector were iron and steel, textiles, grain milling, cement,
beverages (beer and soft drinks), automobile assembly, and petro-chemicals. It
was not unexpected therefore that these production areas were among the first
to be reorganized with national, needs in primary view.
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Enwere Dike (1994) asserts that the transition to a local production of iron
and steel, which began in 1982 marks a turning point in Nigerian industrialization.
The country’s three rolling plants at Oshogbo, Jos, and Katsina were set up in the
early 1980s to provide broad based linkages with the iron and steel plants at
Ajaokuta and Warn. Prior to the establishment of these modern plants, Nigeria
depended on imports and the rather limited output from small-sized cast-iron
works (for instance, the Niger Steel Works at Emene near Enugu) to supplement
imports. Nigerian consumption of steel products had grown from 123,000 metric
tons in 1950 to 226,000 metric tons in 1962, and expanded thereafter to 3.5
million metric tons in 1987 (Dike, 1994). In the mid 1980’s iron and steel was a
successful and growing industry, expected to reach 7 million metric tons of
production by the year 2000.
Textile manufacturing is one of the oldest industries in Nigeria.

It

constituted one of the major manufacturing activities even in pre-colonial times.
Cloth was a favored item in the long distance trade with the North African
Maghreb and Europe, and in the pre-colonial cities of the Hausa-Fulani North,
Kano in particular, there were many specialized cotton producers (Fajana, 1978).
Imported cotton textile arrived with the early colonial merchants. These imports
soon monopolized the cotton textile market and destroyed the local industry. By
the 1950s Europeans Textile industries dominated the Nigerian scene. Among the
first of these enterprises was the British firm of David Whitehead and Sons of
Lanscashire which established the Kaduna Textiles Limited (KTL) in 1958 with
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the Northern Nigerian Government as joint partner (Kilby, 1969). Kaduna Textile
Limited depended on imported automatic looms. By 1964 it was operating 1200
looms and 50,000 spindles, and its output in 1966 amounted to roughly 37 million
meters of textile materials. After 1960, textiles became the leading import
substituting activity, and incentive policies encouraged a spate of fresh investments
by oriental investors, mainly Indian and Japanese.
By 1980, the textile industry had 100 major plants, employing some 100,000
workers, about 20 percent of all of the manufacturing positions in the country
(Gunilla and Beckman, 1987). By world standards, the technological level and the
output mix of Nigerian textiles was among the highest. In all of Africa, only Egypt
and South Africa could claim larger production capacity (Dike, 1994). Nigerian
textile manufacturing always had a solid domestic base, that is, until the 1970s,
when domestic cotton output fell, and by the early 1980s only about 50 percent
of installed capacity was being utilized.
Grain milling is the largest agro-based manufacturing activity in Nigeria,
but the industry grew with virtually no links to the domestic agricultural economy.
The flour mills which are among the largest in the Third World were first
established in 1962-3, with the milling process and the wheat coming from the
United States. By the end of 1983, eight flour mills with a daily capacity of 6,000
metric tons of wheat had been built, more than 90 percent supplied from the
United States wheat source. The total milling capacity by the end of 1984 was
about 10,300 tons per day. Nigeria’s expanding wheat consumption, which grew
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from about 400,000 metric tons in 1975 to 1.5 million metric tons in 1981,
benefitted foreign agriculture, in the United States, not in Nigeria (Dike, 1994).
The domination of the Nigerian flour milling business by U.S. firms came
not only from the relatively low prices for wheat offered by U.S. exporters but the
easy credit lines that also were offered. These factors helped to expand direct
United States private investment in wheat exports to Nigeria. Moreover, Nigeria
made little use of the United States credit program because wheat imports from
the U.S. were financed from petroleum earnings. Although such local flour
milling provoked the growth of small-scale entrepreneurship in the bakery
industry and nurtured the growth of a merchant class in flour distribution and
merchandizing, it impeded the growth of local grains, namely maize, sorghum, and
rice, for which wheat substituted. Cognizant of this dilemma, the government
banned wheat inputs in 1986, and now emphasizes the substitution of local grains
for imported wheat.
Cement production began in Nigeria in 1957 with the installation of the
Nkalagu Cement Company north of Enugu (Kilby, 1969). Effective demand for
cement had grown from 100,(XX) metric tons in 1945 to 150,000 metric tons in
1950, a level which was considered well above that required to sustain local
production. Local investors, however, were few because the Nigerian cement
market was dominated by a few suppliers, most importantly, Associated Portland
Cement Manufacturers (APCM) of Britain which controlled well over 50 percent
of Nigerian cement imports.

As long as this foreign monopoly remained
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unchallenged by local manufacturers there was little incentive for APCM, or any
other major importer for that matter, to build a local plant in Nigeria despite the
existence of a large market. Nigeria finally broke APCM’s monopoly in 1957 by
establishing the 120,000 metric ton capacity Nigerian Cement Company
(Nigercem) at Nkalagu- The Nkalagu plant supplied 24 percent of the domestic
need for cement in the 1960s and early 1970s. By the mid 1980s Nigeria had
eight cement plants producing 3.4 million tons per year. Capital investment in the
industry is put at N4 billion. While cement output per annum was growing
steadily, demand was growing more sharply, from roughly 5 million tons in 1975
to more than 9 million in 1985 (Central Bank Report, 1990).
The brewery industry includes beer and soft drink production in Nigeria.
Their expansion has been about the highest in the manufacturing sector,
particularly since the 1970s. Its expansion was due to high demand and increased
profitability in the brewery industry. The number of beer plants expanded from
fewer than eight in 1977 to thirty-one in 1983, with a capacity of roughly 18
million hectoliters (Dike, 1994). At the end of 1983, the total capital investment
in the beer industry stood at approximately N1.5 billion (Guardian, 1985). One
of the major dilemma facing the industry has been its almost total dependence on
imported barley (for malting in brewing) and concentrates (for soft drinks).
Moreover, Nigerian brewing companies depend on foreign patents which require
the local firms to adhere to the specifications prescribed by owners of such
patents. The requirement to adhere to patent specifications has resulted in the
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non-use of alternative local agricultural products or substitutes, namely maize,
sorghum and rice to form malt for brewing. The SAP/Make-or-Buy policy
promulgated in 1986 (see Chapter VIII) required local breweries to research the
possibilities of replacing imported barley with local crops.
Automobile assembly is one of the new industries to arrive on the Nigerian
import substitution scene. Although some assembling was already being done as
early as the 1950s by foreign companies importing automobiles, for example, R.T.
Briscoe and A.G. Leventist, the quantities assembled locally were rather small
Virtually all vehicles were imported fully assembled. As of 1966, only six vehicle
assembly plants, including bicycle assemblies, were in existence. These plants
employed 1,600 workers and had a gross fixed capital formation of N49.6 million
(Dike, 1994). By the early 1970s, the multinational automobile corporations had
penetrated the Nigerian economy and had established joint ventures with the
Nigerian government to meet the growing demand for private automobiles.
Volkswagen, Benz, Peugeot, Fiat, Steyr and British Leyland established
subsidiaries in Nigeria. Domestic assembly of private automobiles rose from 3,892
units in 1963 to 7,425 units in 1970. With the establishment of a new plant in
1975, output grew from 52,000 in 1976 to 78,000 units in 1978, while imports
declined from 102,916 units in 1976 to 60,281 in 1978, and from 52,101 units in
1984 to 37,241 in 1986 (Central Bank Report, 1994).
Oil production is a major industrial area for the nation and a major source
of foreign exchange.

Nigeria is a leading member of the Organization of
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Petroleum Exporting Countries. Oil production after the civil war and the
subsequent hike in oil prices led to massive increase in government revenue.
Nigeria built four oil-refmeries with a capacity of over 450 million barrels per day,
the largest in Africa. It also expanded the petrochemical industry which now
processes crude oil into various petroleum products. There have been efforts at
diversification, and chemical fertilizers, and oil based synthetic materials such as
heavy alkydresin, polypropylene, and benzene are now being produced. Oil has
been the most successful revenue producing industry in Nigeria, but it was asked
to cover too many of the national costs and it could not satisfy expectations when
world oil glut caused prices to fall in the 1980s.
Analyzing the Manufacturing Sector
Analyses of the manufacturing sector from Nigerian Central Bank Reports
(1990 - 1995) reveal that the share of industry in GDP rose almost three fold
between 1960 and 1982, specifically 12 percent per year between 1960 - 1966 and
32 percent per year between 1980 - 1982. The share of manufacturing in the
industrial GDP, however, was 41% for 1960 -1966 and 27% for 1980 -1982; and
the share of manufacturing in an economically active population was 10% in 1960,
17% in 1980 (the peak of the oil boom), and 8% in 1983 (Central Bank Report,
1994). The result is that the resources and technology required for the operation
of the Nigerian manufacturing sector and the engineering sector, were by 1986
still largely imported. Genuine industrialization in Nigeria will require structural
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changes In favor of capital goods, i.e. engineering products, as opposed to
consumer products. The attainment of technological self sufficiency is the basis
for industrialization. Nigeria, however, reveals a continuing inability to exploit
imported technological systems from which it can develop the new technologies
appropriate to its needs.
Economic Crisis of the 1980’s
Since the 1970’s Nigeria has depended heavily on the sale of oil to sustain
its overall economy, and the government initiated few pragmatic programs to
reverse what proved to be an unwise course for technology development. The
painful economic downturn in the 1980’s, due mainly to the collapse of oil prices,
forced a re-evaluation at the highest level of government. The government re
examined its 1962 import substitution industrialization policy and considered its
seriously flawed because it encouraged the import of equipment and spare parts,
as well as materials from Europe and the United States. The assembly of
manufactures from imported materials and technologies did nothing to improve
the creative talents of the Nigerians and neither industries nor research and
development were encouraged. Moreover, given this import-oriented attitude,
Nigerians were slow to expand the country’s manufacturing sector, in spite of the
fact that the cost of manufactured goods was much higher than the income
generated by the export of the country’s raw materials. The dangers to the
economy posed by this reliance on imports were not immediately apparent
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because high world oil prices in the 1970s had given the country a favorable
balance of payments.
The rapid increase in economic revenue from oil production during the 1970’s
transformed public finance and allowed for considerable investment in infrastructure
such as education, social services, and industrial development. Agriculture, however,
stagnated and export oriented agriculture in particular declined. Receipts from
oil exports were erratic, playing havoc with development planning and lending.
In the early 1980s, a severe foreign exchange crisis contributed to the political and
economic upheavals engulfing the country. Exports, of which oil accounted for
96 percent by 1985, fell by almost 50 percent from their peak in 1980. Exports
fell from $25.7bn to $13.1bn in 1985, and then were more than halved again in
1986 to $5.0bn (Olukoshi et al, 1994). Nigeria’s economic difficulties were
magnified by the build-up of sizable trade deficits, especially between 1981 and
1983, as well as the need to repay medium and long term debts.
The first indication of severe crisis in the Nigerian economy came in 1978,
at the start of the "world oil glut”, when the government tried to maintain the
country’s revenue by raising the posted price of oil by 2 percent. This resulted
in a boycott of Nigeria’s oil by customers with access to cheaper sources of supply,
including the spot oil markets. There was a decline in the country’s oil output
from 2.10 million barrels per day in 1977 to 1.57 million by 1978 and this loss of
revenue plunged the country into a recession.

Under these circumstances,

Nigeria’s import bill, which had accelerated at a rate of 40 percent annually and
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stood at a staggering N1 billion a month by May 1978, could no longer be
sustained (Phillips and Ajakaiye 1993,9). Nigeria suffered a balance of payment
deficit of about N1.3 billion in 1977. Also in the 1977-78 period, industrial
production increased by only 3.9 percent as opposed to 9 percent in 1976. Public
debt increase by 66.4 percent from N1.3bn in 1977 to N2.16bn in 1979 (Onimode,
1989).
When the price of world oil suddenly collapsed in the world market
towards the end of 1981 - 1982, a crisis of immense proportions, much more
severe than the relatively mild one suffered in 1977-78, impacted the Nigerian
economy. The price of Nigerian oil fell from the 1980 level of $44.4 per barrel
to about $28 per barrel in 1985, and to less than $10 per barrel in early 1986.
The country’s revenue from oil fell dramatically from its peak $10 billion in 1979
to about $5,161 in 1982. Nigeria’s oil output declined from 2.05 million barrels
a day in 1980 to 1.294 million barrels a day in 1982 and to 0.8 million barrels a
day by 1983-84 (Anyanwu, 1992). As a result of the crisis, Nigeria’s gross
domestic product (GDP) fell by about 1 percent in 1982 and by a further 8
percent in 1983 to record an annual growth rate of minus 4.5 percent. The
current account recorded a deficit of N4.9 billion in 1982 and N2.9 billion in 1983.
The budget deficit for 1983 alone was N6.231 billion, representing more than 50
percent of total government expenditures (Central Bank Report, 1986). This
crisis also intensified Nigeria’s debt problem. External reserves fell sharply and
foreign debt increased in the face of rising imports as shown in Table 4.
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Table 4
Nigerian Export and Import Trade 1980 - 87
Year

Export (N Billion)

Import (N Billion)

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

12.04
10.08
8.63
6.36
8.32
11.7
8.9
30.2

9.10
12.99
10.77
8.90
7.18
13.0
6.0
7.2

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Report, September 1988.
As the crisis escalated, basic social services collapsed, the agricultural
sector continued its steep decline, the construction boom in the economy ended,
and infrastructural facilities deteriorated rapidly.

The government’s deficit

widened and efforts at containing the more adverse developments created other
serious problems, such as economic depression, rising prices and unemployment.
The situation was made even worse by the gross mismanagement of available
resources. By 1985, the economic had deteriorated in spite of a number of
austerity policies adopted by the government to stem the tide. The various
austerity measures drastically reduced the supply of raw materials and spare parts
to the import dependent manufacturing sector, leading to extensive plant closures,
a substantial drop in capacity utilization, and the layoff cf many workers. Several

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

production cutbacks and the ensuing shortages led to very high prices of essential
commodities. Investments in both the private and the public sector shrank and
the depression deepened.

By the end of 1985 real per capita GDP and

consumption were well below the level recorded in the early 1970s.

The

outstanding external debt rose to over $18 billion out of which about $5 billion
represented trade arrears, and the external debt service obligation increased to
32 percent of GDP (Oke 1990, 36). While servicing on medium and long term
debts was not interrupted until 1986, rescheduling had by then become imperative
if a unilateral default was to be avoided. As the crisis in the Nigerian economy
deepened, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) became
increasingly more prominent in shaping economic policy. The government, hit by
worsening terms of trade for oil, and pressed for credit facilities, entered into
negotiations with the IMF for a stand-by loan facility. In 1983, the civilian
government of President Shagari could not agree to the full IMF conditionality
because elections were near and he was concerned with his political survival.
It was against this background that in 1984 the military again took over the
government. The new regime headed by General Buhari, however, was reluctant
to accept the whole IMF package, especially, the devaluation of the Naira
(Nigerian currency), the removal of the petroleum subsidy, the liberalization of
trade, and an across the board privatization of public enterprises (Anyanwu,
1992). As a result, no agreement with the IMF could be concluded. Matters
were further complicated by Nigeria’s reluctance to accept an IMF loan package,
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the normal prerequisite for rescheduling its outstanding debts by the Paris and
London Club of Creditors.
In 1985, the military government introduced a unilateral cut in the wages
and salaries of all public and private sector employees of 2 - 15 percent of their
annual income. The N500 million which the government realized from these cuts
was paid into a special National Economic Recovery Fund Account in the Central
Bank of Nigeria. Apart from this, the government also reduced the petroleum
subsidy by 80 percent, which led to further hardships for the Nigerian citizenry.
Nevertheless, the belt-tightening meant a reduction in Federal and state
government budgets and the introduction of a structural adjustment program that
promoted self reliance.
Because available data are not consistent with known facts, the exact
magnitude of Nigeria’s outstanding debt in 1986 is not exactly known. While the
federal government of Nigeria quoted a figure which indicated a debt burden of
$26 billion, World Bank and IMF statistics projected a figures closer to $30.5
billion (Olukoshi et al 1994, 83). The more conservative Nigerian figure of $26
billion was still enormously large when compared with Nigeria’s total 1986 Gross
National Product (GNP), said to be N82.46 billion, or less than $13 billion.
Moreover, the amount needed annually to service the Nigerian debt was about
N9.9 billion in 1988 (World Bank Report, 1990).
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The Potential Consequences
In August 1985, General Buhari was ousted from office in a bloodless coup
by General Ibrahim Babangida. Babangida created an Armed Forces Ruling
Council (AFRC) made up of most of the members of the old Supreme Military
Council (SMC). Babangida’s new regime immediate^ opened negotiations with
the World Bank and IMF. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or World Bank
which was established by post World War n representatives of forty-four nations
to provide credit and funds to countries with temporary balance-of-payments
problems. From its capital of more than $10 billion a year, and borrowing power,
the World Bank alone could provide substantial loan for postwar reconstruction
and economic development.
According to Effiong Essien (1990, 78), the military government decided
to call a national debate on the IMF loan and its conditions, and by inference, to
examine the role the IMF should play in the management of the country’s
economic crisis.

The decision to open the debate was taken by General

Babandiga as part of his effort at building public confidence as well as generating
greater input from informed citizens. Adebayo Olukoshi (1993) contends that it
was the expectation of Babangida’s regime that it would be able, by encouraging
a national debate, to reach an accommodation with the IMF. The government,
however, learned from the open debate that there was widespread opposition to
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any IMF role in the nation's quest for economic recovery. University professors,
students, workers, market women, youth organizations, religious leaders,
professional groups, the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) and
members of the armed forces, in particular, soldiers of the 82nd Airborne
Battalion, openly voiced their opposition to the IMF loan and its conditions. The
debate had energized the Nigerian people, it also demonstrated popular disfavor
with the IMF plan. The military government therefore decided it was in its own
best interest to publicly reject the IMF proposal.
The debate succeeded in doing much more, however. It also revealed how
Nigerians approached the matter economic priorities and in the process they
identified the following areas requiring government and public attention: (a) The
appraisal, adaptation and replication of imported technology; (b) The develop
ment of agro-allied industries, including food processing; (c) The expansion of
irrigation and water supply; (d) The overall environmental improvement; (e)
Education reforms, especially science and vocational education in all three tiers
of the educational system; (f) Improvement in health care; and (g) Expansion of
low cost housing (Obansanjo et al 1991; Kaplinsky 1990).
It was against this background of crisis, austerity measures, economic need
and dependency that the Babangida Administration introduced the Structural
Adjustment/Make-or-Buy Polity in June 1986.
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Appropriate Technology and SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy
The goals of the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy are those of technology
development, economic reconstruction and self-reliance. But Nigeria cannot
achieve these goals without a domestic technological base. The major drain on
the nation’s foreign exchange and the cause of its foreign debt is still the
importation of equipment, spare parts and raw materials. That situation has not
altered since 1986. Nigeria is still dependent on imported technology. What the
nation therefore needs is Nigerian technologies that utilize locally available raw
materials and resources to produce products that will satisfy its needs.
Appropriate technology for Nigeria should entail a shift in emphasis from
imported machinery materials and spare parts to the production of equipment
that can be made and used domestically from its own available raw materials. An
appropriate technology would involve the use of the mineral resources (Iron, Tin,
Gold, Columbite, Limestone, Petroleum) that are abundantly available in Nigeria,
as well as the country’s skilled and unskilled labor force. It should avoid products
that require scare resources and capital. Thus, an appropriate technology for
Nigeria would be totally concerned with more local than foreign inputs.
The development of new technologies requires experience in the
production of machine tools, and other capital goods. It requires design and
creative skills as well as applied research. An appropriate technology for Nigeria,
however, also must be cost effective. This is because Nigeria is a very poor nation
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with a per capita income of hardly $250 a year. An appropriate technology for
Nigeria must use local resources, save foreign exchange, be labor intensive,
involve capital saving and produce low cost products.
Summary
Amid the major political and economic crisis examined in this chapter, four
stand out: (1) the chronic political instability in the country; (2) the high rate of
inflation and the serious banking problems; (3) the continuing dependence on
external raw materials and technology; and (4) the increasing burden of an ever
expanding foreign and public debt In sum, Nigeria suffers from extreme political,
economic and social distress. One question raised by these crisis is how can
Nigeria begin to rectify its many faults? The nation cannot build a self-reliant
economy or a resilient, integrated society in the absence of a stable, peoplecentered government. Nor is it helpful to blame the British and the colonial
legacy for the contemporary predicament. Nigeria's record over the past thirty
years is a wretched one, and its future prospects are not promising.
What can be done, knowing that the military and bureaucratic elites that
bear major responsibility for the dislocation and prevailing malaise will continue
to dominate the country’s policy and decision-making processes?
It can be hypothesized that economic development and social change, i.e.,
providing for the nation’s well-being as well as reconciling tribal and ethnic
differences, cannot wait for political modernization to precede them. Denied
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other options or alternatives, Nigeria is forced to utilize its existing political and
administrative institutions in the quest for a healthier economy and balanced
social order.
Given the realities of Nigerian political life, it seems appropriate and useful
to examine aspects of the country’s SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy. Such an examina
tion can perhaps inform the observer as to whether or not the higher civil-military
decision-making apparatus can unify their capabilities, and thereby, direct the
nation along a more positive path.
Given the nature of the Nigerian dilemma described in this study, does the
SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy provide a vehicle wherein Nigeria’s army junta and
professional bureaucracy can, at a minimum, reverse the country’s economic slide
into deeper economic depression? Nigeria has the necessary elements in skilled
and energetic people as well as natural resources, to again begin the process of
national renewal and reconstruction. The SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy offers insight
into leadership’s ability to properly utilize those resources, and hence to steer a
course that not only promotes civil-military cooperation, but also promises a way
out of a deepening national problem.
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CHAPTER Vm
MXITARY-BUREAUCRACY DECISION MAKING
AND IMPLEMENTATION
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the relationship between the
Nigerian higher military and bureaucracy in decision making and decision
implementation, using the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy as a case study. The chapter
presents data with respect to the economic consequences of the implementation
of the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy. The chapter also explores the utility of the
hybrid political system model in explaining the decision making process and in
Nigeria and especially the different responses of the federal ministries to the
Make-or-Buy Policy. The making of the policy, its official proclamation and
implementation is based primarily on government documents, which have been
analyzed extensively. Two other types of data have also been used to assess the
behavior of the federal ministries during the policy implementation stage:
interviews and financial data. The interviews are examined first followed by the
financial data which are presented in table form so that the reader can compare
the ministries to one another. The interviews conducted in 1995-96, reveal intra
and inter-ministerial conflict as the policy passes through an "interpretation"
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phase. The findings from the interviews illustrate the different mandates in each
ministry, and how these perceptions of their distinct mandates affects their
compliance with the policy. The financial data shows similar reaction and
behaviors. An effort has been made here to evaluate policy performance after
nine years of trial and error, notably in the creation of new technology and in the
improvement of the national economy.
The central research question in this study is: What is the relationship
between the Nigerian military junta and the country’s bureaucracy in the decision
making and implementation processes and how has that relationship been shaped
by the colonial legacy? The central research question is operationalized by the
following specific hypotheses:
1. Does lack of consultation with the implementors in a bureaucraticauthoritarian system produce different degrees of resistance or support in the
implementation of development policy?
2. What circumstances in the political/economic environment of Nigeria (a) internationally, and (b) domestically - prompted the development of the
Structural Adjustment/Make-or-Buy policy?
3. To what extent did instability in the political/economic environment
constitute pressure on the nation’s leadership to examine and re-evaluate its
policies?
4. What decision making procedures did the Nigerian military government
follow in enacting the Structural Adjustment/Make-or-Buy policy?
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5. What was the policy? What was it intended to accomplish? Why did
the military government expect this policy would achieve its stated purpose?
6. What was the relationship between the Nigerian military and the career
administrators in the formulation of the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy? Did the
ministries, staffed with career administrators vary in the resources allocated to
them, and advocated by them for the implementation of the SAP/Make-or-Buy
polity?
7. Did the individual ministries view the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy as
consistent with the mandate of their particular ministry? Why and how did the
ministries support or resist the policy? What do the financial data reveal about
the various ministries’ implementation of the policy?
8. After nine years of implementation have any new technologies emerged
to justify the development and execution of the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy?
9. Has the national economy improved due to development of the
SAP/Make-or-Buy policy?
10. If the purpose of the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy is the economic
development of Nigeria, has it succeeded in (a) the public sector, and (b) the
private sector?
11. What is the future of the Structural Adjustment/Make-or-Buy Policy?
Policy Process in Nigeria
The dominant feature of decision making in Nigeria is the principle of
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federal supremacy as defined in the 1979 Constitution. Under the constitution,
the federal government is expected to provide the overall direction and leadership
in the planning process from the formulation stage through the implementation
and evaluation stages (Adamolekun et al, 1990). The decision making process
under the federal supremacy principle requires the National Economic Council,
which is presided over by the vice president, to advise the President concerning
the economic affairs of the federation, and, in particular, on measures necessary
for the coordination of economic planning efforts or the economic development
programs of the various state governments of Nigeria. Figure 4 shows key
governmental agencies and institutions that are involved in the national decision
making process. These include the Ministries of Finance and National Planning.
Policy inputs come from the various ministries and departments of the
Ministry of National Planning.

Here policy alternatives are examined and

evaluated and then translated into programs within the financial parameters
stated by the Ministry of Finance. The key agency in the Ministry of National
Planning is the National Planning Office, which is divided into four directorates,
each headed by a director who is responsible to the director general (as the
permanent secretary is now called) of the ministry. Besides the National Planning
Office, there are two other offices or boards that report to the Ministry of Nation
al Planning: (1) the National Manpower Board (NMB) and (2) the Federal Office
of Statistics (FOS).

The functions of NMB consist of determining personnel

needs and formulating programs for personnel development. The FOS is the nat-
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Figure 4. Normal Decision-Making Process, and the Relationship
Between the Military and Bureaucrats in Decision-Making in Nigeria.
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ional agency responsible for collecting social and economic data throughout the
federation. A number of other interdepartmental and intergovernmental agencies
and institutions also participate in the decision making process. The most notable
among them are (a) the Joint Planning Board (JPB) and (b) the Conference of
Ministers and Commissioners for National and Economic Planning.
The JPB consists of the leading planning officers of the federal and state
governments. The JPS meets periodically, usually in advance of the conference
of commissioners of economic planning. It serves as a clearing house and coord
inating institution for polity proposals emanating from the states. The institution
al framework for planning at the state level differs from that described above in
one major respect: the policy inputs that come to each state Ministry of Economic
Development also include inputs from the top bureaucrats of the local governm
ents and are directed through the State Ministry of Local Government. Decision
making concerning the SAP/Make-or-Buy polity appears to not have followed the
normal polity making process, as the study which follows will reveal. While the
policy making process that led to the SAP/Make-or-Buy polity is different, it
illustrates the basic dilemmas of Nigerian polity formulation procedure.

In

addition, it is important to note that while the polity making process was
different, the bureaucratic processes and difficulties in implementing the polity
were normal. Thus, the overall case study represents a good example of all the
various cross pressures between the militaiy junta and the traditional bureaucracy.
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A Study of the SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy
The SAP/Make-or-Buy policy was announced by General Babangida’s
administration in July of 1986. The sequence of events and the decision making
process utilized in the making and approval of the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy is
unique and thus differs from the typical policy making procedures in Nigeria
described above. It is unique because the military has never before called for a
national debate on any issue or problem facing the country prior to when
decisions were made. The sole decision makers in the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy
were the members of the Armed Forces Ruling Council. The AFRC decision,
however, was influenced by a number of domestic and international institutions.
In any decision making process the existence of an awareness stage occupies a
prominent position. The debt crisis, the lack of domestically created technology
and the possibility of the total collapse of the Nigerian economy provided the
need and produced the awareness, as previously described in chapter seven, for
some kind of policy to be developed. The decision making stages followed by the
Armed Forces Ruling Council are the following:
Step 1: The Armed Forces Ruling Council was aware of the debt crisis and
the failing economy. It was further aware in the mid-1980s of an inadequate
national technological base. The AFRC articulated concerns that in the absence
of a modem national technological capability, existing intensive labor practices
meant output and productivity would continue to decline hence would fail to meet
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the needs of a growing population, or to produce marketable items for export.
Step 2: There were pressures from Nigerian politicians and from various
associations representing economists and manufacturers for the military
government to either do something to improve the economic situation or to hand
over power to a civilian government. Various kinds of citizen groups representing
their regional, religious, and ethnic interests made similar demands. These groups
marched and demonstrated in the major cities of the country. The pressures
exerted by these groups forced the AFRC to announce publicly to the nation that
some kind of speedy action would be taken.
Step 3: The AFRC contacted the IMF and the World Bank to obtain loans
to finance development projects around the country, including the creation of
modem technology where appropriate. It was hoped that an infusion of money
into the economy would at least temporarily quiet the protestors and stimulate
development. In response, the international financial institutions agreed to offer
loans to Nigeria, but only if the government agreed to a set of severe structural
adjustment conditions, including the devaluation of the Naira, the removal of the
petroleum subsidy, the liberalization of trade, the reduction of government
expenditures and the privatization of government enterprises.
Step 4: In order to gain legitimacy for their action, the AFRC informed the
nation about these structural adjustment conditions proposed by the IMF and the
World Bank and called for a national debate on how to solve the Nigerian
predicament. A wide range of citizens, representing different areas of Nigerian
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life responded. They included the bureaucracy, which opposed several of the
conditions, specifically the reduction of government expenditures which would
result in layoffs of career bureaucrats, the removal o f the ofl subsidy, and the
devaluation of the Naira. Political legitimacy had declined in Nigeria because the
military regime could not adequately cope with the economic predicament
plaguing the country. Therefore, to establish the belief that his regime was the
most appropriate for the nation, and ever mindful of his shaky power base,
General Babangida sought to maintain his support in government circle and
especially in the armed forces.
Step 5: The AFRC attempted to negotiate with the IMF and the World
Bank to reduce the structural adjustment conditions. Their request to reduce the
conditions failed because the IMF and the World Bank felt that Nigeria might not
be able to pay back the loan if it did not follow aU of the conditions strictly.
Step 6: General Babangida and members of the AFRC abandoned their
request for the loans from the IMF and the World Bank, but re c o g n izin g that
important measures to improve the economy were called for, they decided to
introduce many of the structural adjustments that had been recommended. These
adjustments included trade liberalization, privatization of government corporations
and operations, devaluation of the Nigerian currency, regulation of the foreign
exchange market, and a sharp reduction in government expenditures.

The

SAP/Make-or-Buy policy was developed and announced as one of these social
structural adjustments, namely the privatization of R & D activities.
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Step 7: General Babangida the chairperson of the AFRC, announced the
SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy in July 1986 and issued the guidelines for its implemen
tation. H e asserted that Nigerians were being battered by a high rate of inflation,
unemployment, underdevelopment, and reduced standard of living. This made
it necessary to give the Nigerian economy an entirety new structure because its
old economic structure was near collapse.
Goals of the SAP/Make-or-Buy Polity
The major goal of the SAP/Make-or-Buy polity was to stabilize Nigeria’s
economy and set it on the path of social, economic and technological growth.
This radical reform policy was designed to restructure the economy, expand non
oil exports, reduce the import content of locally manufactured goods, achieve selfsufficiency in food, and give a larger role in the development of the economy to
the private sector. Accompanying this polity were several other specific, but
major, reforms, notably the abolition of import licenses (with reliance placed on
the foreign exchange auctions to allocate scarce foreign resources), the reduction
and realignment of import duties (designed to reduce protection of local
industries and force manufacturers to reduce import dependence), the abolition
of export duties, the introduction of tough demand management policies to ward
off the inflationary dangers of large scale devaluation, and the progressive
privatization of numerous parastatal companies.

The government also re

structured the Nigerian companies in virtually all sectors of the economy. The
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SAP/Make-or-Buy policy reserved the lion's share of industrial and economic
activities for Nigerian businesses, allowing only 40 percent equity participation by
foreign investors in those businesses utilizing high technology and needing
substantial R & D or heavy capital investment.
The SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy specifically mandates the transfer of new
research and development work from t_w government laboratories to the private
sector (Buy) with the hope that this enlarged arena for R & D would help
generate sufficient technology for the development of the country's industry.
There are two objectives of the Make-or-Buy Policy, a short-run objective and a
long-run objective. The short-run objective is to ensure that federal ministries and
agencies contract out to industry all new research and development (R & D)
requirements. These requirements were not intended to remove the ministries
from all R & D activities since they were allowed to continue their R & D
projects already underway, and even to undertake new ones (Make). The polity
was intended to prompt an increase in research and development in the private
sector, well beyond that existing at the time. By engaging in substantially more
research and development activities, Nigerian industrial managers and officials
were expected to become increasingly more aware of the enormous amount of R
& D needed to develop the country. It was further anticipated that, with the
greater number of R & D contracts and heightened innovation, increased benefits
would occur to Nigerian industry and to the economy as a whole.
The long-run objective of the Make-or-Buy polity was the development of
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a sophisticated technological capability in Nigeria and the modernization of the
entire economy of the country. In order to achieve the objectives of the policy
the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), in January 1987, issued a list of
implementation guidelines that were to be followed by the various ministries and
agencies which were required to develop the various R & D contracts with the
private sector firms. Responsibility for the supervision and evaluation of the
policy fell mainly on two ministries: The Ministry of Science and Technology
(MOST) and the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI).
MOST’s chief concern involved assuring the overall effectiveness of the
policy and the periodic review of procedures for its implementation. Consultation
with other interested departments and agencies was made imperative. MTI was
assigned responsibility for contracting out R & D activities and setting patterns
of delegation for other federal ministries and agencies. Among an extensive list
of guidelines issued by the military government, four are important because they
establish the basic framework for the Structural Adjustment/Make-or-Buy policy.
These four guidelines are as follows (Government Guidelines, 1987):
1. The SAP/Make-or-Buy policy applies to "new" mission oriented R & D
requirements in the natural sciences.
"New mission oriented research and development, signifies an R&D re
quirement that is appearing for the first time or is a significant revision,
modification or expansion of an existing R&D requirement. In the case
of a revision, modification or expansion, only the portions which were
revised, modified or expanded will be considered the new R&D require
ment" (Government Guidelines, 1987).
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2. As a general rule,
... all mission oriented research and development requirements as well as
their associated and subsequent contracts for hardware, systems and
services are to be acquired from Nigerian industry (Government Guide
lines, 1987).
Other guidelines however, allow for exemptions to this general principle. Some
of the exemptions apply,
... where the R&D requirement is essential to provide direct support to a
regulatory function and associated planning activities, and where no private
establishment independent of the firms being regulated can be found or
created, ...(or)... where the conduct of research and development is
essential to establish and maintain a limited in-house competence sufficient
to assess the opportunities represented by the current state-of-the-art, to
enable the operating department to perform its mission and manage its
contracting research in industry,... (Government Guidelines, 1987).
3. With respect to the general applicability of SAP/Make-or-Buy, President
Babangida directed that,
...the polity and guidelines apply to all ministries and agencies named in
Schedule A and B of the Federal Administration Act and to branches
designated as departments for the purposes of the Federal Administration
Act (Government Guidelines, 1987).
4. Generally,
... the onus is on ministries and agencies, with due respect to o p tim u m
benefit to Nigeria, to demonstrate a valid reason why R&D requirements
should be considered for Make rather than Buy (Government Guidelines,
1987).
For example, the guidelines permit a ministry or agency to advance a case for
performing certain kinds of R&D in-house,
... where questions of security prohibit industrial involvement... o r ... where
the R&D requirement is inappropriate to industrial needs, or where no
suitable industrial capability exists and it would not be of benefit to Nigeria
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suitable industrial capability exists and it would not be of benefit to Nigeria
to create one, ...(Government Guidelines, 1987).
The SAP/Make-or-Buy industrial polity also was intended to facilitate
investment through the establishment of the Industrial Development Coordination
Committee (IDCC). The committee comprised the Ministers for Industries,
Finance, Trade, Science and Technology, Agriculture, Defence, Communication,
Employment, Labor, and Internal Affairs, and was given principal responsibility
for (a) approving new industry applications; (b) approving tax incentives for
qualifying firms; and (c) granting expatriate quotas for qualifying new foreign
firms.

Other functions of the IDCC included approving pre-investment

technology transfer agreements as they relate to feasibility studies, assistance in
producing machinery, plants, equipment and components, engineering design
services, plant installation, and plant commissioning. IDCC also was assigned the
tasks of advising on the administration of government industrial incentives and of
making recommendations on pertinent policies including tariffs and various
measures aimed at ensuring the industrial development of Nigeria.
The seven steps in the development of this policy described earlier in the
chapter reveal that the Armed Forces Ruling Council responded to the oil crisis,
the technology deficit, and the overall of failure of the economy by adopting many
of the structural adjustment conditions recommended by the IMF and the World
Bank, even in spite of their political unpopularity. The SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy
was linked with the developments to promote Research and Development (R &
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D) and to boost Nigeria’s quest for modern technology. The interviews conducted
for this study indicate that the various ministries and even the planning bodies
that were normally involved in the development of new policies were not invited
to participate in the decision making process that led to the Make-or-Buy policy,
although a few did have representation on the AFRC. Given this shift in the
decision making process, the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy was not taken seriously
when it was first announced in 1986. Moreover, several federal ministries ignored
the policy even after the guidelines were issued in 1987.
Implementation and Consequences of the Policy
Four ministries of the national government were studied with respect to
the implementation of SAP/Make-or-Buy policy: the Ministry of Agriculture, the
Ministry of Communication, the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Energy,
Mines and Resources. These four ministries were selected because they represent
the major federal government ministries involved in research and development
activities in Nigeria. The ministries were also selected because they represent a
good cross section of the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy arena as well as bureaucratic
power in Nigeria.

The responsibilities of each of these ministries will be

presented first. Then, they vail be grouped based on their responses to the policy
as revealed by the interviews. The two ministries charged with administrative
responsibilities will be examined for their particular coordinative and supervisory
roles with respect to the policy. They are the Ministry of Science and Technology
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In the third part of this section, the financial data will be presented and
analyzed. This consists primarily of the contracting-out data published by the
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) for the fiscal years 1987 to 1994
inclusive.
Finally, the political system model will be evaluated with respect to its
utility to account for the implementation phase of the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy.
Responsibilities of Ministries With Respect to SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy
Ministry of Agriculture
The national agricultural ministry and the related research institutions are
concerned with developing new techniques for extraction, refining and character
ization of crop seeds. It also investigates other uses of crop products, including
improving the method of their production. The ministry also embarks on a
number of medium-term research projects, in collaboration with the World Bank,
in order to develop integrated insect pests management programs for the control
of major pests and to conserve germ plasma. The veterinary department of the
ministry is involved in various vaccine research projects intended to enhance the
productivity of livestock through the reduction of livestock pests and diseases.
Ministry of Communication
The Ministry of Communication controls two departments (1) Nitel and (2)
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Nipost. Nitel is responsible for all research, construction and installation of
telecommunications equipment in Nigeria. Nipost is concerned with the postal
system of the nation.

The Communication Ministry is also responsible for

regulating and granting licenses to television and radio stations in Nigeria.
Ministry of Defense
The Ministry of Defense provides for the territorial security of the nation.
It conducts strategic research to keep the total armed forces, numbered at 94,500
men and women, ready for combat. Among this number 80,000 are Army, 5,000
are Navy and 9,500 are Air Force. Paramilitary forces in its charge include the
Port Security (12,000) and the Security and Civil Defence Corps. The Defence
ministry also provides engineering and construction services to the nation and
coordinates the Nigerian armaments industry. The Armed Forces Ruling Council
is the highest ruling body of both the military and the Nigerian Government
Ministry of Energy. Mines and Resources
The Ministry of Energy, Mines and Resources is in charge of the research
and exploration of all mineral deposits and sources of energy production in
Nigeria, such as petroleum, natural gas, iron and steel, tin, coal, gold and etc. It
is concerned with the core industrial projects, i,e., oil refineries, petrochemical
plants, hydro-electricity, liquefied natural gas, fertilizer, steel, paper and sugar
plants, machine tools, and marble and cement manufacturing.
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Ministries With Minimum or No Policy Conflict
Interviews were conducted with a number of officials in agencies charged
with implementing the SAP/Make-or-Buy polity. Interviews with senior members
of the Ministry of Defense July 3,1995, and Ministry of Communications July 11,
1995, yielded the following generally results. The Ministries of Defense and
Communications tended to perceive only minimal conflict between their
ministries* mandates and the Make-or-Buy requirement to contract out their R
& D requirements. Where conflict was perceived, there were three general
concerns. First, these ministries did not appreciate the unusual confidence shown
by the AFRC in industry as a performer of R & D. Second, scientists conducting
R & D within the ministries were not consulted and they were skeptical about the
policy’s chances of success in the implementation phase. And third, despite the
contracting concessions offered by the Armed Forces Ruling Council guidelines,
the involvement of the Ministry of Trade and Industry in the administration of the
contract process confused its role with that of the Defense and the Communica
tions ministry which already had a practice of making private sector contracts.
In spite of the above concerns, however, several factors allowed these
these ministries to view the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy positively. First, prior to the
development of the policy they had built up a tradition of contracting out to the
private sector thereby substantially reducing their apprehension about the
probable impact and requirements of the policy. This was certainly the case with
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research scientists within the Ministry of Defense who enjoyed a tradition of co
operation with their peers in the private sector. Such co-operation had begun in
the early 1970's under the terms of the United States-Nigeria Defense Sharing
Agreement. The objective of the latter agreement was not unlike the goals of the
SAP/Make-or-Buy policy, namely it was intended to encourage the development
of a high level of Nigerian technological capability through spin-offs associated
with the production of military hardware, as well as software for the African
market.
A second factor which encouraged the Ministries of Defense and
Communications to be supportive of the Make-or-Buy polity was the fact that
these Ministries were generally in pursuit of major goals to which the contractingout requirements did not pose a threat. The Ministry of Communications for
example, had committed itself to the development of a sophisticated communica
tions industry in Nigeria. Therefore, whether the associated R & D was done inhouse or in-industry was not an overriding concern. SAP/Make-or-Buy was seen
as a legitimate vehicle for achieving ministry goals rather than an obstacle to the
progress of communications technology. Similarly, R & D managers within the
Ministry of Defense (interviewed July 4, 1995) were committed to the develop
ment of a strong R & D capability within the Nigerian armaments industry and
they did not envisage SAP/Make-or-Buy impeding their mission. Senior officials
interviewed in the Ministry of Communications stressed that,
a fundamental shift in government polity and a further demonstration of
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the military government's confidence in the private sector's ability to
create new products, processes and services, is due to the present econmic climate. The emphasis on this kind of R & D contract to industry is
basically due to the fact that it will in turn create new jobs for
Nigerians.
Therefore, the contracting out of R & D requirements was actively encouraged
by both ministries.
A third factor which generated support for Make-or-Buy among the
Ministries of Defense and Communications was their acceptance of its basic
rationale. Spin-offs from SAP/Make-or-Buy were perceived accelerating Nigerian
development, notably through the transfer of R & D from the government
laboratories to the private sector. These ministries acknowledge their linkages
with the private sector and how the SAP/Make-or-Buy enhanced overall national
development without threatening their prerogatives.
Finally, the contracting out guidelines of 1987 accommodated internal
ministerial R & D requirements. For instance, one of the guidelines permits the
in-house performance of R & D,
— where the R & D requirement is essential to provide direct support to
a regulatory function and associated planning activities, and where no pri
vate establishment independent of the firms being regulated can be found
or created, e.g. certain aspects of research associated with food quality,
narcotics control, transportation safety regulations and communications
(Government Guideline, 1987).
Another of the contracting-out guidelines permits the ronduct of R & D in-house,
. . . where the conduct of research and development is essential to establish
and maintain a limited in-house competence sufficient to assess the oppor
tunities represented by the current state-of-the-art, to enable the operating
department to perform its mission and manage its contract research in
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industry (Government Guideline, 1987).
Given SAP/Make-or-Buy’s substantial flexibility for the ministries of Defense and
Communications, they generously supported the contracting-out aspects of the
policy.
Ministries Perceiving Policy Conflict
Interview results indicate that the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry
of Energy, Mines and Resources (EMR) perceived a higher level of conflict betw
een their individual mandates and the objectives of the Make-or-Buy policy than
did the Ministries of Defense and Communications. Several important factors
account for this difference in perception.
First, interviews with senior officials in the Ministries of Agriculture and
Energy, Mines and Resources (July 13 and 14, 1995) indicate that they viewed
their ministries primarily as research institutes with a tradition of scientific
excellence which they believed could not be matched by the private sector. One
of the senior officials in the Ministry of Agriculture stated,
the essential need for economic development is not necessarily extensive
indigenous technological output, but rather a capacity to use technology
effectively, whether it is domestic or foreign.
Therefore, they interpreted the SAP/Make-or-Buy requirement to contract out as
a direct threat to their work and they opposed the policy on these grounds. The
Ministry of Agriculture objected to the requirement to contract out, especially in
the area of regulatory R & D, because, in several circumstances, the only
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institutions in the private sector capable of performing the required R & D were
those that had been appropriately regulated.
The Ministries of Agriculture and of Energy, Mines and Resources
believed the private sector lacked the expertise for R & D in matters of concern
them. Officials within the Ministry of Agriculture argued that the pervasive
importance of agriculture to the Nigerian economy demanded that related R &
D work remain the responsibility of the Government. According to these senior
officials,
...even when a portion of the research and development is contracted out
to the private sector, it is coordinated with the research of the entire
international organizations, directed from the home base, and thus not
necessarily fitted into the productive capacity of the Nigerian environment.
The senior officials contend that the vigorous promotion of the free-market model
by Western governments, IMF and World Bank, often as a condition for
extending desperately needed financial assistance, seemed to be designed to shift
power in Nigeria to the private sector, foreign as well as indigenous, and to align
local business interests with foreign interference in national sovereignty, a form
of neoimperialism. Moreover, given the high capital cost of agricultural research,
and the inability of the country’s farmers to pay the cost of R&D activity, the
ministries believed that the private sector could not measure up to the task.
Another factor which generated resistance to the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy
was the apparent conflict of interest between the mission of the Ministry of
Agriculture and the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Resources and the rationale
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and requirements of the SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy. The ministers and directors
interviewed expressed their disbelief that the transfer of R & D from government
laboratories to the private sector would actually generate the technological spin
offs in the areas of their responsibility. They argued that it was not the absence
of basic research within the private sector which accounted for Nigeria's
technological underdevelopment, but the lack of developmental R & D. They
called upon industry to take advantage of the research contributions their
ministries had already made. In other words, industry should be concerned with
commercial viability, thus leaving the government agencies to continue with their
basic research. In this way, in-house based R & D would continue uninterrupted
and industry would benefit from the application of research in commercially
appropriate situations. In conclusion, the resisting ministries agreed that the
SAP/Make-or-Buy policy, whose objective was the transfer of basic research as
well as general R & D responsibilities from the government laboratories to the
private sector, was not needed. Senior officials of the Ministry of Energy, Mines
and Resources argued that,
...While the availability of foreign technology has, in general, clearly been
essential for the Nigerian economy, the method of transfer has typically
been dictated largely by the objectives and interests of the foreign
proprietor. Nothing in Nigerian environment militates against this
procedure.
Finally, the Ministries of Agriculture and Energy, Mines and Resources
were critical of the policy because its specified procedures seemed to complicate
the traditional contracting-out process by requiring the involvement of other
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agencies. The policy guidelines directed MOST and MTI to oversee the Policy’s
implementation by the various ministries. The ministers and directors interviewed
asserted that the involvement of MOST and MTI would lead to the loss of their
traditional control over contracts, and decrease the likelihood that contract
specifications would be satisfied on time, if at all.
Though the interviews indicated that the Ministry of Energy, Mines and
Resources would resist the Make-or-Buy Policy, officials readily admitted that
their primary objection was not against the requirement to contract out as much
as it was against the designation of MOST and MTI as the watchdog of the
Policy. The Ministry of Energy, Mines and Resources contained a small R & D
establishment, although its responsibilities in the area of mines regulation were
considerable. Contracting out was not unknown to the ministry and on numerous
occasions if had sought external research assistance. The ministry’s concern
therefore lay not in out-sourcing work but in seeing its power diminished by the
policy. Therefore, loss of direct control over an important and growing area of
the ministry’s operations was the principal concern.

Additional comments

concerning the roles of MTI and MOST appear below.
Still another factor making for resistance to the policy in these two
agencies was the threat it posed to their integrity. With SAP/Make-or-Buy, the
Ministries of Agriculture and Energy, Mines and Resources, like all other federal
ministries and agencies, were free to determine the volume of assigned R & D
funds to be spent in any fiscal period, as well as the location for R & D work.
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These ministries generally viewed R & D, whether it was contracted out or
performed in-house, as a resource like any other resource, to be deployed for the
attainment of organizational objectives and in accordance with their own
timetables. The uncertainties created by the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy caused
these ministries to speculate about their future role and responsibilities.
The SAP/Make-or-Buy policy and its guidelines, evoked a different
response from that of the Ministries of Defense and Communications as described
earlier. The Ministries of Agriculture and Energy, Mines and Resources were
generally unsupportive of the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy and this study reveals six
basic reasons. First, the ministries viewed the policy as a direct threat to the
continued existence of their R & D establishments. Second, they perceived it to
be a major impediment to the accomplishment of their organizational mandates.
Third, they understood that support for the Policy required them to transfer
control over the R & D contractual process to the private sector. Fourth, they
disagreed with the basic rationale of the SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy, that the
transfer of government R & D work to the private sector would lead inevitably
to the development of indigenous technology that would be useful for Nigerian
industries. Fifth, they resented not being allowed to participate in the formulation
and adoption of the policy. According to senior officials from the Ministry of
Agriculture,
... the Nigerian Government could have been more successful in estab
lishing coherent and efficient decentralized machinery for economic
and technology policies than the isolated action of the AFRC in 1986.
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Six, they opposed giving the management role to MTI and the evaluation role to
MOST.
Management Role of the Ministry of Trade and Industry
Under the SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy, MTI is responsible for the manage
ment of all R & D contracts between the federal ministries, and Nigerian industry.
This responsibility includes supervision of the administrative, scientific and
technical aspects of contracts, as well as the making of payments upon satisfactory
contract completion.
As revealed in the interviews with the contracting-out ministries, MTI’s
managerial role affects the four contracting lines in two important aspects. First,
ministries such as Agriculture and Energy, Mines and Resources contend that the
involvement of MTI in the contractual process reduces their traditional control
over R & D that is now performed by the private sector. Moreover, MTFs
criteria for the awarding of contracts are more broadly based than those followed
by the ministries. As a result, the ministries cannot be sure that their R & D
requirements will be performed to their specifications.
To substantiate their claim, the Ministries of Agriculture and Energy,
Mines and Resources point to two widely held views about the federal oversight
ministries. There is the view that MTI does not possess the necessary scientific
capability in-house to assess industry’s performance in the R & D field, and that
MTI is more of a "marketing" ministry than an organization with reputable R &
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D contract managers.

The ministries also believe that in the awarding of

contracts, MTI is prone to pay significant attention to factors which are not always
consistent with the contracting line ministry’s R & D objectives. These non-R &
D factors include the need to provide for regional equity in the awarding of
contracts and in the fiscal support for contracts. The importance of regional
equity to MTI

can be seen in the SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy Report which

emphasizes the regional distribution of industrial R Sc D expenditures and R Sc
D contracts. The report shows that the distribution of contracted Naira (Nigerian
Currency) already allows for equitable regional dispersion (Central Bank Report,
1995).
The second important area in which the department’s managerial
responsibilities affect the contracting line ministries relates to their response to
the SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy. The four federal ministries responded differently
to SAP/Make-or-Buy, given the level of perceived conflict between their mandates
and the policy. Moreover, in ministries such as Energy, Mines and Resources,
and Agriculture the perceived loss of control over the location of R & D appears
only to have intensified their resistance. Rather than undergoing the rigorous
process of justifying the need for a particular contract with industry and
potentially running the risk of not acquiring what was contracted for, the
ministries have rather chosen to spend so-called "new" R & D money on the
expansion of existing facilities and programs. When challenged, they used the
argument that they were simply continuing projects that were on-going at the time
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the policy was created. They assert that the new R & D money was actually
authorized money for on-going projects and does not have to be contracted out.
Evaluation Role of the Ministiy of Science and Technology (MOST)
Under the Make-or-Buy Polity, the Ministry of Science and Technology
(MOST) has the responsibility for determining the overall effectiveness and
consequences of the polity and for reporting the results of its findings to the
Armed- Forces Ruling Council. The interview with the Director-General of
MOST (August 3, 1995) revealed that, unlike the Ministry of Trade and Industry
which has more of an operational function, MOST is responsible for the
evaluation of SAP/Make-or-Buy following its implementation.
Consistent with its evaluation role, MOST periodically reviews the
contracting-out process to ensure that the Make-or-Buy criteria are being
followed. In addition, the contracting line ministries are required to maintain the
various records designed in consultation with MOST to facilitate the evaluation
of the effectiveness and consequences of the polity. Ministries are also required
to produce the records for the specific cases of R & D contracting out which
MOST selects for detailed review. Finally, in circumstances where the contracting
out of a particular R & D requirement necessitates consultation among the
various contracting line ministries, it is MOST’s responsibility to act as the
"instrument" for calling together an inter-ministry grouping.
Inherent in MOST’s evaluation role is a large measure of supervisory
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responsibility over the contracting-out process, and in two important ways, this
supervisory function is seen as unjustified by the contracting line ministries. First,
the ministries contend that they are better suited to evaluate their own responses
to the Make-or-Buy requirement to contract out since they are the ultimate users
of the R & D performed by industry. Second, as a completely new agency,
MOST lacks the kind of research credibility and status which would generate
respect from scientific establishments within the contracting ministry and agency.
As a result of the objections to MOST’s central position, the contracting
line ministries tend to seek ways of satisfying their R & D requirements which
limit MOST’s evaluation function. For example, in 1993 the Ministry of Energy,
Mines and Resources tried to acquire additional funding in order to expand its
existing in-house R & D facilities. MOST considered that the R & D to be
performed within the new larger complex qualified as new money and should be
contracted out. The Ministry of Energy, Mines and Resources argued

its

proposal did not constitute a significant expansion of its existing R & D functions,
only of the facilities for performing them. Ministerial R&D funds therefore, were
not new money and should not be contracted out

The ministry lost the

argument, however and it was forced to abandon its request for funds to build its
new research complex.
MOST faces several other problems in evaluating the SAP/Make-or-Buy
Polity. First the policy exaggerates potential grounds for conflict. While the
SAP/Make-or-Buy guidelines permit R & D to be performed in-house when the
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research relates to a regulatory function of government, the guidelines also
assume that such R & D is a minor activity. This is not an accurate assumption.
R & D that is related to regulation is a growing activity and there may be more
support for more in-house research may be needed rather than that intended by
the SAP/Make-or-Buy polity.
Another problem faced by MOST in evaluating Make-or-Buy relates to the
form in which the contracting-out data are maintained by MTI. The Ministry of
Trade and Industry maintains only aggregate data. It cannot be ascertained from
these data how much new money was available for contracting-out purposes in
any fiscal year, nor how much of that new money was actually contracted out.
Therefore, the total volume of funds reported to have been contracted out by the
contracting line ministries, with the approval of MTI during the period under
study, cannot be used as an accurate measure of the performance of SAP/Makecr-Buy. Nonetheless, it appears accurate enough when comparing ministerial
compliance with the policy. A major problem with the data is that unsolicited
funds are included when calculating total contract figures. These funds represent
a form of bridge financing and are meant to be very short-term. They do not
necessarily reflect a serious commitment to the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy by the
contracting line ministries and agencies. Therefore, although bridge financing
inevitably increases the total volume of contract funds, its inclusion in the larger
sum presents an additional problem for MOST in the evaluation of Make-or-Buy.
Another problem confronting MOST in the evaluation of Make-or-Buy
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relates to the availability of criteria for determining whether contract increments
of one year should continue to be contracted out in subsequent years. The
SAP/Make-or-Buy Evaluation Report points out that increments of one year do
not become part of the intra-mural base during the next. However, the report
does not tell us how the Government can determine whether this is the case.
Therefore, one is inclined to conclude that given all the above MOST cannot
fulfill its function.
Finally, MOST is faced with a problem relating to the concession granted
in the policy guidelines which permits R & D related to regulatory activities to be
performed in-house.

A sound analysis of SAP/Make-or-Buy requires an

assessment of the major objective of contracting out new R & D to industry as
well as the lesser objective of maintaining adequate research capability in-house.
MOST’s basic problem lies in determining what emphasis should be accorded this
lesser objective which is in direct competition with the policy’s main objective.
While recognizing the limitations of some of the data provided to MOST or
generated by MOST, it nevertheless is important to report the following financial
data for the four contracting line ministries.
Financial Data
The Ministry of Science and Technology Report was published in Nov
ember 1994 by the Industrial Branch of the Ministry (Central Bank of Nigeria,
1995). The report is an evaluation of the SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy and includes
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data for the period 1987-1994. These data cover the period of implementation
which precedes the time period (1994-5) during which the interviews described
above were conducted. Three tables have been developed from the report, with
additional data provided by Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Finance
and Economic Development and the Central Bank for inclusion in this study.
Table 5 and 6 show the mission-oriented R & D contracts and funds
awarded by the Ministry of Trade and Industry for the period 1987 to 1994 on
behalf the four contracting line ministries under study. The data in Table 5
reveals that in 1987, the Ministry of Agriculture awarded no contracts nor funds
to the private sector. It began to do so in 1989 and by 1994 had awarded 13
contracts including 3 in 1994.

The Ministry of Energy, Mines and Resources

contracted-out a total of 84 R&D contracts for the eight years under study. In
1987, it awarded six contracts; the number was increased to 14 the following year,
but decreased to 10 and 8 in the subsequent three years. In 1992 and 1993, the
ministry increased its R&D contracts to 12 and 15, respectively, however, the
number decreased to 11 in 1994. The Ministry of Communications awarded a
fairly higher number of R&D contracts when compared with the above mentioned
ministries, namely 351 over the eight year period. It awarded 47 in 1987, 53 in
1989 and 31 in 1990. Between 1991 and 1993 the ministry maintained a constant
43 R&D contract awards each year, however, it increased the number of contracts
awarded to 50 in 1994. The Ministry of Defense awarded, the greatest number
of R&D contracts, a total of 412 contracts between 1987 and 1994. In each year
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except 1987 and 1991, they awarded the largest number of contracts of the four
ministries studied.
Table 5
Number of Private Sector R & D Contracts Awarded
by the Four Ministries Under Study
Ministry

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

1992

1993

1994 total

Agriculture

0

0

2

2

2

0

4

3

13

Energy, Mines
& Resources 6

14

10

8

8

12

15

11

84

Communi-cations

47

53

31

41

43

43

43

50

351

Defense

45

67

45

48

39

52

60

56

412

Sources: Data provided by the Ministry of Science and Technology, and Central
Bank of Nigeria, Lagos, 1995.
The money spent on R&D contracts by the Ministry of Agriculture as
reported in Table 6 ranges from N131,000 in 1989 to N618 million in 1994, and
for a total of N941.98 million for the eight years. The Ministry of Energy, Mines
for definitive conclusions regarding the compliance of the agencies with the
and Resources spent a total of N555.1 million on R&D contracts for the eight
years. It spent N2.8 million in 1987 and increased its spending gradually to
N233.2 million in 1994. The Ministry of Defense spent N178.1 million in 1987
and increased the amount to N199.1 million in 1988. In 1989 and 1990 the
amount decreased to N 162.5 and N152 million, respectively.
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Table 6
Funds Contracted Out to the Private Sector by Federal Ministries
and Estimates of Total R&D Budget of Each Ministry Under
Study for the Period 1987*1994 (N. in millions)
Ministry

1987
N.

%

1988
N.

%

1989
N.

%

1990
N.

* Agriculture
** R&D Budget

0
442

0

0
659

.131
0 733.2

92.7
0 598.2

* Energy, Mines
& Resources
** R&D Budget

2.8
508

4.6
1 766.3

4.6
1 834.7

28.1
903.9
1

• Defense
** R&D Budget

178.1
272

299.1
65 502.4

*Communtcation
'* R&D Budget

125.3
343

233.1
37 468.3

%

1991
N.

%

1992
N.

%

1993
N.

%

1994 %
N.

Total
N.

618
1178 52

941.98
6377.1 15

%

.152
1000

190
0 942.3

41
20 824.4

40.1
3 628.1

120.4
6 540.1

121.3
22 1223

233.2
10 2320 10

262.5
60 538.8

152
536.4
49 524.7 29 877.7

696.7
61 696.7

736.9
100 1036

939
1402 67

3800.7
5850.3 65

141.2
50 287.8

451.8
50 456.9

803.2
77 849.3

814
95 903.2

672.5
90 1070 63

3586.4
4830.3 74

15

349.3
99 451.8

5

71

555.1
7724.1

7

Source: Financial data calculated from data provided by Science Center, Ministry of Trade and Industry; Federal Ministry of Finance
and Economic Development, and Central Bank of Nigeria, Lagos, 1995.
Note in 1987 the Exchange Rate was SI = N5.50. In 1993-1996 $1 = N22.
In 1994 the Ministry of Agriculture contracted out 42% of its R&D budget to supply fertilizer and agro-chemicals to farmers.
* Contracted out R&D funds.
* * Total R&D budget.
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The Defense Ministry, began to increase its spending beginning in 1991 and by
1994 had spent a total of N3600.7 million on R&D contracts over the eight years.
The Ministry of Communications spent a total of N3486.4 million on R & D
contracts between 1987 and 1994. Ministry of Communication spending increased
steadily from 1987 to 1994 but experienced a slight decrease in 1991 and again
in 1994.
From Table 6 it can be seen that all the ministries tended to increase the
volume of R & D funds which they contracted out over the eight year period.
These data also show the amount of money available for R & D purposes in the
budget of each ministry from which the contracts were awarded. However, it
does not reveal how these funds were allocated between in-house and extra-mural
(contracted out) research. Therefore, caution is necessary in using these data to
when arguing compliance with the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy. It is important to
note that the number of contracts and the amount of money may reflect
opportunity, i.e., availability of grant monies, and little more. The Ministries of
Defense and Communications budgets for R&D were lower than those of the
Ministries of Agriculture and Energy, Mines and Resources yet they awarded
more contracts than the latter. Therefore, using these data alone does not allow
SAP/Make-or-Buy policy. The increases in number of contracts and monies
awarded, however, appear to be substantial for all of the ministries over the eight
year period of implementation.
There are several other criticisms which can be made of the report itself.
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The first of these criticisms relates to the way in which unsolicited funds are
represented. The report acknowledges that the data compiled about the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy reflects salary increases and may not represent a growth in
funds allocated by the Federal Government for R&D purposes. The report does
not stress that the figures may also include unsolicited funds which represent a
form of bridge financing and are not provided on a long-term basis.
The report also contends that:
. . . ministries maintain the contracting funds from year to year for
that purpose, and that they contract in-house during the next year
(MOST Report, 1987)
The report does not say however, how the Government knows or can tell when
a new R & D project which had been approved in the B-Budget and contracted
out in another year, continues to be contracted out in subsequent years when it
is not new, but has become part of the A-Budget. Finally, the report attempts to
evaluate adequate in-house capability as a policy objective but does so only in a
very narrow way. For example, in the report, the in-house capability required of
a ministry seems to be only minimally sufficient to administer and evaluate R&D
contracts with the private sector, not to perform research.
This is a very narrow definition of what in-house capability means, because
what is needed in some ministries is the capability not just to manage contracts,
but to actually do the research in areas where the research is mandated by the
policy, and cannot be contracted out to a party being regulated. Thus, the report
does not contemplate the possibility that some ministries with growing regulatory
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responsibilities will have good reasons, within the intent and scope of the
SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy, to increase the proportion of their in-house research
and the capability to perform it.
From the foregoing analysis, it can be seen that there are several
shortcomings in the total data published on the SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy in the
MOST Report. These shortcomings present severe difficulties for the analysis of
the actual (not just the reported) response to the policy by the contracting line
federal ministries charged with the policy’s implementation. In order to identify
accurately the ministries which did not support the policy in practice, it is
necessary to know the proportion of R & D contracts they awarded each year
from the total annual federal government contracts.
Using the most detailed data provided by MOST for each ministry’s
number of contracts awarded yearly, an attempt has been made to calculate such
a percentage. These data are presented in Table 7. The percentages have been
calculated for all ministries charged with the implementation of the policy, not
just the four that are of concern to this research. The data in Table 7 reveal that
in 1987 and 1988, the Ministry of Agriculture did not award any contracts, how
ever, the Ministry of Communication did. The latter awarded 45.4 percent in
1987 and 40.1 percent in 1988, of the total R & D contracts awarded by the
Federal Government of Nigeria.
Similarly, the Ministry of Defense awarded 20.7 percent in 1987 and 17.3
percent in 1988. The Ministry of Energy, Mines and Resources awarded 5.6
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Table 7
Percentage by Ministry of the Number of R & D Contracts Awarded
by the Federal Government Ministries - Based on Rate of
Support for the SAP/Make-or-Buy Polity Each Year
Under Study 1987-1994
#

Ministries

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

1.

Agriculture

0

0

0.04

2

12

1.2

12

2. Communi
cations 45.4

40.1

38.2

34.8

353

34.0

34.0

35.0

3. Defence 20.7

173

193

25.2

25.2

263

26.0

25.0

4. Energy, Mines
& Resources

5.6

7.7

4.4

53

5.0

43

4.8

4.0

5. Environment

13

4.1

4.6

5.2

5.0

5.0

5.0

5.2

6. Transport

143

16.5

12.2

16.7

16.0

18.0

183

20.2

7. Nat. Research
Council 8.2

10.9

11.9

10.2

10.0

9.3

9.0

103

8. Others

3.4

9.4

2.4

7.1

13

1.8

0.9

4.5

1992 1993 1994
12

Source: Derived from data provided by the Ministry of Science and Technology,
Lagos, Nigeria.
percent in 1987 and 7.7 percent in 1988. This trend of R & D contract awards
continued until 1994. In 1994, the Ministry of Agriculture awarded only 1.2
percent of the total R & D contracts for that year. The Ministry of Energy,
Mines and Resources recorded a 4.0 percent award. The Ministry of Agriculture
and the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Resources jointly awarded a total of 5.2
percent of all the R & D contracts awarded in 1994. These figures indicate
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continued low support for the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy.

The Ministry of

Communications awarded 35 percent of R & D contracts in 1994, while the
Ministry of Defense awarded 25 percent of the total contracts that same year.
Jointly, they awarded a total of 60 percent of all the R & D contracts awarded by
the Federal Government of Nigeria in 1994. The numerical profile of the
Ministry of Communication and the Ministry of Defense reveals stronger support
for the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy.
Interpretation of the Financial Data
One of the research questions asks what the financial data reveals about
the implementation of the policy and whether implementation is related to a
perception of conflict or minimal conflict by the different ministries, The data in
Tables 5 and 6 show that the Ministries of Communications and Defense awarded
a large number of R&D contracts and a considerable sum of money. In Table
6 for example, the R&D contracts that the Ministry of Defense awarded out of
its total R&D budget range from 65 percent in 1987 to 100 percent in 1992. It
awarded another 71 percent in 1993 and 67 percent in 1994. For the eight years
under study, the ministry contracted out an average of 65 percent of its R&D
funds to the private sector. The Ministry of Communication also awarded
between 37 percent and 99 percent of its R&D budget to the private sector.
However, the average R&D fund contracted out during the eight years under
study represented 74 percent of its total R&D budget over the period.
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In contrast, the Ministries of Agriculture and Energy, Mines and Resources
awarded relatively few contracts and monies. The Ministry of Agriculture for
example, awarded to the private sector out of its R&D budget between zero
percent in 1987 and 20 percent in 1992. The output of crops such as maize and
groundnut within the area covered by this project declined by 43.5 percent
(Central Bank Report, 1995). There was however, a sudden increase to 52
percent in 1994. This increase in 1994 was not due to the ministry’s support for
the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy, but rather a result of diverting 42 percent of the
R&D budget to supply fertilizer and agro-chemicals to farmers. The increase in
funding did not however, have a positive impact on all the activities of the
ministry. The average R&D budget funds contracted out by the Ministry of
Agriculture over the eight years period under study, howver, was 15 percent. The
Ministry of Energy, Mines and Resources contracted out between one percent in
1987 and 22 percent of its R&D budget in 1992. The average funds contracted
out in 1993 and 1994 droped to 10 percent. For the eight years under study, its
average R&D budget contracted out to the private sector was only 7 percent.
When the results of the interviews are compared with the financial data, a pattern
emerges that is presented in Table 8. The Ministries of Communications and
Defense perceived minimal conflict between their mandates and the policy and
contracted out a substantial number of R&D projects and money. In other
words, these particular ministries tended to support the policy verbally, and also
contracted out a substantial amount of their R & D work to the private sector.
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The Ministries of Agriculture and Energy, Mines and Resources and the
Ministry of Communications, perceiving greater conflict between the policy and
their mandates, contracted out relatively less R & D . The financial data and the
percentage of contracts awarded reveal that the Ministries of Agriculture and
Energy, Mines and Resources demonstrated minimal support for the policy both
in attitude and deed. By comparing the interview results and financial data, it can
be tentatively concluded that the behavior of the Ministry of Agriculture and
Energy, Mines and Resources upholds the original prediction about the degree
of policy resistance or support. The interview results show that these ministries
were less likely to respond positively to the policy, and, although there has been
some improvement over time, the relatively small amount of R & D contracted
is consistent with the interview results. From the above analysis of the interview
results and the financial data, it is reasonable to conclude that qualified support
exists for the observation that federal ministries responded differently to the
SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy, depending upon the degree of conflict perceived
between their individual mandates and the SAP/Make-or-Buy requirement to
contract out.
We are left to explore whether the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy resulted in the
development of new technology and whether the economy improved following its
enactment. It appears that the policy has not stimulated Nigerian companies to
develop technologies that are appropriate for Nigeria. Since 1986, when the
policy was announced, corporate R&D has increased by only 20 percent, i.e.,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

238
Table 8
Pattern of Ministerial Responses to the SAP/Make-or-Buy
Policy in Terms of Interview and Financial Data

Ministry

Support in
Interview and
Data

Agriculture

X

Defense

X

Communications

X

Energy, Nines
and 'Resources

Npn-Support in
Interview and
naf-a

X

Technology Development and the Performance of the Economy
After Nine Years of SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy
from 3.3 percent of the corporate budget in 1986 to 3.96 in 1994. The public and
private sectors remain dependent upon imported technology. Nevertheless, those
firms that have been able to find local substitutes for imported raw materials have
performed better under the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy than those still heavily
dependent on imports. It also is interesting to note that firms benefiting most
from the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy have been small, highly specialized serviceoriented, and Nigerian owned. SAP/Make-or-Buy policy has had little impact on
the primary target of the policy, that is the major industrial producers.
While some large companies, especially in the manufacturing sector, have
taken advantage of the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy, many more have not.
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SAP/Make-or-Buy therefore cannot be judged a success. The poor performance
of SAP/Make-or-Buy policy has been blamed on several factors, among which are
inadequate infrastructure (e.g., roads, communications), lack of executive
leadership capacity, poor utilization of available manpower, and the absence of
a supportive technological base. The creation of contracts and the transfer of
substantial amounts of money to the private sector have not produced the desired
indigenous technology.

Earlier neglect of the private sector, civil war and

sustained political instability, as well as the almost total dependence on petroleum
exports, are some of the principal elements contributing to the unhealthy state of
Nigeria’s economy. SAP/Make-or-Buy policy was slated to transcend some of
these problems, but it is a minor element in the larger Nigerian picture, and there
is little indication of economic improvement in the first ten years of its implemen
tation.
The Central Bank reports a decline in industrial production in the years
following the introduction of the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy.

The aggregate

index of industrial production dropped 22.8 percent in the fourth quarter of 1995
(1985 being 100%). Similarly, declines of 5.0 and 5.1 percent were recorded in
1992 and 1993, respectively. The contraction in industrial production is traced
to the manufacturing and mining sub-sectors where output fell by 8.2 and 9.8
percent in 1994 and in the first quarter of 1995. This decline was also observed
in the third quarter of 1995 when the index fell by 15.7 percent owing largely to
sustained political crisis in Nigeria and the resulting difficulty in accessing foreign
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exchange for the import of raw materials and

m a c h in e ry

spare parts (Central

Bank of Nigeria, 1995).
The poor performance of the manufacturing sub-sector was confirmed by
a 1995 nation-wide survey conducted by the Central Bank of Nigeria. This survey
covered 509 manufacturing establishments in 29 industrial groups, with a response
rate of 61.3 percent. The survey showed that the average rate of capacity
utilization in the manufacturing industry fell from 37.2 percent in 1993 to 30.4 in
1995.

Five manufacturing sub-groups operated above 50 percent capacity

utilization, namely, beer (54.3%), wood and cork products (51.1%), soft drinks
(50%) and soap and perfumes (50%). Eight others operated above 30 percent.
They are: textile (46.6%), cement and cement products (45%), plastic products
(42%), drugs and medicine (41%), tires and tubes (32%), vegetable and grain
milling (30.5%), fabricated metal products (30%) and bakery products (30%). All
the other groups operated at less than 30 percent of their installed capacity.
These were structural metal products (24%), paints (23.8%), basic metal products
(23%), paper products (23%), printing and publishing (23%) miscellaneous food
preparation (26.5%), roofing sheets (21%), radio, television and electrical
equipment (18%), sugar and confectionery (17.5%), auto vehicle assembly (15%),
and glass products (8%) (Central Bank Report, 1995).
Expenditure on research and development (R&D) by private sector
corporations fell 0.9 percent in 1993 and 26.6 percent in 1994, from 100 percent
in 1985. As in previous years, the expenditure on R&D continued to account for
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a fraction (1.7 percent) of total investment expenditure. Performance of R & D
enterprises deteriorated further at the end of 1995 reflecting a decline in the
levels of output and low overall capacity utilization rates. Interviews conducted
in ten companies reveal that the continued devaluation of the Naira caused the
cost of imported materials to rise by 229 percent between 1987 and 1995.
Similarly, the cost of locally produced raw materials rose by 96 percent in the
same time period. In a climate in which borrowing has become exorbitant, many
private manufacturers in Nigeria And themselves unable to compete for loans or
pay for the foreign exchange needed to bring in foreign products. Moreover, they
are unable to reorganize their production techniques, or even cover their basic
overhead costs.
The inflation cycle poses still another problem for manufacturers of basic
commodities who do not enjoy a large domestic market. Producers who manage
to remain in business in spite of the high cost of production, nevertheless, face a
situation in which the market for their products diminishes by the day. Conse
quently, many manufacturers are forced to stock pile their surplus goods in costly
warehouses.
Table 9 shows the annual capacity utilization of ten Nigerian companies.
These companies were expected to be the major source of technology develop
ment in Nigeria. However, their capacity utilization records do not indicate any
progress in the role they are expected to play in national economic growth.
In 1990 the Delta Steel Company utilization capacity fell from 100 to 8.9
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Table 9
Annual Capacity Utilization in Percentages, for Ten Nigerian
Companies for 1990, 1993, and 1995
Name of Company

Annual Capacity Utilization (%)
1990 1993 %Diff.
1995 %Diff.

Delta Steel Company

8.9

13.2

Ajakuta Steel Company

0

0

Nigerian Refineries

80.2

31.0

Nigerian Machine Tools Limited 10.0

8.0

Nigerian Paper Mills Limited

11.9

12.8

Nigerian Newsprint Mfg. Comp.

12.8

Nigerian Sugar Company

71.0

West African Cement Comp.

68.5

Nigerian Cement Company

23.0

Nigerian Marble Mining Co.

16.6

18.2

37.9

0

0

-61.3

65.5

111.3

-20

10.0

25

7.6

3.5

-72.7

13.3

3.9

3.63

-72.7

43.3

-39

58.0

33.9

1.9

64.0

-8.30

19.0

-17.4

12.0

-36.8

16.6

0

7.9

-52.4

69.8

48.3
0

Source: Interview 1995. Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report, 1995, pp.81-98.
percent. Its capacity increased from 8.9 percent in 1990 to 13.2 percent in 1993.
This represent a 48.3 percent increase from 1990. The capacity utilization for the
company increased by 37.9 percent in 1995 from 13.2 percent in 1993. The Ajakuta Steel Company which has been under construction since 1975, is yet to start
production. The three Nigerian Refineries produced at a total of 80.2 percent
of their capacity in 1990. The level of utilization dropped by 61.3 percent in 1993.
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However, it increased a little bit from 31 percent in 1993 to 65.5 percent in 1995.
This shows a utilization increase of 1113 percent in 1995. The Nigerian Machine
Tools Company manufacturing capacity dropped from 10 percent in 1990 to 8
percent in 1993. It however, increased production by 25 percent in 1995.
Other companies such as the Nigerian Paper Mills Limited increased its
utilization capacity from 11.9 percent in 1990 to 12.8 percent in 1993. Its
production capacity however, decreased by 72.7 percent in 1995 from 12.8 percent
in 1993. Similarly, the Nigerian Newsprint Manufacturing Company production
capacity dropped from 100 percent installation capacity to 12.8 percent in 1990,
increased to 13.3 percent in 1993, and decreased to 3.63 percent in 1995. The
Nigerian Sugar Company continued to produce at a fairly higher rate of 71
percent until 1990. Its production capacity however, decreased to 43.3 percent
in 1993. In 1995, the company utilization capacity increased by 33.9 percent from
its 43.3 percent level in 1993. The West African Poland Cement Company
maintained a capacity utilization of 68.5 percent in 1990,69.8 percent in 1993, and
decreased to 64 percent in 1995. The decrease in 1995 represents a negative 8.30
percent of 1993 rate. Nigerian Cement Company capacity utilization dropped
from 100 percent in the early 1980s to 23 percent in 1990. The company further
decreased its capacity utilization by minus 17.4 percent in 1993. In 1995, its
capacity utilization dropped further to 12 percent.

The trend of capacity

utilization of the Nigerian Marble Mining Company is similar to those of the
other companies mentioned above. Its manufacturing installed capacity decreased
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from 100 percent in 1979 to 16.6 percent in 1990. The company continued to
maintained the 16.6 percent utilization capacity till 1993, before a further decrease
to 7.9 percent in 1995.
The poor performance of these important companies after nine years of
the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy demonstrate that co-ordination and control from the
top is difficult to achieve in large and complex organizations. The Nigerian
Military Government created a policy but it could not guarantee that implementa
tion would follow a direct path. It even modified the policy in 1987 and again in
1989. Such modifications were in response to obstacles in its implementation
phase. Moreover, a procedure for managing unsolicited science and technology
proposals from the private sector was developed.

In 1989 the policy was

expanded again, this time, to cover ongoing R & D and related activities in the
natural and social science fields of urban, regional and transportation studies
(Government Report, 1990).
MOST and MTT continue to play their respective roles in the coordination
and administration of the SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy, but their powers remain
limited and circumscribed. They can not force the Ministry of Agriculture, or the
Ministry of Energy, Mines and Resources to develop specific contracts or allocate
funds in ways that they determine to be more effective. The data in fact, reveals
considerable dissatisfaction with MOST and MTI, given their attempts at
interfering with the work ways of the different ministries. By and large both were
judged impediments not facilitator in the work of the ministries. The weakness
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identified in MOST and MTI, dramatize the weakness in the SAP/Make-or-Buy
policy. Moreover, in the context of Nigeria’s economic plight, sustained conflict
between the military junta and the professional administrators describes a
decision-making process that is ill-equipped to address national problems.
Economic decline and dislocation can only in part be attributed to
ineffective implementation of the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy. What would have
been the likely result had the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy been fully implemented
as the military expected? Interview findings indicate that few economic benefits
would have resulted. Nigeria has experienced frequent breakdowns of equipment
and plant closings; the country continues to experience protracted industrial
unrest, especially among the oil workers. Nigeria also suffers from low utilization
of ready equipment, from foreign exchange constraints, from the high cost of
industrial operations, and above all, from political instability. Thus, one can
conclude that the ministries were pursuing not only their own interests, but the
larger public interests of Nigeria by resisting or opposing an unrealistic policy that
had been policy dictated from above with little or no consultation.
Nigeria in the 1990s remains an underdeveloped, dependent, and
technologically backward country (Ake, 1995; Ihonvbere, 1994). Only when
compared with the other nations of sub-Saharan Africa, does Nigeria appear to
be developing.

Viewed from a global perspective, Nigeria has made little

progress in improving its economy. Foreign interests continue their domination
in most economic sectors, while Nigerian society struggles to overcome its divisive
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self-defeating behavior.
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CHAPTER IX
OBSERVATIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Introduction
This study is an examination of decision-making and decision-implementation between the army junta and federal bureaucracy in Nigeria. The overall
process is illustrated by Nigeria’s SAP/Make-or-Buy policy, and the difficulties
encountered when the federal ministries responded differently, often adversely,
to its implementation. As background, the study has traced Nigeria’s problems
with political development, and especially the roles played by the nation’s military
rulers and higher bureaucrats since the country gained its freedom from British
colonialism.
The research for this study centered on four of Nigeria’s federal ministries.
These were: the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Communications, the
Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Resources. A
substantial segment of Nigeria’s SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy was made the
responsibility of these ministries, and it was they that had responsibility for its
implementation.

SAP/Make-or-Buy was intended to salvage the national

economy, but it failed, in part, because the bureaucracies that were charged with
the policy’s implementation were more inclined to protect their own more limited
247
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institutional interests. The apparent conflict between the army junta and the
higher bureaucracy was a consequence of the former’s decision not to confide in
key ministerial administrators, and the bureaucracy’s instinctive need to secure its
position when the policy seemed to threaten a reduction in their power and
influence. In the absence of a coordinated and cooperative effort at the apex of
government, the Nigerian economy continued to deteriorate. No less significant,
the failure of the SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy also added to the turmoil and
uncertainties in the Nigerian political scene.
Compared to development trends in Indonesia, where since the 1970s the
military government has persued economic growth with a concern for socio
economic equity, Nigeria has thus fallen far short of its goals.

Indonesia’s

development is a function of reasonably successful national integration, and the
resulting political stability has enabled it to build workable institutions. Coopera
tion between the army high command and Indonesian economic manag
ers/technocrats contrasts with the relatively poor relationship between the
Nigerian military junta and the country’s higher bureaucrats. Since 1983, Ghana
also has been moving in a positive direction with its structural adjustment,
agricultural, and trade policies.

Nevertheless, there has been little progress in

reforming state run enterprises, nor in the financial sector where corruption
affects efforts at improving government operations. Reform in these sectors is
particularly difficult because of powerful vested interests that are a consequence
of government intervention.

Most policymakers in Ghana, unlike Nigeria,
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however, agree on what needs to be done.
Nigeria is thus a prime example of divisiveness and maladministration, and
hence of political and socio-economic disarray. Nigeria has experienced coups,
counter-coups, ethnic riots, civil war, religious disturbances, and political upheaval
since attaining independence in October 1960, and its future appears to rest with
its civil-military leaders, who retain a monopoly of power, and who have yet to
demonstrate they can successfully pool their talents for national development.
Political Instability
The on-going political instability in Nigeria is a reflection of the form and
character of the institutions ! system British imperialism imposed on the country.
The colonial system included an army to maintain law and order, and a
bureaucratic apparatus to administer and manage the colony. The colonial
authority also enhanced transportation and communications within and between
the different regions in order to facilitate their extraction of the colony’s minerals
and agricultural commodities. As a by-product of their rule, the British also
encouraged Christian missionaries to proselytize among the native population.
The conversion of some tribes to Christianity and the resistance demonstrated by
others, notably the Muslims, however, intensified rivalries between them, and
heightened concerns that the British would look more favorably on one group as
against another.
Ethnic and tribal conflict intensified as a consequence of perceived
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preferential treatment, which was also fed by competition for scarce resources and
amenities. Exclusivity flourished in circumstances where one region and one tribal
or ethnic order appeared to gain higher power over the other, or where individual
tribes believed it necessary to secure their domains by constructing organizations
that ruled out the inclusion of non-tribal members. Such was the case in Ibo
Union, the Yoruba Self-Help Association, the Ibibio Welfare Union, or the
Urhobo Progressive Union. Each tribal group and each region in which they were
located sought to profit themselves at the expense of their neighbors, thus
increasing the difficulty of building a common all-embracing national identity.
Most important, two of the principal groupings, the Ibo and the Hausa-Fulani
developed sharp rivalries that were strengthened by both ethnic and religious
differences.
The Ibo had readily accepted Christianity and thus had taken advantage
of British educational opportunities. On the other hand, the Hausa-Fulani were
staunch practicing Muslims who avoided European pedagogy. Each, however,
assumed their superiority over the other, with the Ibos flaunting their material
success and the Hausa-Fulani citing their greater independence and coherence as
a self-contained political entity. It was not unusual therefore that during the
period of British colonial rule, the Ibos and the Yorubas would take to adminis
tration and commerce, whereas the Hausa-Fulani would be more inclined to join
the army. Furthermore, colonial administrative centers were more likely found
in the coastal regions inhabited by the Ibos, Yorubas, Ibibios and Urhobos, while
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the hinterland and northern Hausa-Fulani were often outside the range of major
economic and social activity. Indeed the northern marchlands were more readily
used for the positioning of military outposts, cantonments and army training
facilities.
When the colonial authority departed Nigeria little had been done to
bridge the differences between the country's approximately 2S0 tribes and
ethnicities. The political system that was supposed to sustain the country in its
developing years had been hastily improvised and in no way met the challenges
represented by a diverse humanity, espousing different values, traditions, and
practices. Nor were Nigeria’s political leaders up to the task of transforming the
colonial legacy into a coherent national political experience. Burdened by a
federal model they only marginally understood, the politicians who had received
the transfer of power were more inclined to promote their regional and ethnic
interests, and they diverted attention from the tasks of becoming national.
At independence Nigeria was divided into three constituent units, a
northern region with a population larger than the other two combined, and with
eastern and western regions that were more commercially developed, and hence
enjoying greater access to external markets and interests. Regional and tribal
rivalries cut across political, economic, and social issues, and the inability of
leadership to adequately respond to the challenge of a nascent federalism
increased tensions and divisiveness. Less than ten years after independence,
Nigeria was plunged into a civil war that destroyed the First Republic and caused
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the army to intervene in the political life of the nation. Together with the
professional bureaucracy, the civil-military elites sustained the federal union but
they were not about to restore civilian government. Determined to rectify what
they deemed to be a hopelessly divided nation, Nigeria's new rulers sought
national unify in administrative changes that promoted the breakup of the original
three provinces into more, and still more states. Moreover, the total number of
36 states in 1996, may not yet be the end of the process. This fragmentation of
the Nigerian polity aims at diluting the rivalries between the many ethnicities and
tribes, but this essentially administrative reform must still demonstrate that it can
promote overall national consciousness and unify.
In spite of the decentralized governmental experiences, regional tensions
persist, and national solidarity remains an elusive objective. A common Nigerian
political culture is a long way from realization. Moreover, the little confidence
that the people of Nigeria have had in the national enterprise has been further
undermined by the men in uniform who have perpetuated their control of the
state. Faced with repeated coups d’etat and counter-coups, the military elites are
themselves too immersed in regional and ethnic politics. Moreover, they cannot
convince a skeptical people that their purposes are anything more than selfserving exercises. Furthermore, the more the public dramatizes its dissatisfaction
with military rule, the more the afrny junta is likely to repress debate and punish
dissenters. In circumstances where the free expression of ideas, where public
criticism is denied, progressive, programmatic policy-making that is focused on the
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well-being of the general population is made impossible. Nigeria may have been
secured by the civil-military power that dominates it, but the Nigerian people have
paid a high price for their coerced union.
Economic Problems
Political underdevelopment and protracted instability correlates with
economic and social backwardness (Almond and Powell 1978; Huntington, 1968).
Political uncertainties have produced multidimensional economic problems that
range from a weak production base to a stark absence of adequate technology,
from high rates of unemployment and inflation to an over-dependence on
petroleum sales, from a declining agricultural scene to an increasing need for
imported raw materials and spare parts for aging machinery, to an ever increasing
foreign debt, to the maladministration of the public treasury. Confronted with
multiple economic crises the Armed Forces Ruling Council was compelled to
adopt many of the 1986 recommendations made by the International Monetary
Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for a
structural adjustment program that centered on Make-or-Buy policies. Make-orBuy was but one of several structural re-adjustment programs but it was
nevertheless among the most noteworthy.
The international bodies concerned with supporting developmental
programs in third world nations were adamant on the need for change in Lagos.
Citing Nigeria’s enlarging deficits and distorted financial markets, the external
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agencies pressured the ruling junta to accept a reform program that was bound
to cause a negative reaction, notably for this study, from the entrenched
bureaucracy. Moreover, knowing that the reforms would not be well received, the
junta decided not to consult the ministries that were made responsible for their
implementation. Thus, on the one side the junta acknowledged a grave problem
and yielded to foreign pressure, albeit after a public debate that insisted on
rejecting the international proposals; but on the other, it antagonized and
threatened the very administrative institutions responsible for the structural
adjustment policy’s successful execution. The fragile nature of Nigeria’s political
system more or less guaranteed that the Make-or-Buy policy would not be
implemented as originally planned. Nor would the policy have the necessary
effect on an economy already in deep trouble.
When General Ibrahim Babangida introduced the SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy
he seemed to believe that his authoritarian role alone guaranteed its swift and
total implementation.

Given his wishes, let alone his decision, he did not

anticipate resistance from the higher officers in the federal ministries. But so it
was resisted, and so too the SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy failed in its implementation
stage. Babangida had not consulted his key administrators, he had not shown the
necessary confidence in their managerial capacities, and he failed to demonstrate
flexibility in gaining consensus for the projected structural adjustments that the
policy required. If indeed the objective was the unifying of the public and private
sectors, the promotion of an expanded private investment arena and the
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curtailment of public corporate activity, far more attention had to be given to
joint enterprises and cooperative ventures. But there was little if any effort at
brokering an understanding between the private and public sectors, and the
essential instability of the ruling junta meant that there would be less cooperation,
minimum compliance, and hence even greater instability.
It is important to note, however, that of the four ministries studied, the
Ministries of Defense and Communications supported the polity and implemented
it in accordance with junta directives. They contracted out 65 and 75 percent of
their R&D budget to the private sector in each of the eight years for which data
is available. The Ministries of Agriculture and Energy, Mines and Resources,
however, disapproved of the polity and were reluctant to follow orders. Their
views of their individual mandates, along with their conventional operating
procedures, hindered the full implementation of the SAP/Make-or-Buy polity.
These ministries spent between seven and fifteen percent of their R&D budget
on contracts with private sector corporations. Inter-ministry feuding was another
reason for this demonstration of non-compliance. The opposed ministries were
disturbed by the powers conferred on Ministry of Science and Technology
(MOST) and Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) whose functions involved
coordinating the implementation of the polity.

The opposition ministries

envisaged a loss of funding and hence a loss in some power and influence. MOST
and MTI, however, were perceived gaining in authority and mission, and it was
only by proclaiming the sustained importance of their individual mandates that
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they expected to ward off the demands to their new mandate. Although the
nation’s debt crisis, called for compliance with IMF and World Bank demands,
and experienced economists, and management groups also urged implementation
of Make-or-Buy, the interview results reveal that none of these external pressures
influenced the opposed ministries. All data shows the ministries looked internally
and within their organizations in justifying their non-compliance.
This study demonstrates that policy making in Nigeria does not end once
a decision is made by the ruling junta. The implementation of the SAP/Make-orBuy policy by the Nigerian federal bureaucrats had just as great an impact on
policy outputs as the decision-making of the military government. The financial
data for this study, the primary measurement of policy output available, varied
among the agencies. The Defense and Communications ministries negotiated
numerous contracts (65-74 percent of their R&D budget) involving substantial
sums of money during all eight years of the policy studied. By contrast, the
Ministries of Agriculture and Energy, Mines and Resources negotiated a few (7-15
percent of their R&D budget) contracts involving small sums of money. Outputs
and implementation was due to the degree of support or lack of support for the
policy by the individual ministries, each with its self-stated goals and programs,
and in-house R & D . Hence, the institutional relationship between the military
junta and the higher bureaucrats affected the implementation of SAP/Make-orBuy policy.
Our research reveals that since 1986 when the policy was enacted,
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corporate R & D increased by 20 percent from 33 percent in 1986 to 3.96
percent in 1994 (Dike, 1994). The absence of strong R & D activities in both the
private and public sectors tends to perpetuate technology dependence as well as
imported manufactures and commodities. In general, those firms that have been
able to find local substitutes for imported raw materials have performed better
under the SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy than those that are heavily dependent on
imports.

The problem of Nigeria’s under-utilization of industrial capacity

continues to be a major dilemma.

Industrial capacity utilization has varied

between 10 and 80 percent and many companies have ceased operations as a
result of their inability to procure the necessary imported resources and spare
parts. The Nigerian firms which have benefitted most from the policy, have been
small, highly specialized and service-oriented.
Military and Bureaucracy
Nigeria’s military juntas have had as their central purpose the restoration
of public order, and the promotion of economic development. Far from being a
cohesive, united, corrective force, however, the Nigeria military reflected all the
ethnic and social tensions which have plagued the country since independence.
Nevertheless, the most intense disorder and the higher incidence of unrest came
when the country was led by civilian regimes. The military’s justification for the
exercise of political power was its declared capacity to eliminate corruption and
preserve law and order. But under military rule, although relative stability was
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improved, the Gowon, Babangida and Abacha regimes allowed corruption to
increase and It was more widespread and more flagrant than during the brief
periods of civilian government. Thus, the declared corrective intentions of the
military regimes in the first period (1966-79), as well as the more recent military
governments under Buhari, Babangida and Abacha are little more than empty
phrasings.
The problems of corruption, the ever increasing incidence of robbery and
brigandage, the frequent industrial strikes, the miserable performance of the
economy, the high inflation, the uneven development of the country, the low
modernization, and sustained inter-ethnic rivalry have led to the paralysis of the
military government. This confirms Henry Bienen’s (1970) observation that the
military lacks the wisdom, skills, training and mind-set for social and economic
development. The military rules in an arbitrary manner, perhaps even more so
than during the British colonial administration.
Interviews conducted in 1995 among key military officers, federal public
servants, and development program coordinators, show a most inequitable
distribution of resources and opportunities, but sustained dependence on the
higher public bureaucracy. It is the latter’s advice and counsel that is needed in
the making of public policy. Here again, the colonial legacy is most pronounced.
But in spite of the bureaucracy’s continuing importance, it suffers from poor
education, a lack of ethical training, and a high degree of formalism and
impersonality. Moreover, the bureaucracy is a culturally oriented institution that
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is burdened by the pressures of ethnicity, insistent on the maintenance of quotas,
and too easily given to personal expression, to self-pleading, and opportunistic
bargaining.
The civil service reform of 1988 introduced more professionalism and
accountability, but corruption has persisted. Moreover, the creation of still more
states caused a rapid growth in the administrative services, and recruitment into
the public bureaucracy has followed the principle of federal supremacy. A
substantial effort was made to enlist personnel with an understanding of
development administration. But the junta did not follow through in implement
ing these reforms. Given its tendency to reduce the role of the bureaucrats, the
army junta failed to understand how administrators assist the government in
identifying and carrying out appropriate development policies, how they can be
used to stimulate economic growth, promote social equity, strengthen public
sector management, and generally improve international operations. Moreover,
the military administration, under the influence of the IMF and World Bank,
bypassed development administration and promoted the work of the private
sector. Thus neither professionalism nor development administration has received
the necessary support from the central authorities. The undermining of the civil
service tradition was another cost of the AFRC’s general structural adjustment
policies and the SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy.
The fact that successive military juntas have continued to divide and
subdivide the country into more and more administrative states/zones may give
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them more opportunity to thwart secessionist movements, but the process also
multiplies over and again the number of untrained, inexperienced and easily
corrupted bureaucrats at the lower level. It is difficult to see political development in such circumstances. The more centralizing military elites also appear to
have created a situation where the decentralized, less professional bureaucrats in
the different states enjoy significant advantages over the administrators who man
the federal ministries. Does this help to explain the frequent coups, and counter
coups, the changes at the top of the ruling juntas and the clash of interests
between the junta and higher bureaucracy in the federal ministries? In other
words, Nigeria’s tribal/ethnic problems are not resolved by dividing the country
into 36 states. To the contrary, we see a confused army high command, as well
as a higher federal bureaucracy that is increasingly more insecure, in fact so
insecure that it is given to considerable inter as well as intra-organizational
conflict. Effective decision-making is only possible in conditions that promote
cooperation between the military and higher bureaucracy in Nigeria, but such
cooperation has diminished markedly. The Nigerian situation indicates a break
down in civil-military decision-making, and hence a repeated failures in achieving
stated national goals.
Continuing Dependence on External Technology and Raw Materials
Finally Nigerian private sector firms did not generate the anticipated new
technologies promised by the SAP/Make-or-Buy Polity. Nigeria continues its
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dependence on external technology and raw materials. Structural adjustment was
supposed to reduce Nigeria's external debt and redress its payment imbalance.
But the drain on its external foreign exchange reserves continues, and its foreign
debt grows with the steady importation o f foreign-made equipment and spare
parts, as well as raw materials. Therefore, the country’s economic problems
remain and conditions can only worsen. Nigeria will still be in search of a
technology that utilizes locally available resources, and produces products that
satisfy domestic need well into the twenty-first century.
It is noteworthy that the structural adjustment program over-turned almost
two decades of indegenization and self-reliance programs in other areas of the
Nigerian economy. SAP/Make-or-Buy is still a comparatively new policy but its
adequacy, is open to question, especially with regard to the negligible impact it
has had on the country’s private sector firms. Presumably, the private sector
firms, which through their manufacturers association constituted one of the forces
behind the detailed strategy for the resolution of Nigeria’s technological problems,
have already received a significant portion of the estimated $250 million of R &
D contracted out by government ministries and agencies. This research reveals
that the four ministries studied awarded R & D contracts amounting to $163.67
million to private firms. These firms had convinced government of their ability
both to create employment and to put Nigeria in the forefront of new technology.
Presumably also, the military policy-makers believed these objectives were
attainable. But the realization that these firms are not delivering either jobs or
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new technologies leads one to question how well the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy is
being implemented or whether there is too much "slippage" between the intent
of the policy and its actual output.
Related to the m atter of "slippage" between policy intent and policy output
are the reasons underlying two important modification to the SAP/Make-or-Buy
Policy in 1987 and 1989. The first of these modifications was tied to ministerial
budgets that had already been set. Therefore, the need existed to provide interim
financing while the ministries and agencies geared their budgets to accommodate
the contracting out requirements of the policy. Similarly, in 1989 the policy was
expanded to cover ongoing R & D and related studies in the natural sciences, as
well as an urban, regional and transportation topics. This later modification to
the policy was supposed to encourage an expansion of funding for contracting out
purposes.
Implications
The implications of this study for the Nigerian government can be summa
rized as follows: First, governments should not introduce policies which may not
be implemented or maintained, no matter how attractive these policies are in
principle. Second, policies which are working should not be changed no matter
how costly they may seem in terms of resource mis-allocation. Finally, in choosing
among policies, priority should be given to those that enhance the stability of the
overall policy environment.
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Although the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy recognizes three of the four
elements in any public policy (i.e, goals, means and constraints), the true picture
cannot emerge if the fourth element is not analyzed. This fourth element pertains
to the roles and power of the policy implementors or bureaucrats. In Nigeria,
policy touching upon the development of technology is made at the level of the
Armed Forces Ruling Council. Unfortunately, however, it is not whether good
policies are formulated, or even whether the means are provided for the
fulfillment of these policies, but whether the policy is implemented, poorly
implemented, or not implemented at all.
The core element of the SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy therefore lies in its
implementation. For any policy measure to be successful in Nigeria, there is
typically one or more government ministries or agencies whose duty it is to
formulate in minute detail the modalities required in attaining the goals of the
policy. Such a ministry or agency must necessarily be staffed by experienced
bureaucrats. It is also essential that those who are to be involved in policy
implementation should be included in deliberations before the policy is
established. Involvement at the planning stage of a policy generates consensus
among those involved in its implementation. It can be argued that without this
spirit of participation among implementors, the policy will be judged an
imposition, and hence resisted.
In order to avoid the possible problems that are most likely to arise during
implementation, there is often the need to give the bureaucrats a role in
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modifying aspects of the policy. Such powers should be exercised discretely, but
in such a way that displays confidence in bureaucratic decision-making. It was the
contention of the bureaucrats in the ministries studied that the absence of
discretionary powers was a major reason for the failure of the SAP/Make-or-Buy
Policy.
It is clear, the objectives of the SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy have not been
achieved. Moreover, certain policy measures that were introduced such as the
policy guidelines, were not developed with the ministerial consultation they
required. Nevertheless the policy did heighten awareness of the need for new
indigenous technology, even if it is still awaited. Coherent political organization,
bureaucratic competence and national decision-making are essential requirements
of all national development programs but genuine progress is not likely to emerge
in Nigeria until the military junta retires to the barracks and new self-governing
institutions are erected over a political system anchored in democratic practices.
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ECONOMC
INDICATORS

Population: 88.51m as of 26-30 No
vember 1991 census.
Population density: 95.8 inhabitants
per square kilometre at 30 November
1991.
Population growth: Projected 28%
per annum in 1989-2000 (World Bank).
Population structure by age: 46.4%
of a t Nigerians were under the age of
15 years in 1990 (WB).
Urbanisation: 6.42% of the total popu
lation fived in Lagos state in 199! (1991
census).
life expectancy at birth: 52 years as
of 1990 (WB).
Adult literacy: 51% of males and 39%
of females were literate in 1990 (WB).

NIGERIA
1993: NI8.45*$1 &N3226-E1 on 6
Apr! I992;N2S*$1 atthelntor-8ar*
Foreign Exchange Market (FEM) in
first week of Apri 1993;N43«$1 onparalel market h Apr! 1993;N16j99-$1 S.
N29j99«£1 otfidai average for tie year
1992; N981 «$1 average far 1991;
N8.04«$1 average for I990:N7J7-$1
average far 1989.
In tlatian: 46% in December 1992:50%

h Apri 1993 (government e s lmaie):
65%in Apri 1933 (barking sources).

$5.03bn suipkis before otfiba! trans
fers. $S.I3bn supius afterofficial trans
fers in 1990 (WB). Overall-$I.52bn
deficit in 1991 (IMF); $1 JMbn supius in
1990 (IMF).
Net workers'remittances: $ 14m out
flow in 1990 (WB).
Grass International reserves:
$4.13bnin 1990 (WB).

Structure at production: Industry38%
fmckjcSng manufactoring at 7%). agricul
ture 36%, services 2S% in 1990 (WB).

Forward Import co v er Numberof
months' worth of imports that foreign
reserves can caver. S.t months in De
cember 1990 (WB).

Exports: $128Sbn I. o.b. it 1991
(IMF):$l387bnin 1990 (WB).

Total foreign debt: $27JS6bn at 31 De
cember 1992 (Central Bankof Nigeria).

Imports: $ 78 fb n f.o.b . it 1991 (IMF);
SS89bn in 1990 (WB).

GOP: $34.76bn in 1990:55J8bn in
1965 (WB).

Trade balance: $4.44bn vtsfale supius
in 1991 (IMF): $788bnvtsble surplus
in 1990 (WB).

GDP growth: 1.4% annual average in
1980-90.6.0% annual average in
1965^80 (WB).

Terms of bade: index (1987=100) 100
in 1990 (WB).

GUP per capita: $404 in 1990 (AS esti
mate); Wbrld Bank's 1990 estimate of
$290 is based on an overestimated
population figure of 115.5m.

Principal exports: Fuels &minerals
97%. other primary commodffies 2% in
1990 (WB).

Monetary unit: Naira, divided into 100
kobo.

Principal Imports: Machinery & trans
port equipment 44%. other manufac
tures 37%. lood 16%. otier primary
commodities 2%. fuel 1%in 1990 (WB).

Exchange rates: N2S.22=St &
N37.89=£1 on 1 September 1993:
N3T792=$t & N48.54=£t on S April

Balance of payments: Current ac
count- Sl2bn surplus in 1991 (IMF):

Oebt-sendce ratio: Oebt-service pay
ments as a percentage of export earn
ings. 203% in 1990 (WB).
Principal crops: Production in 1990 cassava 26.6m tonnes, yams 22m t. m llel 4m L sorghum 4m L paddy rice 1.9m
L maize I-83m L pulses 1.46m L sugar
cane t.4m Looooyams 13m t. plan
tains t .26m t. groundnuts in shed
U7mt(FAO).
Main trading partners: Principal sup
pliers UK &Germany, principal efient
USA.
Official development assistance:
5262m in 1991 (0.8% of GNP. $2.60
per capita): 5250m in 1990; $346m in
1989:5120m in 1988:$69min 1987:
5S9m n t986:St.03bn in I98S (WB).

Source: Nigeria Country Report 1995. Walden Publishing Limited.
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Structural Adiustment/Make-or-Buv Policy Survey Questionnaire
Please respond to each item by checking all the statements you believe to be true
for your Ministry/Organization.
1.

What are your main professional goals?
— To become rich
— Contribute to national development programs
— Become head of your organization
— Others

2.

Can Research and Development help Nigerian industries to grow?
— Definitely True
— Partially True
— False

3.

Do you like the involvement of the private sector in the process of
improving technology in the country?
— Strongly Agree
— Agree
— Disagree

4.

Would you like to use your position to help develop Nigeria?
— Yes
— Undecided
— No

5.

Is your ministry/agency’s decisions normally influenced by ethnic loyalty?
— Yes
Partially
---- Never

6.

Do your organization perform any in house R&D projects?
— Yes
— No

7.

How many contracts do you award every year?
— 500 - 1000
— 100-500
— Less than 100
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8.

Are any of the contracts you award related to R & D?
— Yes
— No

9.

Do you support the SAP/R&D policy of the government?
— Yes
— Undecided
— No

10.

Is there any conflict between the objectives of the SAP/R&D policy and
those of your ministry?
— Strong conflict
— Partial conflict
— Undecided
— Others

11.

What is the relationship between your ministry/organization and the
military juntas?
— Very good
— Partially good
— Not good
— Others

12.

Do you think that SAP has had an impact on Nigeria economy?
— Strongly Agree
— Agree
— Disagree
— Strongly Disagree

13.

Would you like to see any changes made on the SAP/R&D Make-or-Buy
polity?
— Strongly Agree
— Agree
— Disagree
— Strongly Disagree

14.

Would those changes in the policy make any difference in your
organization?
— Yes
— Undecided
— No
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15.

Do you have any problems implementing the SAP/R&D policy in your
ministry/agency?
— Yes
— No
— Others

16.

Do you consider costs and benefits in decision making in your ministry or
organization?
— Yes
— No

17.

What are the most appropriate technologies for Nigeria? (Please chech
more than one).
' — Agricultural and raw material process
— Import and Export investment
— Petroleum Product Technology
— Indigenous mineral resources technology
— Reseaech and Development of all local resources
— Awarding contracts to the private sector

18.

Must all government policies conform with your ministry’s standard
operation procedure?
— Yes
— Partially conform
— No

19. Do you consider funding to be a major problem in implementing this policy
in your ministry or organization?
— Definitely True
— Partially True
— Partially False
— Definitely False
20.

How often do bureaucratic negotiations take place between senior officers
of your ministry, and other ministries or organizations?
— Definitely Often
— Partially Often
— Disinterested
— Definitely Never
Thank you for your help!
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Kalamazoo. M crtgw 49006-3899
616 387-8293

Human Subjects Institutional Review Board

W E S T E R N MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY

Date: January 23. 1995
To:

Robert Dibie

From: Richard Wright. Interim Ch
Re:

HSIRB Project 1lumber 95-01-14

This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project entitled “Structural
adjustment/make-oc-buy development policy. An evaluation of public policy in Nigeria" has been
approved under the exempt category of review by the Human Subjects Institutional Review
Board. The conditions and duration of this approval are specified in the Policies of Western
Michigan University. You may now begin to implement the research as described in the
application.
Please note that you must seek specific approval for any changes in
design. You must also
seek reapproval if the project extends beyond the termination dace. In addition if there are any
unanticipated adverse or unanticipated events associated with the conduct of this research, you
should immediately suspend the project and contact the*Chair of the HSIRB for consultation.
The Board wishes you success in the pursuit of your research goals.
Approval Termination:
xc:

January 25. 1996

Ziring. PSCI
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